federal laches standard in Texas

2016In 2013, the Texas Court' of Criminal Appeals stated that after it had; in Carrio , “implicitly” adopted “the federal laches standard” of rule 9(a) and federal case law interpreting it, “the State’s [laches] burden has been impossibly high primarily due to the requirement that the State make a particularized showing of prejudice to its ability to respond to the [habeas corpus] application.” Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 212-14 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (citing Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 487-88 ; Ex parte Wolf, 296 S.W.3d 160, 167 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd)).

2014The federal laches standard further limited the type of prejudice the State could show to "prejudice in its ability to respond to the allegations in the petition." Id. at 211-12 (citing Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 488 ; Walters, 21 F.3d at 687 ).

2016In Perez, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that although the Court’s adoption of the federal laches standard “was logically sound at the time, ... events ... since Carrio demand that we abandon that standard in favor of a more equitable approach.” Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 213 .

2016The court also noted that if the State made “its showing of these elements, it [was] then the burden of the petitioner, in federal court, to show either that the state actually ha[d] not been prejudiced or that the petitioner’s delay [was] justified under the rule.” Id. (citing Walters, 21 F.3d at 687 ).- ■In 2013, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that after it had, in Garrió, “implicitly” adopted “the federal laches standard” of rule 9(a) and federal case law interpreting it, “the State’s [laches] burden has been impossibly high primarily due to the requirement that the State make a

2016The court also noted that if the State made “its showing of these elements, it [was] then the burden of the petitioner, in federal court, to show either that the state actually ha[d] not been prejudiced or that the petitioner’s delay [was] justified under the rule.” Id. (citing Walters, 21 F.3d at 687 ).- ■In 2013, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that after it had, in Garrió, “implicitly” adopted “the federal laches standard” of rule 9(a) and federal case law interpreting it, “the State’s [laches] burden has been impossibly high primarily due to the requirement that the State make a

2016The court also noted that if the State made “its showing of these elements, it [was] then the burden of the petitioner, in federal court, to show either that the state actually ha[d] not been prejudiced or that the petitioner’s delay [was] justified under the rule.” Id. (citing Walters, 21 F.3d at 687 ).- ■In 2013, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that after it had, in Garrió, “implicitly” adopted “the federal laches standard” of rule 9(a) and federal case law interpreting it, “the State’s [laches] burden has been impossibly high primarily due to the requirement that the State make a

2013Under the Fifth Circuit interpretation of Federal Rule 9(a), to invoke laches in response to a habeas petition, a state was required to "(1) make a particularized showing of prejudice, (2) show that the prejudice was caused by the petitioner having filed a late petition, and (3) show that the petitioner has not acted with reasonable diligence as a matter of law." Carrio , 992 S.W.2d at 488 (citing Walters , 21 F.3d at 686-87 ). (5) Importantly, the federal laches standard limited the type of prejudice the State could show to "prejudice in its ability to respond to the allegations in the petiti

2013Under the Fifth Circuit interpretation of Federal Rule 9(a), to invoke laches in response to a habeas petition, a state was required to “(1) make a particularized showing of prejudice, (2) show that the prejudice was caused by 'the petitioner having filed a late petition, and (3) show that the petitioner has not acted with reasonable diligence as a matter of law.” Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 488 (citing Walters, 21 F.3d at 686-87 ). 5 Importantly, the federal laches standard limited the type of prejudice the State could show to “prejudice in its ability to respond to the allegations in the petition.

2013See, e.g, Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama , 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman , 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes , 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash , 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). 10.

2013See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir.1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir.1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). .

2013See, e.g, Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama , 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman , 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes , 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash , 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). 10.

2013See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir.1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir.1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). .

2013See, e.g, Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama , 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman , 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes , 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash , 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). 10.

2013See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir.1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir.1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). .

2013See, e.g, Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama , 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman , 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes , 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash , 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). 10.

2013See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir.1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir.1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). .

2013See, e.g, Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama , 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman , 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes , 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash , 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). 10.

2013See, e.g., Bedford v. Attorney General of Alabama, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir.1991) (applying federal laches doctrine, finding no laches after 19-year filing delay); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.1989) (same, regarding 17-year delay); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir.1988) (same, regarding 25-year delay); Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.1984) (same, regarding 23-year delay); Sutton v. Lash, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.1978) (same, regarding 21-year delay). .

2016Because the court concluded that “the federal laches standard” that it had adopted had' proven to be “ineffective at weeding out stale claims in Texas- post-conviction-cases,” it “abandoned] that formulaic standard in favor of the more flexible common-law approach to laches in the post-conviction context.” Id. at 214-15 .

2016In 2013, the Texas Court' of Criminal Appeals stated that after it had; in Carrio , “implicitly” adopted “the federal laches standard” of rule 9(a) and federal case law interpreting it, “the State’s [laches] burden has been impossibly high primarily due to the requirement that the State make a particularized showing of prejudice to its ability to respond to the [habeas corpus] application.” Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 212-14 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (citing Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 487-88 ; Ex parte Wolf, 296 S.W.3d 160, 167 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd)).

2013Federal courts found that, under their restrictive interpretation of Rule 9(a), the State faced an almost impossible burden to establish laches, even when an applicant's delay was "extreme." See, e.g., Smith v. Jones , 256 F.3d 1135 , 1143 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Our decisions indicate that laches rarely applies even where the delay in filing a petition has been extreme"); Rideau v. Whitley , 237 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[L]apses of time that affect the state's ability [to respond], but that do not make it 'virtually impossible' for the state to respond, [do not] require dismissal" for l

2013Federal courts found that, under their restrictive interpretation of Rule 9(a), the State faced an almost impossible burden to establish laches, even when an applicant’s delay was “extreme.” See, e.g., Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 , 1143 n. 8 (11th Cir.2001) (“Our decisions indicate that laches rarely applies even where the delay in filing a petition has been extreme”); Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir.2000) (“[Ljapses of time that affect the state’s ability [to respond], but that do not make it ‘virtually impossible’ for the state to respond, [do not] require dismissal” for lach

2013Federal courts found that, under their restrictive interpretation of Rule 9(a), the State faced an almost impossible burden to establish laches, even when an applicant's delay was "extreme." See, e.g., Smith v. Jones , 256 F.3d 1135 , 1143 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Our decisions indicate that laches rarely applies even where the delay in filing a petition has been extreme"); Rideau v. Whitley , 237 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[L]apses of time that affect the state's ability [to respond], but that do not make it 'virtually impossible' for the state to respond, [do not] require dismissal" for l

2013Federal courts found that, under their restrictive interpretation of Rule 9(a), the State faced an almost impossible burden to establish laches, even when an applicant’s delay was “extreme.” See, e.g., Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 , 1143 n. 8 (11th Cir.2001) (“Our decisions indicate that laches rarely applies even where the delay in filing a petition has been extreme”); Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir.2000) (“[Ljapses of time that affect the state’s ability [to respond], but that do not make it ‘virtually impossible’ for the state to respond, [do not] require dismissal” for lach