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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1955(People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [ 36 P. 7 ].) As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 [ 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578, 580 ], experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. 1955(People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [ 36 P. 7 ].) As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 [ 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578, 580 ], experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsonred2 sentences2014Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact. ‘Even an inflection in the voice can make a difference in the meaning.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, we have recognized “that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge”; that “the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box”; and that “the same factors used in evaluating a juror may be given different we 2014Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact. ‘Even an inflection in the voice can make a difference in the meaning.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, we have recognized “that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge”; that “the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box”; and that “the same factors used in evaluating a juror may be given different we | 1 | 1 |
People v. Andersonred2 sentences2006Moreover, in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 315 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 690 P.2d 669 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], we held, inter alia, that there was no “constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.” We have consistently adhered to this view. 2006Moreover, in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 315 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 690 P.2d 669 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], we held, inter alia, that there was no “constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.” We have consistently adhered to this view. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Turnerred2 sentences2006Moreover, in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 315 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 690 P.2d 669 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], we held, inter alia, that there was no “constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.” We have consistently adhered to this view. 2006Moreover, in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 315 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 690 P.2d 669 ], overruled on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], we held, inter alia, that there was no “constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of specific juror attitudes on the death penalty.” We have consistently adhered to this view. | 1 | 1 |
David Junior Brown v. Gary Dixon, Warden, Central Prison, David Junior Brown v. Gary Dixon, Warden, Central Prisongreen1 sentence2006(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 490, 498, fn. 15 [declining to hold that Witherspoon was “a command liberally to examine the exercise of the peremptory challenge”].) We decline to extend Witherspoon in this manner. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 282-283; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 228, 241 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 729 P.2d 839 ].) The court did not question the prosecutor’s excuses for challenging Manuel S. This was error, particularly since the primary excuse given was patently invalid. 1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 282-283; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 228, 241 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 729 P.2d 839 ].) The court did not question the prosecutor’s excuses for challenging Manuel S. This was error, particularly since the primary excuse given was patently invalid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Charrongreen2 sentences1987(People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 690, 692, 703; People v. Charron (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 981, 992 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 660 ].) Because the prosecution failed to meet its burden of justifying the exercise of the peremptory challenge to Casarez, we need not review the perhaps questionable justifications offered for peremptorily challenging the other Hispanic jurors. 1987(People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 690, 692, 703; People v. Charron (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 981, 992 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 660 ].) Because the prosecution failed to meet its burden of justifying the exercise of the peremptory challenge to Casarez, we need not review the perhaps questionable justifications offered for peremptorily challenging the other Hispanic jurors. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1955(People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [ 36 P. 7 ].) As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 [ 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578, 580 ], experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. 1955(People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [ 36 P. 7 ].) As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 [ 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578, 580 ], experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. | 2 | 1951–1955 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2014Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact. ‘Even an inflection in the voice can make a difference in the meaning.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, we have recognized “that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge”; that “the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box”; and that “the same factors used in evaluating a juror may be given different we | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Barber
green
1 sentence1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 273-275; People v. Barber, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 392 .) While the justification need not rise to a level of challenge for cause, counsel must articulate bona fide reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenge that would be equally applicable to any member of the venire, irrespective of whether or not that person was a member of an identifiable class, as opposed to mere “sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) The prosecutor’s primary reason for e | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1989The exercise of the peremptory challenge clearly resulted in “decision-making by racial stereotype.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 22 Cal.3d 296, 299 .) The striking of a single prospective juror for group bias is reversible error per se. 1989She also added that Manuel S. had his arms folded across his chest, “and it looked like he’d already made up his mind either way . . . .” In People v. Johnson (1978) 22 Cal.3d 296 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 915 , 583 P.2d 774 ], the chief prosecution witness was expected to testify to his prior statements, including the word “ ‘nigger.’ ” The defendant was Black and the prosecutor was concerned whether a Black juror could objectively weigh the testimony of the witness. {Id. at p. 299.) The prosecutor indicated his intent to exclude every potential Black juror regardless of what voir dire would reveal con | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Wheeler
red
1 sentence1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 273-275; People v. Barber, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 392 .) While the justification need not rise to a level of challenge for cause, counsel must articulate bona fide reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenge that would be equally applicable to any member of the venire, irrespective of whether or not that person was a member of an identifiable class, as opposed to mere “sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) The prosecutor’s primary reason for e | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kaufman v. Court of Appeal
green
1 sentence1984(See, e.g., Kaufman v. Court of Appeal, supra, 31 Cal.3d 933 .) The exercise of the peremptory challenge is strictly curtailed by the terms of the statute and by judicial interpretation. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.