Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Virginia Aragon v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.green2 sentences1989It also furthers the state’s interest in protecting the public from legal malpractice, an interest that transcends labor law.” (750 F.2d at 1456-1457.) 5 The Aragon discussion of preemption and the Farmer test logically relates to the question whether there is “complete preemption”—that is, whether the matter must be heard in federal court. 1989It also furthers the state’s interest in protecting the public from legal malpractice, an interest that transcends labor law.” (750 F.2d at 1456-1457.) 5 The Aragon discussion of preemption and the Farmer test logically relates to the question whether there is “complete preemption”—that is, whether the matter must be heard in federal court. | 1 | 1 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpentersgreen2 sentences1988To allow appellant to proceed in state court “might create a significant risk of misinterpretation of federal law and the consequent prohibition of protected conduct [or vice versa].” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 203 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 229 ].) Because appellant’s claim is arguably protected by the NLRA and fails to meet the Farmer test for exceptions to the Garmon preemption rule, exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct alleged in the complaint lies with the NLRB. 1988To allow appellant to proceed in state court “might create a significant risk of misinterpretation of federal law and the consequent prohibition of protected conduct [or vice versa].” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 203 [ 56 L.Ed.2d at p. 229 ].) Because appellant’s claim is arguably protected by the NLRA and fails to meet the Farmer test for exceptions to the Garmon preemption rule, exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct alleged in the complaint lies with the NLRB. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gentile
red
1 sentence2021(People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 ; People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1117–1118.) Accordingly, it was error to deny Farmer’s motion for acquittal. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McCoy
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 ; People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1117–1118.) Accordingly, it was error to deny Farmer’s motion for acquittal. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Osorio
green
2 sentences2015The appellate court upheld the trial court’s discretionary decision to exclude the evidence as lay opinion and did not apply the Farmer rule involving spontaneous utterance: “The opinion rule excludes admission of a spontaneous statement of inadmissible opinion [citation], and such opinions or conclusions should be excluded even where the statement as a whole meets the requirements of Evidence Code section 1240” (id. at p. 583) and “Farmer did not change the rule that opinion testimony may properly be excluded even where the rest of the statement meets the requirements of Evidence Code section 2015The appellate court upheld the trial court’s discretionary decision to exclude the evidence as lay opinion and did not apply the Farmer rule involving spontaneous utterance: “The opinion rule excludes admission of a spontaneous statement of inadmissible opinion [citation], and such opinions or conclusions should be excluded even where the statement as a whole meets the requirements of Evidence Code section 1240” (id. at p. 583) and “Farmer did not change the rule that opinion testimony may properly be excluded even where the rest of the statement meets the requirements of Evidence Code section | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Heslington
green
1 sentence2014In light of our order augmenting the record, Farmer's motion is denied as moot. 4 DISCUSSION In Hobbs, the Supreme Court confirmed that "all or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the privilege [under Evidence Code, section 1041] and protect the identity of a confidential informant." (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 971 .) "But, in order to preserve a defendant's right to 'reasonable access to information that might form the basis for challenging the validity of a search warrant,' a trial court must follow certain procedures when a search warrant affida | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hobbs
green
1 sentence2014In light of our order augmenting the record, Farmer's motion is denied as moot. 4 DISCUSSION In Hobbs, the Supreme Court confirmed that "all or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the privilege [under Evidence Code, section 1041] and protect the identity of a confidential informant." (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 971 .) "But, in order to preserve a defendant's right to 'reasonable access to information that might form the basis for challenging the validity of a search warrant,' a trial court must follow certain procedures when a search warrant affida | 1 | 2014–2014 |
No. 85-6562
green
1 sentence1988(Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp. (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 563, 565 , citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, supra, 471 U.S. 202 ; Hyles v. Mensing (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 1213, 1216-1217 .) 9 Machinists analysis generally applies to state laws that cover all employees, union and nonunion alike, and potentially upset the economic balance in the collective bargaining process. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hyles v. Mensing
green
1 sentence1988(Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp. (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 563, 565 , citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, supra, 471 U.S. 202 ; Hyles v. Mensing (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 1213, 1216-1217 .) 9 Machinists analysis generally applies to state laws that cover all employees, union and nonunion alike, and potentially upset the economic balance in the collective bargaining process. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
1 sentence1988(Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp. (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 563, 565 , citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, supra, 471 U.S. 202 ; Hyles v. Mensing (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 1213, 1216-1217 .) 9 Machinists analysis generally applies to state laws that cover all employees, union and nonunion alike, and potentially upset the economic balance in the collective bargaining process. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Neal v. State of California
green
2 sentences1987The farmer makes the decision as to the acres not to be plowed down with usually only one objective—to save time and money. 6 Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11 , explains that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense. 1987The farmer makes the decision as to the acres not to be plowed down with usually only one objective—to save time and money. 6 Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11 , explains that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
In Re Marriage of Cary
green
2 sentences1976Co., 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Farmers’ principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that Lara was Menchaca’s “spouse” and was therefore entitled to recover under Menchaca’s policy with Farmers. 5 The trial court in reaching its decision and Lara in responding to Farmer’s brief have both relied upon the decision in In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 862 ]. 6 In Cary, the court essentially held that, as a result of the Family Law Act (Civ. 1976Co., 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Farmers’ principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that Lara was Menchaca’s “spouse” and was therefore entitled to recover under Menchaca’s policy with Farmers. 5 The trial court in reaching its decision and Lara in responding to Farmer’s brief have both relied upon the decision in In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 862 ]. 6 In Cary, the court essentially held that, as a result of the Family Law Act (Civ. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1976Co., 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Farmers’ principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that Lara was Menchaca’s “spouse” and was therefore entitled to recover under Menchaca’s policy with Farmers. 5 The trial court in reaching its decision and Lara in responding to Farmer’s brief have both relied upon the decision in In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 862 ]. 6 In Cary, the court essentially held that, as a result of the Family Law Act (Civ. 1976Co., 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ].) Farmers’ principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that Lara was Menchaca’s “spouse” and was therefore entitled to recover under Menchaca’s policy with Farmers. 5 The trial court in reaching its decision and Lara in responding to Farmer’s brief have both relied upon the decision in In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 862 ]. 6 In Cary, the court essentially held that, as a result of the Family Law Act (Civ. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.