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8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhausegreen2 sentences2003In Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, the court of appeals held that a counterclaim was compulsory in nature and was improperly severed. 641 S.W.2d 522, 523-26 (Tex.1982). 2003In Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, the court of appeals held that a counterclaim was compulsory in nature and was improperly severed. 641 S.W.2d 522, 523-26 (Tex.1982). | 3 | 3 |
Laney v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 857 (stating that ruling on motion to suppress must be upheld if legally correct even if trial court did not present same basis in its ruling). | 1 | 1 |
In Re CPVYgreen1 sentence2019See In re B.T.D., No. 01-16-00582-CV, 2017 WL 343613 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that, in absence of written motion that complied with rules of procedure, trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied father’s request for continuance); In re G.A.H., No. 02–11–00015–CV, 2011 WL 4711980 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 6, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re C.P.V.Y., 315 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2010, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brabsongreen1 sentence2019On appeal of the grant of a motion to suppress, “[w]e must review the record to determine if there is any valid basis upon which to affirm the [trial] court’s ruling.” Brabson, 899 S.W.2d at 745-46. | 1 | 1 |
Landers v. State Farm Lloydsgreen1 sentence2019See Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hillgreen2 sentences2016Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 6, 8, 10 (holding that officer’s good faith belief that Transportation Code permitted nonconsensual, war-rantless blood draw “is irrelevant” to whether blood-draw results should be suppressed under Fourth Amendment); see State v. Hill, No. 03-13-00834-CR, 484 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 , 2016 WL 690738, at *4 (Tex.App.—Austin Feb. 17,2016, pet. filed) (analyzing Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and holding, like in Tercero , that good-faith exception is limited to good-faith reliance on warrant and, absent issuance of warrant, does not apply)- We turn now to 2016Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 6, 8, 10 (holding that officer’s good faith belief that Transportation Code permitted nonconsensual, war-rantless blood draw “is irrelevant” to whether blood-draw results should be suppressed under Fourth Amendment); see State v. Hill, No. 03-13-00834-CR, 484 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 , 2016 WL 690738, at *4 (Tex.App.—Austin Feb. 17,2016, pet. filed) (analyzing Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and holding, like in Tercero , that good-faith exception is limited to good-faith reliance on warrant and, absent issuance of warrant, does not apply)- We turn now to | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allen Tercerogreen1 sentence2016Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 6, 8, 10 (holding that officer’s good faith belief that Transportation Code permitted nonconsensual, war-rantless blood draw “is irrelevant” to whether blood-draw results should be suppressed under Fourth Amendment); see State v. Hill, No. 03-13-00834-CR, 484 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 , 2016 WL 690738, at *4 (Tex.App.—Austin Feb. 17,2016, pet. filed) (analyzing Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and holding, like in Tercero , that good-faith exception is limited to good-faith reliance on warrant and, absent issuance of warrant, does not apply)- We turn now to | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Arbor Green Owners Ass'n, Inc.green1 sentence2003Id .; see Garcia v. Arbor Green Owners Ass’n , Inc ., 838 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); see also Fluty v. Simmons Co ., 835 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (requiring party to obtain hearing on motion for new trial before complaining trial court abused its discretion by not granting motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law). | 1 | 1 |
Fluty v. Simmons Co.green1 sentence2003Id .; see Garcia v. Arbor Green Owners Ass’n , Inc ., 838 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); see also Fluty v. Simmons Co ., 835 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (requiring party to obtain hearing on motion for new trial before complaining trial court abused its discretion by not granting motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McGuire v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. of New York
green
2 sentences2003Occidental, slip op. at 4, 2003 WL 1799012 , at *2 n. 2. 4 In McGuire, the court citing Rule 41 held that it “is not necessary to determine whether or not the McGuire claim was, in fact, a compulsory counterclaim, since the trial court had the discretionary power to sever the McGuire claim.” McGuire, 431 S.W.2d at 351 . 2003Occidental, slip op. at 4, 2003 WL 1799012 , at *2 n. 2. 4 In McGuire, the court citing Rule 41 held that it “is not necessary to determine whether or not the McGuire claim was, in fact, a compulsory counterclaim, since the trial court had the discretionary power to sever the McGuire claim.” McGuire, 431 S.W.2d at 351 . | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Commercial Union Insurance Co. of New York v. Pryor
neutral
2 sentences1968The pertinent provisions of the compromise settlement agreement which was approved by the trial court are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. 423 S.W.2d at 365 and 366. 1968The pertinent provisions of the compromise settlement agreement which was approved by the trial court are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. 423 S.W.2d at 365 and 366. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Stringer v. Munnell
green
2 sentences1968Under these circumstances, the McGuire claim was not barred by the failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim, as in Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ refused) and Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ refused). 1968Under these circumstances, the McGuire claim was not barred by the failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim, as in Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ refused) and Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ refused). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Beach v. Runnels
green
2 sentences1968Under these circumstances, the McGuire claim was not barred by the failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim, as in Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ refused) and Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ refused). 1968Under these circumstances, the McGuire claim was not barred by the failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim, as in Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ refused) and Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ refused). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Rose v. Baker
green
2 sentences1968Rule 41, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that “any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” This rule refers to a claim which is a severable part of a controversy which involves more than one Rose v. Baker, 143 Tex. 202 , 183 S.W.2d 438 (1944). 1968Rule 41, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that “any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” This rule refers to a claim which is a severable part of a controversy which involves more than one Rose v. Baker, 143 Tex. 202 , 183 S.W.2d 438 (1944). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.