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8 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1924–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whittington v. City of Austingreen2 sentences2011With regard to condemnation generally, a governmental entity may prevail on an eminent domain claim only if the condemnation is for a “public use.” Whittington v. City of Austin (“Whittington I”), 174 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied). 2011With regard to condemnation generally, a governmental entity may prevail on an eminent domain claim only if the condemnation is for a “public use.” Whittington v. City of Austin (“Whittington I”) , 174 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tex. App. — Austin 2005, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
City of Carrollton v. Singergreen2 sentences2010On appeal, the Singers argued that the “City is not immune from suit in this instance because the agreement between the parties was, in essence, a settlement of an eminent domain claim, for which the City has no immunity by virtue of the Texas Constitution.” Id. at 795 . 2010He voiced several concerns with the majority’s conclusion that the “City exposed itself to suit by ‘its threat of eminent domain proceedings,’ and that the parties’ agreement settled an eminent domain claim in which ‘the Singers would have a claim against the City for adequate compensation.’” Id. at 802 . | 1 | 3 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2010See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). 5 ECOM maintains that its pleadings establish that the easement agreement is actually a settlement of an eminent domain claim. 2009Conservation Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied)). 4 … See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; Singer, 232 S.W.3d at 795 . 5 … See Bland Indep. | 1 | 2 |
Travis County v. Pelzel & Associates, Inc.red1 sentence2010See Singer, 232 S.W.3d at 803 (Cayce, C.J., dissenting); see also Travis County v. Pelzel & Assocs., 77 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex. 2002) (“[A] governmental entity does not waive immunity from suit simply by contracting with a private party.”). not be reached.” We must take ECOM’s pleadings as true. | 1 | 1 |
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsettgreen1 sentence2010See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005) (“In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.”); see also Weingarten, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (Deed contained language evidencing an intent to settle and avoid eminent domain proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Weingarten Realty Investors v. Albertson's, Inc.green1 sentence2010See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005) (“In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.”); see also Weingarten, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (Deed contained language evidencing an intent to settle and avoid eminent domain proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commissiongreen1 sentence2009Conservation Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied)). 4 … See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; Singer, 232 S.W.3d at 795 . 5 … See Bland Indep. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas a & M University-Kingsville v. Lawson
green
2 sentences2007The question we must answer is whether, by contracting with the Singers to perform certain improvements in exchange for their deed of a portion of their property for the City's use as a roadway, the City entered into a settlement agreement of an eminent domain claim, thereby submitting to the trial court's jurisdiction under the Texas Constitution and the reasoning of Texas A & M University-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex.2002). 2007The question we must answer is whether, by contracting with the Singers to perform certain improvements in exchange for their deed of a portion of their property for the City’s use as a roadway, the City entered into a settlement agreement of an eminent domain claim, thereby submitting to the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Texas Constitution and the reasoning of Texas A & M University-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex.2002). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009Analysis In a single issue, the Trust asserts that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over its declaratory judgment action because the parties entered an agreement settling an eminent domain claim for which TxDOT’s immunity from suit was waived and, therefore, TxDOT’s immunity is likewise waived for the 3 … See State v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 50 , 53–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Tex. Natural Res. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Tooke v. City of Mexia
green
2 sentences2007When the supreme court held that section 51.075 alone does not waive a city's immunity from suit, id. at 342-43 , the Singers amended their petition, asserting that the City did not have immunity from suit under the Texas Constitution and A & M because its contract with the Singers was, in essence, a settlement agreement of an eminent domain claim. 2007When the supreme court held that section 51.075 alone does not waive a city’s immunity from suit, id. at 342-43 , the Singers amended their petition, asserting that the City did not have immunity from suit under the Texas Constitution and A & M because its contract with the Singers was, in essence, a settlement agreement of an eminent domain claim. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hart v. Village of Adams
green
2 sentences1924Where it becomes necessary to invade private property, it must be done with the consent of the owner or under the doctrine of eminent domain. * * * Neither can the city, in the exercise of its corporate powers, interfere with the rights of the owner over his property, nor with his personal rights where it is not necessary to do so for the public benefit." (Italics ours.) Hart v. Adams, 140 A.D. 663 , 125 N.Y.S. 652 : "If the owner of private property will not consent to the use of his property for drainage purposes, the municipality must resort to legal proceedings to acquire such right." See, 1924Where it becomes necessary to invade private property, it must be done with the consent of the owner or under the doctrine of eminent domain. * * * Neither can the city, in the exercise of its corporate powers, interfere with the rights of the owner over his property, nor with his personal rights where it is not necessary to do so for the public benefit." (Italics ours.) Hart v. Adams, 140 A.D. 663 , 125 N.Y.S. 652 : "If the owner of private property will not consent to the use of his property for drainage purposes, the municipality must resort to legal proceedings to acquire such right." See, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.