Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jay v. Mahaffey CA4/3green2 sentences2022“The general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 (Jay).) Strictly speaking, Attorneys’ reply presented new argument rather than new evidence. 2022“The general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 (Jay).) Strictly speaking, Attorneys’ reply presented new argument rather than new evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Ricogreen2 sentences1978(See In re Morrow (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 39, 57 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 142 ] [disapproved on other grounds, Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674 ( 125 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 542 P.2d 1349 )].) We conclude there is no merit in Carol’s claim. 1978(See In re Morrow (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 39, 57 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 142 ] [disapproved on other grounds, Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674 ( 125 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 542 P.2d 1349 )].) We conclude there is no merit in Carol’s claim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Morrowred2 sentences1978(See In re Morrow (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 39, 57 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 142 ] [disapproved on other grounds, Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674 ( 125 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 542 P.2d 1349 )].) We conclude there is no merit in Carol’s claim. 1978(See In re Morrow (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 39, 57 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 142 ] [disapproved on other grounds, Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674 ( 125 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 542 P.2d 1349 )].) We conclude there is no merit in Carol’s claim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re TMRgreen2 sentences1978R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol’s claim that the Department was derelict in failing to explore and offer such alternative services. 1978R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol’s claim that the Department was derelict in failing to explore and offer such alternative services. | 2 | 2 |
Mejia v. Reedgreen1 sentence2016(See Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 666 [“Whenever, as in this case, the parties agree upon the property division, no law requires them to divide the property equally, and the court does not scrutinize the MSA to ensure that it sets out an equal division”].) Section 2550, which requires the court to divide community property equally, contains an exception for “written agreement[s] of the parties,” and thus does not apply to property divisions in marital settlement agreements. | 1 | 1 |
Leni v. Lenigreen1 sentence2016(See In re Marriage of Leni (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1093 [reviewing trial court’s ruling that spouse had no fiduciary duty as a matter of law de novo].) The parties do not cite to any extrinsic evidence offered to the trial court to aid in interpreting the MSA. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Epsteinyellow2 sentences1987Although reimbursement is the general rule where, after separation, separate funds are used to pay community obligations, “‘[Reimbursement should not be ordered if payment was made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect reimbursement, for example, ... where the payment was made on account of a debt for the acquisition or preservation of an asset the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not substantially in excess of the value of the use.’ ” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], quoting In re Marr 1987Although reimbursement is the general rule where, after separation, separate funds are used to pay community obligations, “‘[Reimbursement should not be ordered if payment was made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect reimbursement, for example, ... where the payment was made on account of a debt for the acquisition or preservation of an asset the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not substantially in excess of the value of the use.’ ” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], quoting In re Marr | 1 | 1 |
Sieglinde A. v. Smithgreen2 sentences1987Although reimbursement is the general rule where, after separation, separate funds are used to pay community obligations, “‘[Reimbursement should not be ordered if payment was made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect reimbursement, for example, ... where the payment was made on account of a debt for the acquisition or preservation of an asset the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not substantially in excess of the value of the use.’ ” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], quoting In re Marr 1987Although reimbursement is the general rule where, after separation, separate funds are used to pay community obligations, “‘[Reimbursement should not be ordered if payment was made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect reimbursement, for example, ... where the payment was made on account of a debt for the acquisition or preservation of an asset the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not substantially in excess of the value of the use.’ ” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], quoting In re Marr | 1 | 1 |
Tulare County Welfare Department v. Carolyn M.green2 sentences1978It is now well recognized that prelude to a judicial determination resulting in the permanent severance of the vitally significant parent-child relationship, the trial court should consider less severe available alternatives designed to keep the family unit intact. ( In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 300, 310-311 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 ]; In re T.M.R. (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol's claim that the Department was derelict in faili 1978It is now well recognized that prelude to a judicial determination resulting in the permanent severance of the vitally significant parent-child relationship, the trial court should consider less severe available alternatives designed to keep the family unit intact. ( In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 300, 310-311 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 ]; In re T.M.R. (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol's claim that the Department was derelict in faili | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Jacqueline H.
green
2 sentences1978It is now well recognized that prelude to a judicial determination resulting in the permanent severance of the vitally significant parent-child relationship, the trial court should consider less severe available alternatives designed to keep the family unit intact. ( In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 300, 310-311 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 ]; In re T.M.R. (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol's claim that the Department was derelict in faili 1978R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol’s claim that the Department was derelict in failing to explore and offer such alternative services. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Detrich v. Carolyn B.
green
2 sentences1978It is now well recognized that prelude to a judicial determination resulting in the permanent severance of the vitally significant parent-child relationship, the trial court should consider less severe available alternatives designed to keep the family unit intact. ( In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 300, 310-311 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 ]; In re T.M.R. (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol's claim that the Department was derelict in faili 1978R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; accord: In re Carmaleta, supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 ; In re Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 177 .) But the record does not support Carol’s claim that the Department was derelict in failing to explore and offer such alternative services. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Rosevear v. Rosevear
green
1 sentence2013And as explained in In re Marriage of Roseveare (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 686 , the negligence of a party’s attorney does not provide a sufficient basis to set aside a dissolution judgment under Family Code section 2122: “Carol’s claim really boils down to an assertion that she failed to obtain an equitable division of property or support order because of the negligence of her attorneys. . . . [E]ven though attorney negligence will not be imputed to a client to bar an order setting aside a judgment, such an order may still only be granted if it is based on one of the five exclusive grounds sp | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.