7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DIANA H. v. Rubingreen2 sentences2011"When a state expresses such an interest through particular legislation, its policy judgments are entitled to judicial deference." Diana H. v. Rubin, 217 Ariz. 131, 136, ¶ 23 , 171 P.3d 200, 205 (App.2007). ¶ 14 In all cases in which a child is held in temporary custody for five days or longer that is, after a dependency petition has been filedthe juvenile court has a duty to conduct a preliminary protective hearing. [5] A.R.S. § 8-824.A ("The court shall hold a preliminary protective hearing to review the taking into temporary custody of a child . . . not fewer than five days nor more than 2011"When a state expresses such an interest through particular legislation, its policy judgments are entitled to judicial deference." Diana H. v. Rubin, 217 Ariz. 131, 136, ¶ 23 , 171 P.3d 200, 205 (App.2007). ¶ 14 In all cases in which a child is held in temporary custody for five days or longer that is, after a dependency petition has been filedthe juvenile court has a duty to conduct a preliminary protective hearing. [5] A.R.S. § 8-824.A ("The court shall hold a preliminary protective hearing to review the taking into temporary custody of a child . . . not fewer than five days nor more than | 2 | 2 |
Adrian E. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2009Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, ¶ 23 , 158 P.3d 225, 231-32 (App. 2007) (same). 3 Draven later told a CPS investigator that Denise had been drinking and had been angry with him as well and that he had left after Denise told him to “get out of the house.” 4 According to the report CPS prepared for the preliminary protective hearing, the deputy did not charge Denise with driving under the influence of an intoxicant on this occasion, despite the evidence of her intoxication, because he had not seen her operating a vehicle. 8 ¶14 After an initial investigation, CPS allowed Draven and Larsen to remain with Den 2009Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, ¶ 23 , 158 P.3d 225, 231-32 (App. 2007) (same). 3 Draven later told a CPS investigator that Denise had been drinking and had been angry with him as well and that he had left after Denise told him to “get out of the house.” 4 According to the report CPS prepared for the preliminary protective hearing, the deputy did not charge Denise with driving under the influence of an intoxicant on this occasion, despite the evidence of her intoxication, because he had not seen her operating a vehicle. 8 ¶14 After an initial investigation, CPS allowed Draven and Larsen to remain with Den | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel Thomas v. Blakeygreen2 sentences2006Thomas v. Blakey, 211 Ariz. 124, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 639, 641 (App.2005). ¶ 14 Although the department argues that no authority expressly establishes a parent’s “absolute right” to attend a dependency disposition hearing, the rules of procedure for the juvenile court clearly contemplate the presence of “the parent, guardian or Indian custodian” of a dependent child at a disposition hearing, Rule 56(E)(5), as well as a preliminary protective hearing, Rule 50(C)(5); an initial dependency hearing, Rule 52(C)(4), (D)(8); a settlement conference, Rule 53(D)(4); a pretrial conference, Rule 54(C)(2)(b); 2006Thomas v. Blakey, 211 Ariz. 124, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 639, 641 (App.2005). ¶ 14 Although the department argues that no authority expressly establishes a parent’s “absolute right” to attend a dependency disposition hearing, the rules of procedure for the juvenile court clearly contemplate the presence of “the parent, guardian or Indian custodian” of a dependent child at a disposition hearing, Rule 56(E)(5), as well as a preliminary protective hearing, Rule 50(C)(5); an initial dependency hearing, Rule 52(C)(4), (D)(8); a settlement conference, Rule 53(D)(4); a pretrial conference, Rule 54(C)(2)(b); | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Paul E. v. Courtney F.
green
1 sentence2026Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388 , 394 ¶ 22 (2019). ¶25 The court imposed the school restriction in conjunction with the award of sole legal decision-making authority to Father under A.R.S. § 25-401(3), including exclusive authority over educational decisions, and 7 HANDY v. SHAW Decision of the Court as part of a broader protective framework grounded in prior findings that Mother abused Child and fabricated allegations of abuse. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Mohamed v. Robbins
green
2 sentences1981Appellant urges that we consider this contract to be a protective clause within the exception stated in Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz.App. 195 , 531 P.2d 928 (1975). 1981Appellant urges that we consider this contract to be a protective clause within the exception stated in Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz.App. 195 , 531 P.2d 928 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Porter v. Eyer
green
2 sentences1968We held, in Tyson v. Tyson, supra, that, in quoting Sec. 236 of Restatement of the Law, Contracts: “(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” Cf. Webb Const. Co. v. Crane Co., 52 Ariz. 299, 310 , 80 P.2d 698 ; Porter v. Eyer, 80 Ariz. 169, 173 , 294 P.2d 661 ; and Ed Stearman & Sons, Inc. v. State ex rel. 1968We held, in Tyson v. Tyson, supra, that, in quoting Sec. 236 of Restatement of the Law, Contracts: “(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” Cf. Webb Const. Co. v. Crane Co., 52 Ariz. 299, 310 , 80 P.2d 698 ; Porter v. Eyer, 80 Ariz. 169, 173 , 294 P.2d 661 ; and Ed Stearman & Sons, Inc. v. State ex rel. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Webb v. Crane Co.
green
2 sentences1968We held, in Tyson v. Tyson, supra, that, in quoting Sec. 236 of Restatement of the Law, Contracts: “(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” Cf. Webb Const. Co. v. Crane Co., 52 Ariz. 299, 310 , 80 P.2d 698 ; Porter v. Eyer, 80 Ariz. 169, 173 , 294 P.2d 661 ; and Ed Stearman & Sons, Inc. v. State ex rel. 1968We held, in Tyson v. Tyson, supra, that, in quoting Sec. 236 of Restatement of the Law, Contracts: “(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” Cf. Webb Const. Co. v. Crane Co., 52 Ariz. 299, 310 , 80 P.2d 698 ; Porter v. Eyer, 80 Ariz. 169, 173 , 294 P.2d 661 ; and Ed Stearman & Sons, Inc. v. State ex rel. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.