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16 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Charles Farrell Malone v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Malone, 502 F.2d at 556 ("The courts strive to protect freedom of speech, religion and racial equality, 9 State v. K.H.-H., No. 91934-8 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) but freedom of association may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order."). 4 Thus, the majority correctly cites Bahl as requiring that probation conditions limiting free speech "be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest and must be reasonably necessary to achieving that interest." Majority at 7; Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757 . 2016Malone, 502 F.2d at 556 (“The courts strive to protect freedom of speech, religion and racial equality, but freedom of association may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order.”). 9 Thus, the majority correctly cites Bahl as requiring that probation conditions limiting free speech “be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest and must be reasonably necessary to achieving that interest.” Majority at 751; Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757 . ¶41 In spite of quoting and crediting that Bahl test, the majority declines to apply it. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Pattongreen2 sentences2016See State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379 , 396 n.9, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) (stating that we do not reach Fourth Amendment arguments when the article I, section 7 provides “independent and adequate state grounds” to resolve the issue). 2016See State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379 , 396 n.9, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) (stating that we do not reach Fourth Amendment arguments when the article I, section 7 provides “independent and adequate state grounds” to resolve the issue). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Calvin L. Flettgreen2 sentences2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry's "totality of the circumstances analysis" to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as "in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and Ybarra"); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). 2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry’s “totality of the circumstances analysis” to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as “in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s directions in both Terry and Ybarra”); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wayne Cedric Bellgreen2 sentences2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry's "totality of the circumstances analysis" to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as "in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and Ybarra"); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). 2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry’s “totality of the circumstances analysis” to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as “in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s directions in both Terry and Ybarra”); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Talleygreen2 sentences1997See State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d 192, 209 , 858 P.2d 217 (1993) (stating that Washington courts apply a federal analysis to claims of overbroad restrictions on speech). 1997See State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d 192, 209 , 858 P.2d 217 (1993) (stating that Washington courts apply a federal analysis to claims of overbroad restrictions on speech). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Greengreen2 sentences1972See State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Flanagan, 223 Tenn. 134 , 443 S.W.2d 25 (1969). 1972See State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Flanagan, 223 Tenn. 134 , 443 S.W.2d 25 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bahl
green
2 sentences2016Malone, 502 F.2d at 556 ("The courts strive to protect freedom of speech, religion and racial equality, 9 State v. K.H.-H., No. 91934-8 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) but freedom of association may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order."). 4 Thus, the majority correctly cites Bahl as requiring that probation conditions limiting free speech "be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest and must be reasonably necessary to achieving that interest." Majority at 7; Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757 . 2016Malone, 502 F.2d at 556 (“The courts strive to protect freedom of speech, religion and racial equality, but freedom of association may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order.”). 9 Thus, the majority correctly cites Bahl as requiring that probation conditions limiting free speech “be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest and must be reasonably necessary to achieving that interest.” Majority at 751; Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757 . ¶41 In spite of quoting and crediting that Bahl test, the majority declines to apply it. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Ybarra v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry's "totality of the circumstances analysis" to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as "in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and Ybarra"); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). 2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry’s “totality of the circumstances analysis” to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as “in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s directions in both Terry and Ybarra”); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Collier v. City of Tacoma
green
2 sentences1997Collier, 121 Wash.2d at 748 , 854 P.2d 1046 . 1997Collier, 121 Wn.2d at 748 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Albin v. National Bank of Commerce
green
1 sentence2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Fernandez-Medina
green
1 sentence2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
White v. Peters
green
2 sentences2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). 2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Reynolds v. Phare
green
2 sentences2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). 2023We have consistently stated, since at least the 1950s, and even after Chapman and Neder, that “[i]t is prejudicial error to submit an issue to the jury that is not warranted by the evidence.” Clausing, 147 16 State v. Avington (Dominique James), No. 101398-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) Wn.2d at 627 (citing Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455 ); Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191 ; Albin, 60 Wn.2d at 754 ; Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 827 , 329 P.2d 471 (1958). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith
red
2 sentences1998Boerne effectively reinstated the less protective standard of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S. Ct. 1595 , 108 L. 1998Boerne effectively reinstated the less protective standard of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S. Ct. 1595 , 108 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d 281 , 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), or should we instead expressly adopt an independent interpretation of Washington's state constitution and apply the more protective analysis this court previously developed in State v. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 44 , 659 P.2d 528 (1983)? 1992JOHNSON, J. (dissenting) This case presents a question of first impression: In deciding whether a criminal defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial are violated when the government fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, should we follow the Supreme Court's analysis of the federal constitution in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , *316 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), or should we instead expressly adopt an independent interpretation of Washington's state constitution and apply the more protective analysis this court previously developed in State v. Vaster, 99 Wn | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Vaster
yellow
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d 281 , 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), or should we instead expressly adopt an independent interpretation of Washington's state constitution and apply the more protective analysis this court previously developed in State v. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 44 , 659 P.2d 528 (1983)? 1992Ed. 2d 281 , 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), or should we instead expressly adopt an independent interpretation of Washington's state constitution and apply the more protective analysis this court previously developed in State v. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 44 , 659 P.2d 528 (1983)? | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Missouri v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1985Ed. 2d 535 , 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983), and declined to apply a more protective standard under the Washington Constitution. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Flanagan
green
2 sentences1972See State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Flanagan, 223 Tenn. 134 , 443 S.W.2d 25 (1969). 1972See State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Flanagan, 223 Tenn. 134 , 443 S.W.2d 25 (1969). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1969In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. 1969In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State v. Tetzlaff
green
2 sentences1969Our conclusion is fortified by our recent decision in State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wn.2d 649 , 453 P.2d 638 (1969), wherein we said: [T]he right of a known and identified accused to have counsel present at the time of police interrogation is an indispensable part of the protective privilege of the fifth amendment to our federal constitution. 1969Our conclusion is fortified by our recent decision in State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wn.2d 649 , 453 P.2d 638 (1969), wherein we said: [T]he right of a known and identified accused to have counsel present at the time of police interrogation is an indispensable part of the protective privilege of the fifth amendment to our federal constitution. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.