ttca waiver in Texas

2006See Benavides v. Dallas-Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. , 946 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ).

2002See Benavides v. Dallas-Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. , 946 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).

2024Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225 ; accord Rodriguez v. Holmes, 556 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, no writ); Tex. Civ.

2023See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 .

2009See id.; Morgan, 175 S.W.3d at 418 (holding that plaintiff’s negligence claim actually centered on the intentional physical confrontation and did not fall within the TTCA waiver); see also TEX .

2009See id.; Morgan, 175 S.W.3d at 418 (holding that plaintiffs negligence claim actually centered on the intentional physical confrontation and did not fall within the TTCA waiver); see also Tex. Civ.

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm’n v. White, 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2003Auth ., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm'n v. White , 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds , 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm’n v. White, 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2003Auth ., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm'n v. White , 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds , 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm’n v. White, 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2003Auth ., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (holding that waiver is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act); see also Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm'n v. White , 13 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), rev’d on other grounds , 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (stating “we will interpret the TTCA waiver provisions broadly, but within reason and while keeping in mind that the legislature did not intend a general waiver of governmental immunity”).

2021See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 (tort theories are “under” the TTCA); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 385 (claims are “brought under” the TTCA even if immunity is retained).

2015Dist., 383 S.W.3d 783, 791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). 25 Id. 26 Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 369 . 27 Vincent v. West Texas State University, 895 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995). 10 jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.28 The TTCA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit when the claimant alleges personal injury or death arising from the operation or use of a motor- driven vehicle; however, there is no waiver for intentional torts.29 In determining whether claims are barred by sovereig

2011In Anderson , for example, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the use of an EKG machine did not cause Richard Anderson’s death by heart attack after he received two EKGs—the results of which were disputed—and was not transported to the emergency room despite his pleas that he was having a heart attack. 120 S.W.3d at 6–7, 9.

2011In Anderson , for example, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the use of an EKG machine did not cause Richard Anderson’s death by heart attack after he received two EKGs — the results of which were disputed — and was not transported to the emergency room despite his pleas that he was having a heart attack. 120 S.W.3d at 6-7, 9 .

2010See Page, 701 S.W.2d at 835 . 6 To the extent that Romm’s response to the City’s second issue can be construed as contending that the sign is a special defect, the City would not have waived immunity under the TTCA for that claim because, among other reasons, it owed Romm no duty.

2010See Page , 701 S.W.2d at 835 . 6: To the extent that Romm’s response to the City’s second issue can be construed as contending that the sign is a special defect, the City would not have waived immunity under the TTCA for that claim because, among other reasons, it owed Romm no duty .

2021See Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 .

2001See Lee, 38 S.W.3d at 868 (holding TTCA's immunity waiver did not encompass true substance of state hospital patient’s complaint, which was that hospital staff failed to protect her from assailant); Scott, 7 S.W.3d at 720 (holding plaintiffs allegation that school negligently allowed her assailant to use school dormitory room to assault her did not state claim under TTCA); see also Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 (holding real substance of plaintiff’s complaint was that patient's death was caused by hospital staff’s failure to restrain him once they learned he was suicidal, not by condition or use

2018The statutory definition requires both “control and paid employment to invoke the [TTCA]’s waiver of immunity.” Olivares v. Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 461 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Adkins v. Furey, 2 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)); see also City of Houston v. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d 880, 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“The statutory definition requires both control and paid employment to invoke the TTCA waiver of immunity.”).

2015This statutory definition “requires both control and paid employment to invoke the TTCA waiver of immunity.” City of Hous. v. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d 880, 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

2015See Seureau v. subject to this subchapter" is defined as " a written contract ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206 , 219 stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (" the goods or services to the local governmental entity that is Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the properly executed on behalf of the local governmental intentional tort of fraud" ); Sanders v. City of Grapevine, entity." TEX.

2012See Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 219 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“the Legislature has not waived immunity with respect to the intentional tort of fraud”); Sanders v. City of Grapevine, 218 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).

2013See Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543 ; see also Redden v. Denton Cnty., 335 S.W.3d 743 , 748–49 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (discussing Salcedo and subsequent supreme court cases narrowing its holding and the TTCA’s immunity waiver).

2013Redden v. Denton Cnty., 335 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Tex. Tech Univ.

2018The statutory definition requires both “control and paid employment to invoke the [TTCA]’s waiver of immunity.” Olivares v. Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 461 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Adkins v. Furey, 2 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)); see also City of Houston v. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d 880, 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“The statutory definition requires both control and paid employment to invoke the TTCA waiver of immunity.”).

2013Olivares, 401 S.W.3d at 368-69 .

2021See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659 (tort theories are “under” the TTCA); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 385 (claims are “brought under” the TTCA even if immunity is retained).

2012Id. at 658–59.

2025See Cty. of El Paso v. Baker, 579 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) 7 “The difference between a licensee and an invitee is that an invitee is on the premises for the mutual benefit of herself and the possessor, while a licensee is there only for her own purposes, not because of any business dealings with the possessor.” Gontarek v. Sapp, No. 10-23-00034-CV, 2023 WL 5624129 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza, L.P., 278 S.W.3d 901, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). 15 (analyzing TTCA claim where plainti

2025See Cty. of El Paso v. Baker, 579 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) 7 “The difference between a licensee and an invitee is that an invitee is on the premises for the mutual benefit of herself and the possessor, while a licensee is there only for her own purposes, not because of any business dealings with the possessor.” Gontarek v. Sapp, No. 10-23-00034-CV, 2023 WL 5624129 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza, L.P., 278 S.W.3d 901, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). 15 (analyzing TTCA claim where plainti

2025See Cty. of El Paso v. Baker, 579 S.W.3d 686, 692 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) 7 “The difference between a licensee and an invitee is that an invitee is on the premises for the mutual benefit of herself and the possessor, while a licensee is there only for her own purposes, not because of any business dealings with the possessor.” Gontarek v. Sapp, No. 10-23-00034-CV, 2023 WL 5624129 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza, L.P., 278 S.W.3d 901, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). 15 (analyzing TTCA claim where plainti

2024Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225 ; accord Rodriguez v. Holmes, 556 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, no writ); Tex. Civ.

2023See King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751 .

2022City of Houston v. Nicolai, 539 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).1 On this record, I conclude that Officer Gonzales was performing a ministerial duty, so official immunity does not insulate her actions from tort 1 The City previously appealed a denial of immunity in part on the theory that the failure to seatbelt Nicolai was neither a cause of the accident nor part of the TTCA waiver of immunity for operation of a motor vehicle.

2022Nicolai, 539 S.W.3d at 392 .

2021PRAC. & REM. § 101.0215(a)(1).21 Thus, because Officer McCullers was engaged in a governmental function, Appellees were required to provide formal or actual notice under the TTCA on their claim for 19 While only persuasive authority, we note that, since submission, the Houston court of appeals held, “Permitting off-duty police officers to work outside jobs providing police services is closely related to the City's governmental function of providing police protection and control in the interest of the general public[],” and that such “services therefore were governmental for purposes of determi

2020See Timmons, 331 S.W.3d at 846 (holding timely notice of healthcare liability claim does not excuse failure to give timely TTCA notice).

2020See Timmons, 331 S.W.3d at 846 (holding timely notice of healthcare liability claim does not excuse failure to give timely TTCA notice).