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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Companygreen2 sentences2010(Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co. (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Cairns V).) The Ninth Circuit affirmed all three orders in June 2002. 2010The judgment becomes final and Franklin Mint disburses the funds that had been interpleaded The Fund appealed from the denial of its motion to reinstate the right of publicity claim, the summary adjudication of the false endorsement claim, and the award of attorney fees. ( Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co. (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 1139, 1144 ( Cairns V ).) The Ninth Circuit affirmed all three orders in June 2002. ( Id. at p. 1159.) At some point after the litigation was over, the $2.5 million that had been interpleaded with the district court was returned to Franklin Mint. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sassouniangreen1 sentence1999(Id. at p. 549, fn. 10.) “That the jury expended so much time and effort in its deliberations strongly suggests that the [recanting witness’s] testimony did not in fact ‘operate[] as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatter[ed] the defense.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We find that the parties’ arguments with respect to prosecutorial emphasis and length of deliberations serve as an endorsement of the rule that, in *1322 determining materiality, the probability of a different result is “assessed by considering the evidence in question under the totality of the relevant circumstances and not in is | 1 | 1 |
Vannier v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988The doctrine is applied only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with, the exercise of a fundamental right. [Citations.]” (Vannier v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 163, 171 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 650 P.2d 302 ].) Here, as we shall explain, the endorsement requirement does not encroach upon Lucas’s constitutional rights to due process in the context of presenting evidence (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 ]) or to compel the attendance of witnesses, but rather constitutes a reasonable, minimally burdens 1988The doctrine is applied only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with, the exercise of a fundamental right. [Citations.]” (Vannier v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 163, 171 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 650 P.2d 302 ].) Here, as we shall explain, the endorsement requirement does not encroach upon Lucas’s constitutional rights to due process in the context of presenting evidence (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 ]) or to compel the attendance of witnesses, but rather constitutes a reasonable, minimally burdens | 1 | 1 |
Island v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1959(Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 547-548 [ 184 P.2d 153 , 173 A.L.R. 896 ].) Accordingly, if plaintiffs’ rights against the insurer are to be determined according to the terms of the original policy, the endorsement is no defense and the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. 1959(Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 547-548 [ 184 P.2d 153 , 173 A.L.R. 896 ].) Accordingly, if plaintiffs’ rights against the insurer are to be determined according to the terms of the original policy, the endorsement is no defense and the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Cal. v. Continental Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Co. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 195 ; Ameron Internat. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
American States Insurance v. Koloms
green
2 sentences2011Co. v. Koloms (1997) 177 Ill.2d 473 [ 227 Ill.Dec. 149 , 687 N.E.2d 72, 80 ].) The court went on to explain that these efforts resulted in an endorsement to the standard form CGL policy adopted in 1970 as exclusion (f). 2011Co. v. Koloms (1997) 177 Ill.2d 473 [ 227 Ill.Dec. 149 , 687 N.E.2d 72, 80 ].) The court went on to explain that these efforts resulted in an endorsement to the standard form CGL policy adopted in 1970 as exclusion (f). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
MacKinnon v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2011(MacKinnon, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 643 .) Then in 1985, following significant and extensive litigation over the precise meaning of certain words in exclusion (f), the insurance industry drafted a new version of the exclusion, referred to as the “ ‘absolute pollution exclusion.’ ” (MacKinnon, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 644 .) The motivation for the amended exclusion was twofold, namely to eliminate “ ‘coverage for gradual environmental degradation and government-mandated cleanup such as Superfund response cost reimbursement.’ ” (Id. at p. 645, quoting Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Cons 2011(MacKinnon, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 643 .) Then in 1985, following significant and extensive litigation over the precise meaning of certain words in exclusion (f), the insurance industry drafted a new version of the exclusion, referred to as the “ ‘absolute pollution exclusion.’ ” (MacKinnon, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 644 .) The motivation for the amended exclusion was twofold, namely to eliminate “ ‘coverage for gradual environmental degradation and government-mandated cleanup such as Superfund response cost reimbursement.’ ” (Id. at p. 645, quoting Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Cons | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.
green
2 sentences2010Addressing the false endorsement claim, the court observed that, “[a]l-though it is clear that this case was well outside the bounds of any previous decision, [the Fund’s false endorsement] claim could be considered an attempt to extend existing law,” and therefore did not “rise to the level of ‘groundless, unreasonable, vexatious or bad faith.’ ” (Cairns IV, supra, 115 F.Supp.2d at p. 1188 .) The court continued: “In contrast, [the Fund’s] claims for dilution and false advertising were groundless and unreasonable. 2010Addressing the false endorsement claim, the court observed that, "[a]lthough it is clear that this case was well outside the bounds of any previous decision, [the Fund's false endorsement] claim could be considered an attempt to extend existing law," and therefore did not "rise to the level of `groundless, unreasonable, vexatious or bad faith.'" ( Cairns IV, supra, 115 F.Supp.2d at p. 1188 .) The court continued: "In contrast, [the Fund's] claims for dilution and false advertising were groundless and unreasonable. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Washington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1988The doctrine is applied only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with, the exercise of a fundamental right. [Citations.]” (Vannier v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 163, 171 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 650 P.2d 302 ].) Here, as we shall explain, the endorsement requirement does not encroach upon Lucas’s constitutional rights to due process in the context of presenting evidence (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 ]) or to compel the attendance of witnesses, but rather constitutes a reasonable, minimally burdens 1988The doctrine is applied only when there exists a real and appreciable impact on, or a significant interference with, the exercise of a fundamental right. [Citations.]” (Vannier v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 163, 171 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 650 P.2d 302 ].) Here, as we shall explain, the endorsement requirement does not encroach upon Lucas’s constitutional rights to due process in the context of presenting evidence (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 ]) or to compel the attendance of witnesses, but rather constitutes a reasonable, minimally burdens | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Transport Indemnity Co.
green
1 sentence1983Co., supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 649, 659 ; italics added.) Pacific Indemnity, in turn, was based on the rationale set forth in Argonaut’s discussion of the policy of the law requiring the P.U.C. endorsements. “[T]he purpose of the endorsement requirement is to protect the public and not to determine which of two insurers should be held ultimately liable. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.