absurd consequences rule (California) · Go Syfert
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absurd consequences rule in California

7 California opinions name it 1 courts 2014–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Estate of Letchworthgreen
cal · 1927 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(In re Estate of Letchworth (1927) 201 Cal. 1, 8 [ 255 P. 195 ].) Even some more recent cases have suggested that courts should only resort to the absurd consequences rule if the plain language of the statute fails to reveal a clear meaning.

2015(In re Estate of Letchworth (1927) 201 Cal. 1, 8 [ 255 P. 195 ].) Even some more recent cases have suggested that courts should only resort to the absurd consequences rule if the plain language of the statute fails to reveal a clear meaning.

12
Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(See, e.g., Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; but see California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 878 P.2d 1321 ] [Court “need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would \ . . [lead] to absurd results.’ ”].) We note that the language of section 1041, subdivision 3 “is so plain and clear that any attempt to interpret it would be almost an absurdity . . .” itself.

2015(See, e.g., Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; but see California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 878 P.2d 1321 ] [Court “need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would \ . . [lead] to absurd results.’ ”].) We note that the language of section 1041, subdivision 3 “is so plain and clear that any attempt to interpret it would be almost an absurdity . . .” itself.

12
In Re Jose C.green
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022That may be, but “we are not in a position to engraft such a 4 requirement into the [MDO Act].” (In re Jose C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 844, 849, fn. 2 .) Defendant contends our refusal to do so will cause “absurd consequences.” In her view, it would be absurd to require trial courts to advise section 2966 petitioners of their right to an attorney and to a jury trial but not of their right to call, confront, and subpoena witnesses. “[S]tatutory language should not be given a literal meaning if it would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend.” (People v. Achrem (2013) 2

11
In Re Huddlesongreen
calctapp · 1964 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our Construction Does Not Violate the Constitution “ ‘It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in part, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.’ ” (In re Huddleson (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 618, 624 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 581 ].) The foregoing principle of sta

2017Our Construction Does Not Violate the Constitution “ ‘It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in part, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.’ ” (In re Huddleson (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 618, 624 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 581 ].) The foregoing principle of sta

11
People v. Leivagreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014(See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506, 508, 510 ; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 .) Despite the fact that this court has analyzed the applicability of the absurd consequences exception or otherwise recognized the existence of this rule on occasions too numerous to cite here (e.g., People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 ), the majority relies on a quotation involving the statutory interpretation of federal law to avoid application of the exception.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
California School Employees Ass'n. v. Governing Board of the Marine Community College Districtgreen
cal · 1994 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(See, e.g., Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; but see California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 878 P.2d 1321 ] [Court “need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would \ . . [lead] to absurd results.’ ”].) We note that the language of section 1041, subdivision 3 “is so plain and clear that any attempt to interpret it would be almost an absurdity . . .” itself.

2015(See, e.g., Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; but see California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 878 P.2d 1321 ] [Court “need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would \ . . [lead] to absurd results.’ ”].) We note that the language of section 1041, subdivision 3 “is so plain and clear that any attempt to interpret it would be almost an absurdity . . .” itself.

22

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Bell green
calctapp · 2015
2 sentences

2019Thus, Morales seeks to persuade this court that the plain meaning of Penal Code section 490.2 entails results so dire as to compel us to "rewrite the statute[ ] under the absurd consequences doctrine." ( Bell , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 93 .) We are not so persuaded.

2019Thus, Morales seeks to persuade this court that the plain meaning of Penal Code section 490.2 entails results so dire as to compel us to "rewrite the statute[ ] under the absurd consequences doctrine." ( Bell , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 93 .) We are not so persuaded.

22019–2019
Cassel v. Superior Court green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2022That may be, but “we are not in a position to engraft such a 4 requirement into the [MDO Act].” (In re Jose C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 844, 849, fn. 2 .) Defendant contends our refusal to do so will cause “absurd consequences.” In her view, it would be absurd to require trial courts to advise section 2966 petitioners of their right to an attorney and to a jury trial but not of their right to call, confront, and subpoena witnesses. “[S]tatutory language should not be given a literal meaning if it would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend.” (People v. Achrem (2013) 2

12022–2022
People v. Achrem green
calctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2022That may be, but “we are not in a position to engraft such a 4 requirement into the [MDO Act].” (In re Jose C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 844, 849, fn. 2 .) Defendant contends our refusal to do so will cause “absurd consequences.” In her view, it would be absurd to require trial courts to advise section 2966 petitioners of their right to an attorney and to a jury trial but not of their right to call, confront, and subpoena witnesses. “[S]tatutory language should not be given a literal meaning if it would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend.” (People v. Achrem (2013) 2

12022–2022
People v. May green
calctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2022That may be, but “we are not in a position to engraft such a 4 requirement into the [MDO Act].” (In re Jose C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 844, 849, fn. 2 .) Defendant contends our refusal to do so will cause “absurd consequences.” In her view, it would be absurd to require trial courts to advise section 2966 petitioners of their right to an attorney and to a jury trial but not of their right to call, confront, and subpoena witnesses. “[S]tatutory language should not be given a literal meaning if it would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend.” (People v. Achrem (2013) 2

12022–2022
Unzueta v. Ocean View School District green
calctapp · 1992
1 sentence

2015III, § 3 [judiciary may not exercise legislative powers absent authorization by Constitution]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) “Each time the judiciary utilizes the ‘absurd result’ rule, a little piece is stripped from the written rule of law and confidence in legislative enactments is lessened….” (Unzueta, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1699 .) Unlike a court’s notion of absurdity and the revisions it would impose as a result, the text 41 Earlier cases suggested that the absurd consequences doctrine does not apply when the Legislature’s intent is clearly apparent from the language of the statu

12015–2015
Younger v. Superior Court green
cal · 1978
1 sentence

2014(See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506, 508, 510 ; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 .) Despite the fact that this court has analyzed the applicability of the absurd consequences exception or otherwise recognized the existence of this rule on occasions too numerous to cite here (e.g., People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 ), the majority relies on a quotation involving the statutory interpretation of federal law to avoid application of the exception.

12014–2014
People v. Fenton green
calctapp · 1993
1 sentence

2014(See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506, 508, 510 ; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 .) Despite the fact that this court has analyzed the applicability of the absurd consequences exception or otherwise recognized the existence of this rule on occasions too numerous to cite here (e.g., People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 ), the majority relies on a quotation involving the statutory interpretation of federal law to avoid application of the exception.

12014–2014
People v. Pieters green
cal · 1991
1 sentence

2014(See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506, 508, 510 ; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 ; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 .) Despite the fact that this court has analyzed the applicability of the absurd consequences exception or otherwise recognized the existence of this rule on occasions too numerous to cite here (e.g., People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 ), the majority relies on a quotation involving the statutory interpretation of federal law to avoid application of the exception.

12014–2014

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