Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing System, Inc.green2 sentences1987See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-624 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695-697 (1977). 1987See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-624 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695-697 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
City of Hawthorne v. Peeblesgreen2 sentences1979It conflicts with the well established eminent domain rule that “ ‘necessity does not signify impossibility of [maintaining] the improvement . . . without taking the land in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.’ ” (Italics added, City of Hawthorne v. Peebles (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 758, 763 [ 333 P.2d 442 ]; Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Brandon (1894) 103 Cal. 384 [ 37 P. 484 ]; see also 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (rev. 3d ed. 1975) § 4.11[3], pp. 4-179 to 4-199; Legislative Com. com. (1975) Code Civ. 1979It conflicts with the well established eminent domain rule that “ ‘necessity does not signify impossibility of [maintaining] the improvement . . . without taking the land in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.’ ” (Italics added, City of Hawthorne v. Peebles (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 758, 763 [ 333 P.2d 442 ]; Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Brandon (1894) 103 Cal. 384 [ 37 P. 484 ]; see also 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (rev. 3d ed. 1975) § 4.11[3], pp. 4-179 to 4-199; Legislative Com. com. (1975) Code Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Bacich v. Board of Controlgreen2 sentences1962Justice Edmonds, in his concurring opinion in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 358-359 [ 144 P.2d 818 ], observes: “In considering this problem, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. ’ ’ Justice Traynor, concurr 1962Justice Edmonds, in his concurring opinion in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 358-359 [ 144 P.2d 818 ], observes: “In considering this problem, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. ’ ’ Justice Traynor, concurr | 1 | 1 |
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Districtgreen2 sentences1962Justice Edmonds, in his concurring opinion in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 358-359 [ 144 P.2d 818 ], observes: “In considering this problem, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. ’ ’ Justice Traynor, concurr 1962Justice Edmonds, in his concurring opinion in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 358-359 [ 144 P.2d 818 ], observes: “In considering this problem, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. ’ ’ Justice Traynor, concurr | 1 | 1 |
O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Districtgreen2 sentences1943(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P. 2d 1 ]; O’Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63 [ 119 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, since such factors may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the staty, it is apparent that the difference in market value before and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining recoverable compensation. 1943(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P. 2d 1 ]; O’Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63 [ 119 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, since such factors may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the staty, it is apparent that the difference in market value before and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining recoverable compensation. | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1943(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P. 2d 1 ]; O’Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63 [ 119 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, since such factors may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the staty, it is apparent that the difference in market value before and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining recoverable compensation. 1943(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 24 [ 119 P. 2d 1 ]; O’Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63 [ 119 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, since such factors may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the staty, it is apparent that the difference in market value before and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining recoverable compensation. | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahongreen2 sentences1943In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 [ 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 ]: “Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law [as the Pennsylvania statute under consideration forbidding the mining of coal within 150 feet of the improved property of another].... 1943In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 [ 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 ]: “Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law [as the Pennsylvania statute under consideration forbidding the mining of coal within 150 feet of the improved property of another].... | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1943So the question depends upon the particular facts.” The court recognized that the question as to when compensation is required to be made for a diminution in value of private property under the eminent domain clause cannot be disposed of by general propositions; the problem is one “of degree.” (p. 416.) Also this court, in Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ], held that the diminution in value of land occasioned by a public improvement diverting the main flow of traffic from in front of the premises is noncomp ensable. 1943So the question depends upon the particular facts.” The court recognized that the question as to when compensation is required to be made for a diminution in value of private property under the eminent domain clause cannot be disposed of by general propositions; the problem is one “of degree.” (p. 416.) Also this court, in Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [ 123 P.2d 505 ], held that the diminution in value of land occasioned by a public improvement diverting the main flow of traffic from in front of the premises is noncomp ensable. | 1 | 1 |
State of California v. Marin Municipal Water Dist.green2 sentences1943Dist., 17 Cal.2d 699, 706 [ 111 P.2d 651 ].) In considering this problem!, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. 1943Dist., 17 Cal.2d 699, 706 [ 111 P.2d 651 ].) In considering this problem!, the court must weigh the relative interests of the public and the individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of its function for the public good, while at the same time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental power. | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. San Diego Electric Railway Co.green2 sentences1943Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [ 280 P. 109 ]; Town of Windsor v. Whitney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 [ 100 So. 147 , 33 A.L.R. 682 ]; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p. 1006.) Thus, if, in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interest affected by the improvement which results in a diminution in the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clause of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the improvement as a “damaging” of the land; since the 1943Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [ 280 P. 109 ]; Town of Windsor v. Whitney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 [ 100 So. 147 , 33 A.L.R. 682 ]; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p. 1006.) Thus, if, in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interest affected by the improvement which results in a diminution in the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clause of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the improvement as a “damaging” of the land; since the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ayon
green
1 sentence2026In that case, plaintiff supermarket owners brought an eminent domain challenge related to proposed construction that would impair one of the two entrances to their adjacent customer parking lot. ( Ayon, supra, 54 Cal.2d at pp. 220–223.) The California Supreme Court explained “[t]emporary injury resulting from actual construction of public 3 Defendants contend it is unclear which plaintiff(s) have appealed here because the opening appellate brief uses the term “appellant” in its singular form and does not reference McKee. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Agins v. City of Tiburon
green
1 sentence1987(Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 278 .) And that determination was later upheld by the United States Supreme Court: “The State Supreme Court correctly rejected the contention that the municipality’s good-faith planning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so burdened the appellants’ enjoyment of their property as to constitute a taking. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rialto Irrigating District v. Brandon
green
2 sentences1979It conflicts with the well established eminent domain rule that “ ‘necessity does not signify impossibility of [maintaining] the improvement . . . without taking the land in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.’ ” (Italics added, City of Hawthorne v. Peebles (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 758, 763 [ 333 P.2d 442 ]; Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Brandon (1894) 103 Cal. 384 [ 37 P. 484 ]; see also 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (rev. 3d ed. 1975) § 4.11[3], pp. 4-179 to 4-199; Legislative Com. com. (1975) Code Civ. 1979It conflicts with the well established eminent domain rule that “ ‘necessity does not signify impossibility of [maintaining] the improvement . . . without taking the land in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.’ ” (Italics added, City of Hawthorne v. Peebles (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 758, 763 [ 333 P.2d 442 ]; Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Brandon (1894) 103 Cal. 384 [ 37 P. 484 ]; see also 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (rev. 3d ed. 1975) § 4.11[3], pp. 4-179 to 4-199; Legislative Com. com. (1975) Code Civ. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis
green
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
People v. Ricciardi
green
2 sentences1943(See, for example, the discussion of the distinction between impairment of view by a private individual and by a proper highway improvement, in my dissenting opinion in People v. Ricciardi, post, p. 390 [ 144 P.2d 799 ].) The factors to be considered are, on the one hand, the magnitude of the damage to the owner of the land, and, on the other, the desirability and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the danger that the granting of compensation will tend to retard or prevent it. 1943(See, for example, the discussion of the distinction between impairment of view by a private individual and by a proper highway improvement, in my dissenting opinion in People v. Ricciardi, post, p. 390 [ 144 P.2d 799 ].) The factors to be considered are, on the one hand, the magnitude of the damage to the owner of the land, and, on the other, the desirability and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the danger that the granting of compensation will tend to retard or prevent it. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Meyer v. Richards
green
2 sentences1943Although an interference with the abutting owner's right of access in one direction only, but leaving a less convenient means of egress in another direction, has been held not to be a taking of private property within the prohibition of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [ 19 S.Ct. 106 , 41 L.Ed. 199 ]), a majority of the courts which have considered the right of a property owner to damages, under the eminent domain clause of the jurisdiction, for being placed in a cul-de-sac have allowed recovery to those in t 1943Although an interference with the abutting owner’s right of access in one direction only, but leaving a less convenient means of egress in another direction, has been held not to be a taking of private property within the prohibition of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [ 19 S.Ct. 106 , 41 L.Ed. 199 ]), a majority of the courts which have considered the right of a property owner to damages, under the eminent domain clause of the jurisdiction, for being placed in a cul-de-sac have allowed recovery to those in t | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Meyer v. Richmond
green
2 sentences1943Although an interference with the abutting owner’s right of access in one direction only, but leaving a less convenient means of egress in another direction, has been held not to be a taking of private property within the prohibition of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [ 19 S.Ct. 106 , 41 L.Ed. 199 ]), a majority of the courts which have considered the right of a property owner to damages, under the eminent domain clause of the jurisdiction, for being placed in a cul-de-sac have allowed recovery to those in t 1943Although an interference with the abutting owner’s right of access in one direction only, but leaving a less convenient means of egress in another direction, has been held not to be a taking of private property within the prohibition of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [ 19 S.Ct. 106 , 41 L.Ed. 199 ]), a majority of the courts which have considered the right of a property owner to damages, under the eminent domain clause of the jurisdiction, for being placed in a cul-de-sac have allowed recovery to those in t | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Lowell v. Buffalo County
neutral
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Lowell v. Buffalo County
neutral
1 sentence1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Felton v. State Highway Board
green
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 GaApp. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Burton v. Freund
neutral
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Highbarger v. Milford
green
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
City of Chicago v. Baker
neutral
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 GaApp. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am. 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 GaApp. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Davis v. City of Chicago
neutral
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
City of Chicago v.Burcky
green
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 GaApp. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Coy v. City of Tulsa
neutral
1 sentence1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Maxwell v. City of Miami
green
2 sentences1943Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [ 280 P. 109 ]; Town of Windsor v. Whitney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 [ 100 So. 147 , 33 A.L.R. 682 ]; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p. 1006.) Thus, if, in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interest affected by the improvement which results in a diminution in the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clause of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the improvement as a “damaging” of the land; since the 1943Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [ 280 P. 109 ]; Town of Windsor v. Whitney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 [ 100 So. 147 , 33 A.L.R. 682 ]; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p. 1006.) Thus, if, in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interest affected by the improvement which results in a diminution in the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clause of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the improvement as a “damaging” of the land; since the | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Falender v. Atkins
green
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co.
neutral
2 sentences1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City 1943(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [ 171 S.E. 198 ]; City of Chicago v. Baker, 39 C.C.A. 318 [ 98 F. 830 ]; City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [ 42 N.E. 178 , 49 Am.St.Rep. 142 , 29 L.R.A. 568 ]; Davis v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill.App. 244 [ 8 N.E.2d 378 ]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [ 114 N.E. 965, 967 ]; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [ 80 P. 633 ]; Burton v. Freund, 243 Mich. 679 [ 220 N.W. 672 ]; Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [ 108 N.W. 480 , 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741 ]; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 194 [ 230 N.W. 842 , 242 N.W. 452 ]; Coy v. City | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.