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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Alcalared2 sentences2011Thus, to paraphrase [People v.] Alcala [(1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 623 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ] (rejecting the contention the jury must be instmcted to distrust in-custody informant testimony)], ‘whatever consideration [an immunized witness] may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent.’ ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 624 .)” (Hunter, at pp. 977-978.) *883 That Hunter held a cautionary instruction is not required when a witness testifies under a grant of transactional immunity is clear. 2011Thus, to paraphrase [People v.] Alcala [(1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 623 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ] (rejecting the contention the jury must be instmcted to distrust in-custody informant testimony)], ‘whatever consideration [an immunized witness] may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent.’ ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 624 .)” (Hunter, at pp. 977-978.) *883 That Hunter held a cautionary instruction is not required when a witness testifies under a grant of transactional immunity is clear. | 1 | 1 |
Counselman v. Hitchcockred2 sentences2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes 2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes | 1 | 1 |
People v. Huntergreen2 sentences1993California law clearly conditions a grant of transactional immunity on a written request by the prosecutor. (§ 1324; see People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) The section 1324 grant of immunity is strictly an executive function, “since the decision to seek immunity is an integral part of the charging process, and it is the prosecuting attorneys who are to decide what, if any, crime is to be charged.” (In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ], italics in original.) Therefore, it is not within the court’s power to gran 1993California law clearly conditions a grant of transactional immunity on a written request by the prosecutor. (§ 1324; see People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) The section 1324 grant of immunity is strictly an executive function, “since the decision to seek immunity is an integral part of the charging process, and it is the prosecuting attorneys who are to decide what, if any, crime is to be charged.” (In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ], italics in original.) Therefore, it is not within the court’s power to gran | 1 | 1 |
In Re Webergreen2 sentences1993California law clearly conditions a grant of transactional immunity on a written request by the prosecutor. (§ 1324; see People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) The section 1324 grant of immunity is strictly an executive function, “since the decision to seek immunity is an integral part of the charging process, and it is the prosecuting attorneys who are to decide what, if any, crime is to be charged.” (In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ], italics in original.) Therefore, it is not within the court’s power to gran 1993California law clearly conditions a grant of transactional immunity on a written request by the prosecutor. (§ 1324; see People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 973 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) The section 1324 grant of immunity is strictly an executive function, “since the decision to seek immunity is an integral part of the charging process, and it is the prosecuting attorneys who are to decide what, if any, crime is to be charged.” (In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ], italics in original.) Therefore, it is not within the court’s power to gran | 1 | 1 |
Daly v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992This will require that the trial judge ensure that the jurors in question be given every opportunity to testify, and, if they persist in asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, that they be "immunized" either through a grant of transactional immunity upon the request of the prosecution pursuant to section 1324, or a grant of "use immunity" through the court. ( Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal. Rptr. 61 ].) If, after the hearing, the trial judge concludes tha 1992This will require that the trial judge ensure that the jurors in question be given every opportunity to testify, and, if they persist in asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, that they be "immunized" either through a grant of transactional immunity upon the request of the prosecution pursuant to section 1324, or a grant of "use immunity" through the court. ( Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal. Rptr. 61 ].) If, after the hearing, the trial judge concludes tha | 1 | 1 |
Tarantino v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992This will require that the trial judge ensure that the jurors in question be given every opportunity to testify, and, if they persist in asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, that they be "immunized" either through a grant of transactional immunity upon the request of the prosecution pursuant to section 1324, or a grant of "use immunity" through the court. ( Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal. Rptr. 61 ].) If, after the hearing, the trial judge concludes tha 1992This will require that the trial judge ensure that the jurors in question be given every opportunity to testify, and, if they persist in asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, that they be "immunized" either through a grant of transactional immunity upon the request of the prosecution pursuant to section 1324, or a grant of "use immunity" through the court. ( Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 465, 469 [ 122 Cal. Rptr. 61 ].) If, after the hearing, the trial judge concludes tha | 1 | 1 |
People v. Labelgreen2 sentences1983(People v. Label (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 774 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 522 ].) In Label appellant attacked the propriety of a limited rather than a general grant of immunity under section 1324, Penal Code. 1983(People v. Label (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 774 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 522 ].) In Label appellant attacked the propriety of a limited rather than a general grant of immunity under section 1324, Penal Code. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1982Second, they rely upon People v. Stewart (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 339, 343 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 562 ] which held that a defendant was not granted immunity by section 1324 for a crime to which he had pled guilty. 1982Second, they rely upon People v. Stewart (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 339, 343 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 562 ] which held that a defendant was not granted immunity by section 1324 for a crime to which he had pled guilty. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kastigar v. United States
green
1 sentence2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Blackburn v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes 2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Baxter v. Palmigiano
green
2 sentences2007(See Baxter v. Palmigiano (1976) 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 , quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2272, p. 439.) Presumably, a public employee's silence, with or without immunity, could support inferences adverse to him with respect to matters under inquiry. 2007(See Baxter v. Palmigiano (1976) 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 , quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2272, p. 439.) Presumably, a public employee's silence, with or without immunity, could support inferences adverse to him with respect to matters under inquiry. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ex parte Cohen
green
2 sentences2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes 2007Prior to that decision it had been widely supposed that defeasance of the privilege required a grant of transactional immunity, which exempts the interrogatee from prosecution with respect to matters disclosed under immunity. ( Id. at pp. 449-453, 92 S.Ct. 1653 ; see Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U.S. 547, 585-586 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 .) The widespread belief that transactional immunity was necessary spawned many statutes providing such immunity, including some two dozen still on the books in California. [3] He can also be compelled to answer if some other rule of law precludes | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Superior Court (Kaufman)
green
2 sentences1989It sets forth the conditions under which immunity is to be granted, some of the procedures to be followed, the scope of immunity, and the consequence which attends compulsion of the testimony.” (Id., at p. 876; cf. People v. Superior Court (Kaufman) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 421 , 426 & 426, fn. 4 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 ].) We believe the Campbell case to be correctly decided and follow its holding that where immunity is to be ordered by the court in criminal cases, the terms of that immunity must comply with the limitations set forth in Penal Code section 1324. 4 *4 We therefore conclude t 1989It sets forth the conditions under which immunity is to be granted, some of the procedures to be followed, the scope of immunity, and the consequence which attends compulsion of the testimony.” (Id., at p. 876; cf. People v. Superior Court (Kaufman) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 421 , 426 & 426, fn. 4 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 ].) We believe the Campbell case to be correctly decided and follow its holding that where immunity is to be ordered by the court in criminal cases, the terms of that immunity must comply with the limitations set forth in Penal Code section 1324. 4 *4 We therefore conclude t | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Campbell
green
2 sentences1983(People v. Campbell, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 867, 877 .) Thus it is clear that it is within the sole discretion of the district attorney to limit the grant of transactional immunity as he sees fit in exchange for the testimony of the witness. 1983(People v. Campbell, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 867, 877 .) Thus it is clear that it is within the sole discretion of the district attorney to limit the grant of transactional immunity as he sees fit in exchange for the testimony of the witness. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.