protective standard in California

2024The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.” (Id., 17 Cal.3d at p. 442 , italics added.) 26. stating, “Crunch on this, you son of a bitch.” Ellsworth was even startled by Victoria’s intensity and anger while she was talking to him.

2023The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.’ ” (People v. One Ruger .22-Caliber Pistol (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 310, 315 (22-Caliber Pistol), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 442 (Tarasoff).) Moreover, unlike the common law duty to warn articulated in Tarasoff, the exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in Evidence Code 1024, by its plain terms, does not require danger to a readily identifiable victim.

2018On the other hand is the recognition that, under limited circumstances, preserving a confidence is less important than protecting the safety of someone whom the patient intends to harm.” (Ibid.) Defendants argue the standard of care governing a university’s duty to protect its students from foreseeable acts of violence should mirror the limitations set forth in section 43.92 because it would be illogical “to impose a less protective standard of care on lay [school personnel] who don’t possess the same 13 Although described as a “duty to protect,” Tarasoff’s analysis makes clear that a therapis

2018Finally, defendants contend that adopting the ordinary standard of care will result in “lay [school personnel] case, the Supreme Court similarly concluded that a university may, “in an appropriate case” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619, fn. 2 ), discharge its duty to protect by conveying a warning to the students at risk. 18 erring on the side of caution and compromising both medical information and other privacy interests by warning students about classmates who act odd or excluding troublesome students.” 2.

2001The protective privilege ends where the *484 public peril begins.’ ” (People v. Lakey, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976-977; accord, People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748-749 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ]; see People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 586 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 758 ].) We agree with the reasoning in Lakey and consider it applicable in the context of an SVP proceeding.

2001The protective privilege ends where the *484 public peril begins.’ ” (People v. Lakey, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976-977; accord, People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748-749 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ]; see People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 586 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 758 ].) We agree with the reasoning in Lakey and consider it applicable in the context of an SVP proceeding.

2017A vital element of this protective framework is the vesting in a public official the duty to investigate the need for a conservatorship which may lead to commitment, and the discretion to file a petition in light of that investigation." ( Kaplan, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1360 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 408 .) "Here, as in the case of a criminal defendant, it is appropriate that when the power of the state is invoked to deprive an individual of her freedom, the decision to commence judicial proceedings should be left to a public officer." ( Ibid . ) In In re Conservatorship of Martha P. (2004) 117 Cal.

2017A vital element of this protective framework is the vesting in a public official the duty to investigate the need for a conservatorship which may lead to commitment, and the discretion to file a petition in light of that investigation." ( Kaplan, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1360 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 408 .) "Here, as in the case of a criminal defendant, it is appropriate that when the power of the state is invoked to deprive an individual of her freedom, the decision to commence judicial proceedings should be left to a public officer." ( Ibid . ) In In re Conservatorship of Martha P. (2004) 117 Cal.

2000The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.” (Id., at p. 442; see also People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 558 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ].) Section 8102 protects firearm owners and the public from the consequences of firearm possession by people whose mental state endangers themselves or others.

2000The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.” (Id., at p. 442; see also People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 558 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ].) Section 8102 protects firearm owners and the public from the consequences of firearm possession by people whose mental state endangers themselves or others.

2023The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.’ ” (People v. One Ruger .22-Caliber Pistol (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 310, 315 (22-Caliber Pistol), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 442 (Tarasoff).) Moreover, unlike the common law duty to warn articulated in Tarasoff, the exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in Evidence Code 1024, by its plain terms, does not require danger to a readily identifiable victim.

2023(In re Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 178 , 183–184 (Kevin F.); see also 22-Caliber Pistol, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 312, 314– 315 [in action under Welf. & Inst.

2016(See Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ] [in civil cases third party personnel files are considered confidential and protected by a constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution unless the party seeking them can demonstrate a “compelling need” for their discovery]; Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 ] [same].) Even were this true, that is a policy judgment for the Legislature, not this court.

2016(See Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ] [in civil cases third party personnel files are considered confidential and protected by a constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution unless the party seeking them can demonstrate a “compelling need” for their discovery]; Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 ] [same].) Even were this true, that is a policy judgment for the Legislature, not this court.

2016(See Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ] [in civil cases third party personnel files are considered confidential and protected by a constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution unless the party seeking them can demonstrate a “compelling need” for their discovery]; Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 ] [same].) Even were this true, that is a policy judgment for the Legislature, not this court.

2016(See Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ] [in civil cases third party personnel files are considered confidential and protected by a constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution unless the party seeking them can demonstrate a “compelling need” for their discovery]; Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 ] [same].) Even were this true, that is a policy judgment for the Legislature, not this court.

2014(Compare People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 765 [“when faced with a different sentencing judge, a defendant must object at that time or waive his Arbuckle rights[]”] and People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540, 1544 [same] with People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 709 [defendant’s waiver must be supported by some affirmative statement or conduct].) We conclude that defendant waived her right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted her plea even applying the more protective standard in Horn.

2014(Compare People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 765 [“when faced with a different sentencing judge, a defendant must object at that time or waive his Arbuckle rights[]”] and People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540, 1544 [same] with People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 709 [defendant’s waiver must be supported by some affirmative statement or conduct].) We conclude that defendant waived her right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted her plea even applying the more protective standard in Horn.

2014(Compare People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 765 [“when faced with a different sentencing judge, a defendant must object at that time or waive his Arbuckle rights[]”] and People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540, 1544 [same] with People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 709 [defendant’s waiver must be supported by some affirmative statement or conduct].) We conclude that defendant waived her right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted her plea even applying the more protective standard in Horn.

2009Elizabeth cites Bernard, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 809-810, in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the purpose of section 21350 was “ ‘to prevent unscrupulous persons in fiduciary relationships from obtaining gifts from elderly persons through undue influence or other overbearing behavior.’ ” (39 Cal.4th at p. 809, quoting Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children’s Foundation (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ].) She argues that an interpretation confined to the plain language of section 21351 would create a loophole by which unscrupulous care custodians could u

2009Elizabeth cites Bernard, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 809-810, in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the purpose of section 21350 was “ ‘to prevent unscrupulous persons in fiduciary relationships from obtaining gifts from elderly persons through undue influence or other overbearing behavior.’ ” (39 Cal.4th at p. 809, quoting Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children’s Foundation (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ].) She argues that an interpretation confined to the plain language of section 21351 would create a loophole by which unscrupulous care custodians could u

2001The protective privilege ends where the *484 public peril begins.’ ” (People v. Lakey, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976-977; accord, People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748-749 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ]; see People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 586 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 758 ].) We agree with the reasoning in Lakey and consider it applicable in the context of an SVP proceeding.

2001The protective privilege ends where the *484 public peril begins.’ ” (People v. Lakey, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976-977; accord, People v. Henderson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 740, 748-749 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 858 ]; see People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 586 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 758 ].) We agree with the reasoning in Lakey and consider it applicable in the context of an SVP proceeding.

1988The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern. ...'" ( Id. at p. 1129, italics added.) While Briscoe posits a two-part protective test, newsworthiness and a shock to a community's sense of decency, Virgil includes in its concept of newsworthiness the notion the matter is offensive to the community as measured by a reasonable member-of-the-public

1988The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern. ...'" ( Id. at p. 1129, italics added.) While Briscoe posits a two-part protective test, newsworthiness and a shock to a community's sense of decency, Virgil includes in its concept of newsworthiness the notion the matter is offensive to the community as measured by a reasonable member-of-the-public