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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2025(See Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1256 & fn. 11.) Citing rule 4.408(a), the court concluded that “the requirement that an aggravating factor exist is merely a requirement that the decision to impose the upper term be reasonable.” (Black I, at p. 1255.) The United States Supreme Court then held otherwise in Cunningham, writing that “broad discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence . . . does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions.” (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 290 ; see Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 305 [finding “immaterial” that “the enu | 1 | 1 |
Common Cause v. Board of Supervisorsgreen1 sentence2022(See Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 447 [“if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong 23 That rule provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: [¶] (a) violate these rules or the State Bar Act, knowingly[ ] assist, solicit, or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another,” or “(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official, or to achieve results by means that violate these rules, the State Bar Act, or other law . . . .” 69 showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court has discret | 1 | 1 |
NewLife Sciences, LLC v. Weinstockgreen1 sentence2022(See Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 447 [“if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong 23 That rule provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: [¶] (a) violate these rules or the State Bar Act, knowingly[ ] assist, solicit, or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another,” or “(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official, or to achieve results by means that violate these rules, the State Bar Act, or other law . . . .” 69 showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court has discret | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunklered1 sentence2013An attorney should 'resolve any doubt in favor of preserving the integrity of his testimony and against his continued participation as trial counsel.' " (People v. Dunkle 7 (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 915 (Dunkle).) Furthermore, even if an advocate-witness has obtained the informed written consent of his or her client, the trial court nevertheless has discretion to disqualify counsel where he or she is a material witness in the case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Villanuevagreen2 sentences2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ 2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Giminezgreen2 sentences2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ 2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cunningham v. California
green
1 sentence2025(See Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1256 & fn. 11.) Citing rule 4.408(a), the court concluded that “the requirement that an aggravating factor exist is merely a requirement that the decision to impose the upper term be reasonable.” (Black I, at p. 1255.) The United States Supreme Court then held otherwise in Cunningham, writing that “broad discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence . . . does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions.” (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 290 ; see Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 305 [finding “immaterial” that “the enu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Black
red
1 sentence2025(See Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1256 & fn. 11.) Citing rule 4.408(a), the court concluded that “the requirement that an aggravating factor exist is merely a requirement that the decision to impose the upper term be reasonable.” (Black I, at p. 1255.) The United States Supreme Court then held otherwise in Cunningham, writing that “broad discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence . . . does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions.” (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 290 ; see Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 305 [finding “immaterial” that “the enu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Berkowitz
green
1 sentence2014We agree. 2 Defendant obtained three certificates of probable cause. 2 In People v. Berkowitz (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 671 (Berkowitz), after the trial court denied the defendant’s section 1538.5 suppression motion, the defendant entered into a plea bargain which included a waiver of his right to appeal. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Belmontes
green
1 sentence2013If the latter is chosen, the reasons therefor should be stated for the record.” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348 ; see rule 4.425.) Defendant contends that the trial court’s statement of reasons “does not reflect recognition that the court was choosing between the various choices available, i.e., a concurrent sentence, a one-third midterm consecutive sentence [citation], or a fully consecutive sentence.” The People counter that the trial court’s statement of reasons was sufficient because it “referred to the probation report as a basis for its decision.” In the People’s view, the probati | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Donaldson
green
1 sentence2013It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.' " (Donaldson, at p. 929.) "[T]he State Bar [of California] has adopted a rule of professional conduct that prohibits, with few exceptions, a lawyer from acting as both advocate and witness [citation] . . . ." (Donaldson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 927 , citing rule 5-210.) Rule 5- 210 states: "A member shall not act as an advocate before a jury which will hear testimony from the member unless: "(A) The testimony relates to an uncontested matter; or "(B) The testimony relate | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ 2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it "`exceed[ed] the bounds of reason' " under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , 107 Cal. Rptr.2d 830 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 )—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was "tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the cr | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 ].) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it “ ‘exceeded] the bounds of reason’ ” under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 ])—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was “tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the crimes [he] had committ 2003(Citing rule 4.412(a) and People v. Villanueva (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Finally, the defendant could not argue that his sentence was an abuse of discretion—i.e., that it "`exceed[ed] the bounds of reason' " under the circumstances ( Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215 , 107 Cal. Rptr.2d 830 , quoting People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 534 P.2d 65 )—because his agreement to be vulnerable to a term of up to six years was "tantamount to a stipulation that [a sentence of that length] was within the range of reasonableness for the cr | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Estate of Corcofingas
green
2 sentences1961Proc., §955; Estate of Corcofingas, 24 Cal.2d 517 [ 150 P.2d 194 ]; Winslow v. Harold G. 1961Proc., §955; Estate of Corcofingas, 24 Cal.2d 517 [ 150 P.2d 194 ]; Winslow v. Harold G. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.