cautionary eyewitness instruction in Utah

2021In addition, “people identify members of their own race with greater accuracy than they do members of a different race.” Id.; see also Long, 721 P.2d at 493 . 21 ¶70 Hunter argues that instructing the jury on these Long factors would have alerted the jury to weaknesses in the Surveillance Officers’ testimony and, therefore, trial counsel was deficient for not requesting such an instruction. ¶71 To support his argument, Hunter invokes what we said in State v. Maestas—that “unless obvious tactical reasons exist to forego an instruction, trial counsel faced with . . . eyewitnesses who, with varyi

2015In Long, the Court accepted the invitation to "either abandon any pretext of requiring a cautionary eyewitness instruction or make the requirement meaningful" by deciding "to follow the latter course." Id. at 487 .

2019"Whether the trial court erred in not giving a cautionary eyewitness instruction to the jury is a question of law which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions." State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120 , 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

2006See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that “[w]hether the trial court erred in not giving a cautionary eyewitness instruction to the jury is a question of law”). ¶ 10 Fifth, Harper claims that defense counsel, after eliciting unanticipated prejudicial testimony, should have moved for a mistrial, requested the testimony be stricken, or asked the court for a curative instruction.

1999See Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). ¶ 21 Maestas asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to seek suppression of the blatantly suggestive eyewitness identifications and because counsel failed to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction at trial, which would have informed the jury of the weaknesses inherent in such identifications.

1997Although the trial court erred in not providing the jury the cautionary instruction, we will not reverse a conviction unless the error was harmful, “ ‘i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant.’ ” State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah App.1994) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993)); see also Utah R.Crim.

1997The supreme court in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), stated, “[T]rial courts shall give [a cautionary eyewitness] instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.” Id. at 492 (emphasis added); see also State v. Kinsey,- 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).

1997Although the trial court erred in not providing the jury the cautionary instruction, we will not reverse a conviction unless the error was harmful, “ ‘i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant.’ ” State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah App.1994) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993)); see also Utah R.Crim.