conclusion without instruction in California

2020Thompkins’s trial counsel suggested the jury should be allowed to consider codefendant Fox an accomplice, but he did not request that CALJIC No. 3.19 be given using Fox’s name. 86 issue, especially because there was no specific request for the instruction36 and the jury would have been naturally skeptical of any attempt by Fox to shift blame from himself simply because of his role in the crime.37 (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 371 [omission of “care and caution” instruction harmless where “[a]ny reasonable juror would reach this conclusion without instruction”].) Moreover, any error in om

2020Thompkins’s trial counsel suggested the jury should be allowed to consider codefendant Fox an accomplice, but he did not request that CALJIC No. 3.19 be given using Fox’s name. 86 issue, especially because there was no specific request for the instruction36 and the jury would have been naturally skeptical of any attempt by Fox to shift blame from himself simply because of his role in the crime.37 (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 371 [omission of “care and caution” instruction harmless where “[a]ny reasonable juror would reach this conclusion without instruction”].) Moreover, any error in om

2001Notwithstanding defendant’s citation of federal and state Court of Appeal cases, we have observed that “[n]o cases have held failure to instruct on the law of accomplices to be reversible error per se.” (People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 470 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 906 , 516 P.2d 298 ].) Because we find no error and otherwise find any error to be harmless, we accordingly reject defendant’s federal constitutional claims that the court’s failure to instruct on accomplice liability violated his right to a trial by jury, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth A

2001Notwithstanding defendant’s citation of federal and state Court of Appeal cases, we have observed that “[n]o cases have held failure to instruct on the law of accomplices to be reversible error per se.” (People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 470 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 906 , 516 P.2d 298 ].) Because we find no error and otherwise find any error to be harmless, we accordingly reject defendant’s federal constitutional claims that the court’s failure to instruct on accomplice liability violated his right to a trial by jury, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth A

2026(See In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1132 [“a litigant who fails to bring to the attention of the trial court alleged deficiencies in the court’s statement of decision waive[s] the right to complain of such errors on appeal”].) Although the spirit of this doctrine applies to the Armendarizes’ appellate claim of ambiguity, we decline to apply the doctrine because it usually applies to factual findings, whereas the Armendarizes have characterized their appellate challenges as legal challenges to the validity of the injunctive relief.