claim of attorney-client privilege in California

2023(Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1208 .) Substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence or a mere scintilla of evidence, but is only evidence that is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.

2005(People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ].) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the [ruling] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ].) However, even when exercising substantial evidence review, the appellate court “must exercise its independent judgment in applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11

2005(People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ].) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the [ruling] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ].) However, even when exercising substantial evidence review, the appellate court “must exercise its independent judgment in applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11

2005(People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ].) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the [ruling] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ].) However, even when exercising substantial evidence review, the appellate court “must exercise its independent judgment in applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11

2005(People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ].) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the [ruling] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ].) However, even when exercising substantial evidence review, the appellate court “must exercise its independent judgment in applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11

2005(People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ].) “[The] appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the [ruling] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 475 P.2d 649 ].) However, even when exercising substantial evidence review, the appellate court “must exercise its independent judgment in applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found.” (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 11

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

2004(See Cornish v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 467, 480 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 383 ].) “The rule is based on the notion that when' there is a claim of attorney client privilege, for example, it is neither customary nor necessary to review the contents of the communication in order to determine whether the privilege applies as the court’s factual determination does not involve the nature of the communications or the effect of disclosure but rather the existence of the relationship at the time the communication was made, the intent of the client and whether the communication emanates from the cli

1991Is the person entitled to claim the privilege sufficiently protected by suppression of the improperly obtained evidence in any trial or other hearing against the movant or holder of the privilege? (§ 1538.5, subd. (d); see United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 366 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 564, 569 , 101 S.Ct. 665 ].) In 1979 the Legislature faced the difficult legal questions raised by the use of warrants in the search of attorneys’ offices by adoption of subdivision (c) of section 1524.

1991Is the person entitled to claim the privilege sufficiently protected by suppression of the improperly obtained evidence in any trial or other hearing against the movant or holder of the privilege? (§ 1538.5, subd. (d); see United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 366 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 564, 569 , 101 S.Ct. 665 ].) In 1979 the Legislature faced the difficult legal questions raised by the use of warrants in the search of attorneys’ offices by adoption of subdivision (c) of section 1524.

1975Its ultimate goal is the ascertainment of truth, and where furtherance of the adversary system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal, the adversary system must give way to reasonable restraints designed to further that goal.” (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 487 P.2d 1234 ].) Similar considerations govern the claim of attorney-client privilege.

1975Its ultimate goal is the ascertainment of truth, and where furtherance of the adversary system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal, the adversary system must give way to reasonable restraints designed to further that goal.” (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 487 P.2d 1234 ].) Similar considerations govern the claim of attorney-client privilege.