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7 California opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Middlesex Insurance v. Manngreen2 sentences2010(Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 3, p. 6507 [amending § 203.1 to add that penalty “shall not apply in any case in which an employee recovers the service charge authorized by Section 1719 of the Civil Code in an action brought by the employee thereunder” (italics added)].) 7 The Restatement test for determining tort liability for a violation of a statute is as follows: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of 1992Co. v. Mann (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 558, 570 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 495 ], citing Rest.2d Torts, § 874A.) Arguably, this test has been superseded by Moradi-Shalal . | 1 | 2 |
Katzberg v. Regents of University of Californiagreen1 sentence2020That Restatement section provides: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.” (Cf. Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Superior Courtred2 sentences1993(See Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 491, 497-500 [ 262 Cal. Rptr. 754 ] [intentional spoliation of evidence]; Middlesex Ins. 1993(See Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 497-500 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [intentional spoliation of evidence]; Middlesex Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Zimmerman v. Stottergreen2 sentences1987The court announced that “the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: ‘When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort a 1987The court announced that “the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: ‘When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort a | 1 | 1 |
Walter J. Warren Insurance Agency v. Surpur Timber Co.green2 sentences1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi 1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi | 1 | 1 |
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotelgreen2 sentences1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi 1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi | 1 | 1 |
Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn.green2 sentences1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi 1981Agency v. Surpur Timber Co. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 99, 104-105 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) With respect to these statutes, the appropriate rule is the general rule stated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, usi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems
red
2 sentences2020That Restatement section provides: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.” (Cf. Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 3 2020That Restatement section provides: “When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.” (Cf. Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 3 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Leeper v. Beltrami
green
1 sentence2020(See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 203-204 ; Woodham v. Allen (1900) 130 Cal. 194, 198-200 .)” (Ibid.) In other words, “[a]n action for duress is an action for the recovery of moneys received by a defendant under the influence of duress. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 428.) The appellate court concluded that “[t]he fatal flaw in [the] plaintiff’s action [was] that she apparently never paid the money [the] defendants demanded in their letters.” (Id. at p. 426.) Tran maintains that Eat Club failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its extortion cause of action, in part because it | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Woodham v. Allen
green
1 sentence2020(See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 203-204 ; Woodham v. Allen (1900) 130 Cal. 194, 198-200 .)” (Ibid.) In other words, “[a]n action for duress is an action for the recovery of moneys received by a defendant under the influence of duress. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 428.) The appellate court concluded that “[t]he fatal flaw in [the] plaintiff’s action [was] that she apparently never paid the money [the] defendants demanded in their letters.” (Id. at p. 426.) Tran maintains that Eat Club failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its extortion cause of action, in part because it | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
green
2 sentences2002As observed by Friesen, “[ Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388 , and its progeny] actually illustrate [] a body of precedent established by state courts, . . . [and] expressed in section 874A of the Second Restatement of Torts.” (Friesen, supra, § 7-5(c), at p. 420.) The cited Restatement section provides: “When a legislative [or constitutional] provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed 2002As observed by Friesen, “[ Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388 , and its progeny] actually illustrate [] a body of precedent established by state courts, . . . [and] expressed in section 874A of the Second Restatement of Torts.” (Friesen, supra, § 7-5(c), at p. 420.) The cited Restatement section provides: “When a legislative [or constitutional] provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Smith v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1993(See Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 491, 497-500 [ 262 Cal. Rptr. 754 ] [intentional spoliation of evidence]; Middlesex Ins. 1993(See Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 497-500 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [intentional spoliation of evidence]; Middlesex Ins. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.