Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bookman v. Boltgreen2 sentences2002See Bookman, 881 S.W.2d at 776 . 2002See Bookman , 881 S.W.2d at 776 . | 2 | 2 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodred2 sentences2009As a result, the FRSA preempts [a] state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at [a] crossing were inadequate.”); Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670-671 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 ("In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary [of Transportation] has determined [in 23 C.F.R. § 646.214 (b)(3)-(4) ] the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. 2009As a result, the FRSA preempts [a] state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at [a] crossing were inadequate.”); Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670-671 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 ("In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary [of Transportation] has determined [in 23 C.F.R. § 646.214 (b)(3)-(4) ] the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. | 1 | 3 |
Hester v. CSX Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences1998Contrary to the plurality’s assertion, “[t]he fact that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices legally presupposes that the Secretary approved and authorized the expenditure, which in turn legally presupposes that the Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were adequate to their task.” Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 . 1998Importantly, however, Hester acknowledged that “[o]f course, passive warning devices are not adequate where section 646.214(b)(3) applies,” and that “its seems clear on the facts before us that the applicable provision is section 646.214(b)(4)” because the crossing in question “was a rural crossing and that therefore subsections (A) through (E) of section 646.214(b)(3)(i) were not applicable.” Hester, 61 F.3d at 386 n. 6. 3 In this case, as evidence of the expenditure of federal funds for the installation of warning devices at the 16th Street Crossing, Santa Fe offered, among other things, the | 1 | 1 |
cluster 706077green2 sentences1998Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); see also Elrod 68 F.3d at 244 (holding that “[fjederal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators.”); Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191 (joining the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in finding that the participation of federal funds legally presupposes the Secretary of Transportation’s approval of the type of safety devices installed). 1998Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); see also Elrod, 68 F.3d at 244 (holding that "[f]ederal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators."); Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191 (joining the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in finding that the participation of federal funds legally presupposes the Secretary of Transportation's approval of the type of safety devices installed). | 1 | 1 |
Nancy Armijo, Personal Representative of the Estate of Luz Armijo, Deceased v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Companygreen2 sentences1998Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); see also Elrod 68 F.3d at 244 (holding that “[fjederal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators.”); Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191 (joining the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in finding that the participation of federal funds legally presupposes the Secretary of Transportation’s approval of the type of safety devices installed). 1998Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); see also Elrod, 68 F.3d at 244 (holding that "[f]ederal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators."); Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191 (joining the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in finding that the participation of federal funds legally presupposes the Secretary of Transportation's approval of the type of safety devices installed). | 1 | 1 |
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Lemongreen2 sentences1998R.R. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 514 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d by agmt.) (holding “the only question” relevant to preemption is whether federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices). 1998R.R. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 514 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd by agmt.) (holding "the only question" relevant to preemption is whether federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 39 F.3d 864 , 867 (8th Cir.1994) (stating that replacement of eight-inch lenses in existing flashing lights at railroad crossing with twelve-inch lenses did not constitute the installation of a warning device). 20 . 2005Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc ., 39 F.3d 864 , 867 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that replacement of eight-inch lenses in existing flashing lights at railroad crossing with twelve-inch lenses did not constitute the installation of a warning device). [20] We only analyze these issues as to the tape in question at the Front Street Crossing, not as to all retroreflectorized tape. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Jeter-Millar Company v. Kasch Bros., Inc.
green
1 sentence1973A & S Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Burk, 390 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1965, no writ); Jeter-Millar Company, Inc. v. Kasch Bros., Inc., 466 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1971, no writ); 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 4.11.-5. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
A & S Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Burk
green
1 sentence1973A & S Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Burk, 390 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1965, no writ); Jeter-Millar Company, Inc. v. Kasch Bros., Inc., 466 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1971, no writ); 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 4.11.-5. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.