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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1972–1987 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wheelerred2 sentences1985(People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) The cross-sectional requirement was set forth 34 years ago in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ]. 1985(People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) The cross-sectional requirement was set forth 34 years ago in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ]. | 3 | 3 |
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.green2 sentences1985Thus, in Theil v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ], the high court held that exclusion of daily wage earners from jury service violated the cross-sectional requirement, threatening “the subtle undermining of the jury system.” (Id., at p. 225 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1187 ].) The court cautioned that the rule does not mean “that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, reli gious, racial, political and geographic groups in the community; . . . [b]ut it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court offi 1985Thus, in Theil v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ], the high court held that exclusion of daily wage earners from jury service violated the cross-sectional requirement, threatening “the subtle undermining of the jury system.” (Id., at p. 225 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1187 ].) The court cautioned that the rule does not mean “that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, reli gious, racial, political and geographic groups in the community; . . . [b]ut it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court offi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Remirogreen2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Hillerygreen2 sentences1987(See Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261-266 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 607-610 , 106 S.Ct. 617, 622-624 ].) Similarly, in other contexts, courts have distinguished the cross-sectional violation of Taylor from improper jury selection practices that threaten the impartiality of juries. 1987(See Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261-266 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 607-610 , 106 S.Ct. 617, 622-624 ].) Similarly, in other contexts, courts have distinguished the cross-sectional violation of Taylor from improper jury selection practices that threaten the impartiality of juries. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lewisred2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cabralgreen2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Breckenridgegreen2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Newtongreen2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Powellgreen2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sirhanred2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Texasgreen2 sentences1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P 1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hinesgreen2 sentences1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P 1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P 1985That we refuse to do.” (Id., at p. 224 [ 90 L.Ed. at p. 1186 ].) These concerns, nonetheless, are amplified in the context of discriminatory exclusion of a racial or ethnic minority group, as alleged in the present case. 6 As this court emphatically stated nearly 50 years ago, “ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from which individuals of his own race who are otherwise qualified as jurors in the particular case, have not been arbitrarily excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’” (Italics added.) (People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P | 1 | 1 |
Frazier v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983There is no reason to refuse to apply Cooper's "actual purpose of the Legislature" test in the present context since a cross-sectional analysis requires the application of a stricter standard of review than merely "rational basis." (See ante, at p. 354, fn. 11.) [13] If there is a valid concern that individual members of the "guilt phase includable" group may not be impartial, that can be explored through voir dire. [14] As Justice Jackson, a former prosecutor, has written, "prosecutors seldom fail to stress, if not exaggerate, the importance of the case before them to the whole social, if not 1983There is no reason to refuse to apply Cooper's "actual purpose of the Legislature" test in the present context since a cross-sectional analysis requires the application of a stricter standard of review than merely "rational basis." (See ante, at p. 354, fn. 11.) [13] If there is a valid concern that individual members of the "guilt phase includable" group may not be impartial, that can be explored through voir dire. [14] As Justice Jackson, a former prosecutor, has written, "prosecutors seldom fail to stress, if not exaggerate, the importance of the case before them to the whole social, if not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Uhlemanngreen2 sentences1983(See People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 670 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ] (dis. opn.).) [15] The majority opinion suggests that use of a single, death-qualified jury will actually benefit the accused, because it will guarantee that the penalty phase jury is aware of "lingering doubts" that may have survived the guilt phase deliberations. 1983(See People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 670 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ] (dis. opn.).) [15] The majority opinion suggests that use of a single, death-qualified jury will actually benefit the accused, because it will guarantee that the penalty phase jury is aware of "lingering doubts" that may have survived the guilt phase deliberations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Billy Junior Woodard v. Willis Sargent, Warden, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction
yellow
2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir.1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) [7] See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal. Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Catherine Foster, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. James L. Sparks, Etc.
green
2 sentences1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 389-390 [ 1987(See, e.g., Woodard v. Sargent (8th Cir.1985) 753 F.2d 694, 697 .) [7] See, for example, People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [ 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ]; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 809, 839 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1135 ]; People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d 633, 646 [ 141 Cal. Rptr. 614 ]; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 707, 715 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 418 ]; People v. Breckenridge (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 913, 921 [ 125 Cal. Rptr. 425 ]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 107, 126-127 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 109 ]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lockhart v. McCree
green
2 sentences1986(Id., at p. — [ 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 150 ].) The court found that a group which shares attitudes on the imposition of the death penalty is not a “distinctive group” whose systematic exclusion from juries violates the Sixth Amendment. 1986The circuit court found the death penalty opponents to be a “distinctive group” (id., at p. 231) which, when systematically excluded from juries, violates the cross-sectional requirement of the Sixth Amendment and is more “conviction prone than a normal criminal jury.” (Id., at p. 237.) Reversing Grigsby in McCree , the United States Supreme Court held that “death-qualification” of a jury violates neither the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment (Lockhart v. McCree, supra, at p. — [ 90 L.Ed.2d at p. 150 ]) nor the constitutional right to an impartial jury. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Brown
green
2 sentences1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F.Supp. 31, 33 .) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. 1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. *729 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir.1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F. Supp. 31, 33 .) (1b) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F.Supp. 31, 33 .) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. 1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. *729 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir.1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F. Supp. 31, 33 .) (1b) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
People v. Fort
green
2 sentences1972(Cf. People v. Fort (Ill.App. 1971) 273 N.E.2d 439, 446 .) Indeed, as long as the system of jury selection is in compliance with the cross-sectional principle, it is constitutionally permissible to enact provisions, aimed at minimizing inconvenience to jurors and expense to the county, which limit the geographical area from which jurors are chosen for service in a particular judicial district. 1972App. 1971) 273 N.E.2d 439, 446 .) (3) Indeed, as long as the system of jury selection is in compliance with the cross-sectional principle, it is constitutionally permissible to enact provisions, aimed at minimizing inconvenience to jurors and expense to the county, which limit the geographical area from which jurors are chosen for service in a particular judicial district. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. Gary Steven Florence
green
2 sentences1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F.Supp. 31, 33 .) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. 1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. *729 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir.1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F. Supp. 31, 33 .) (1b) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F.Supp. 31, 33 .) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. 1972(See United States v. Florence (4th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 46, 50 ; Katz v. United States (1st Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 7 , 9, cert. den. 375 U.S. 903 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 144 , 84 S.Ct. 193 ]; United States v. Brown (E.D.La. 1968) 281 F.Supp. 31, 33 .) As has been noted, Dr. Breiman testified that while 11 percent of the population of the County of Los Angeles was black, the information furnished to him showed that the selection of jurors on a county-wide basis resulted in 8 percent of the jurors being persons who were black. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.