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8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turner, Albert Jamesgreen1 sentence2024Id. at 424–25. 9 Based on the circumstances of McCoy and the Supreme Court’s language concerning “express statements,” our Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “a defendant cannot simply remain silent before and during trial and raise a McCoy complaint for the first time after trial.” Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d 250, 276 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Grangergreen2 sentences1999See Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993). .The dissenting opinion in Stephens also answers the prosecutorial overreaching-requiring-the-prosecution-to-be-punished argument that some like to make in cases like this. 1999See Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). [7] The dissenting opinion in Stephens also answers the prosecutorial overreaching-requiring-the-prosecution-to-be-punished argument that some like to make in cases like this. | 1 | 1 |
Green International, Inc. v. Solisgreen1 sentence1998The court decided that this clause did not “constitute the type of extraordinary risk-shifting found in Dresser.” Id. at 387. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2024Distinguishing a prior decision in which the Court decided that a defense lawyer is free to concede guilt when his client is informed of this proposed strategy but neither consents nor objects (Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004)), the Court held that when the defendant makes “express statements” of his desire to maintain his innocence, his lawyer must oblige. 2024Id. at 424–25. 9 Based on the circumstances of McCoy and the Supreme Court’s language concerning “express statements,” our Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “a defendant cannot simply remain silent before and during trial and raise a McCoy complaint for the first time after trial.” Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d 250, 276 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ex Parte Bagley
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 337 . 2008Id. at 337 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander
green
1 sentence2003In examining the case law, the court decided that a requirement to pool, a requirement to provide compensatory royalties, and a requirement to release the lease were legal not factual questions. (10) The district court primarily relied on Amoco to conclude that only two factual issues existed for a petroleum engineer expert witness: (1) whether substantial drainage occurred and, (2) if so, whether a reasonably prudent operator could have drilled an offset well with a reasonable expectation of profit. 622 S.W.2d at 568 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Drew v. State
green
2 sentences1994I draw more support for my argument that Graham's claim is not suitable for state habeas from this Court's previous discussions of the nature of a claim of "newly discovered evidence." In Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), this Court decided that a claim of newly discovered evidence will prevail only if, "The materiality of the evidence is such as would probably bring about a different result in another trial." Drew v. State , at 226; and cases cited therein. 1994I would hold they are not properly advanced in state habeas proceedings. • I draw more support for my argument that Graham’s claim is not suitable for state habe-as from this Court’s previous discussions of the nature of a claim of “newly discovered evidence.” In Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), this Court decided that a claim of newly discovered evidence will prevail only if, “The materiality of the evidence is such as would probably bring about a different result in another trial.” Drew v. State, at 226; and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Stanley Durka
green
2 sentences1993In United States v. Durka, 490 F.2d 478 (1973), the Court held that a federal district court had jurisdiction “to enter an order affecting the defendant’s property rights despite the passage of three months from the rendition of judgment and defendant’s discharge.” There, the court decided that the rule announced in “18 U.S.C.A. § 3006 A vests in the district court broad authority to issue such an order.” Further, that court observed that three months was not an “unreasonable” length of time. 1993In United States v. Durka, 490 F.2d 478 (1973), the Court held that a federal district court had jurisdiction "to enter an order affecting the defendant's property rights despite the passage of three months from the rendition of judgment and defendant's discharge." There, the court decided that the rule announced in " 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006 A vests in the district court broad authority to issue such an order." Further, that court observed that three months was not an "unreasonable" length of time. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hernandez v. State
green
1 sentence1989Id. at 617 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.