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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2022It concluded that the autonomy rights violated by counsel’s unilateral decision to concede his client’s guilt of first degree murder fell within that category of rights that are “so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 (Chapman).) The court likened the violation in the case to a violation of a defendant’s right of self-representation, explaining “ ‘[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.’ ” (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1511 .) Like the deprivation of that right 2022It concluded that the autonomy rights violated by counsel’s unilateral decision to concede his client’s guilt of first degree murder fell within that category of rights that are “so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 (Chapman).) The court likened the violation in the case to a violation of a defendant’s right of self-representation, explaining “ ‘[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.’ ” (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1511 .) Like the deprivation of that right | 2 | 2 |
Martinides v. Mayergreen2 sentences2016(E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 419 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 650 P.2d 1171 ] [plaintiff had less than “B” average in college and “unspectacular” test scores; impermissible to look to future earnings for doctors]; Martinides v. Mayer (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1205-1206 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 679 ] [plaintiff had “C” grades in high school, never attended college or any nursing classes; impermissible to look to future earnings for nurses].) To be sure, a handful of cases suggest that a plaintiffs earning capacity is within a jury’s common knowledge and thus may be left to the jury’s 2016(E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 419 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 650 P.2d 1171 ] [plaintiff had less than “B” average in college and “unspectacular” test scores; impermissible to look to future earnings for doctors]; Martinides v. Mayer (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1205-1206 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 679 ] [plaintiff had “C” grades in high school, never attended college or any nursing classes; impermissible to look to future earnings for nurses].) To be sure, a handful of cases suggest that a plaintiffs earning capacity is within a jury’s common knowledge and thus may be left to the jury’s | 1 | 1 |
Girard v. Irvinegreen2 sentences2016(Girard v. Irvine (1929) 97 Cal.App. 377, 386 [ 275 P. 840 ]; Evarts v. Santa Barbara C. 2016(Girard v. Irvine (1929) 97 Cal.App. 377, 386 [ 275 P. 840 ]; Evarts v. Santa Barbara C. | 1 | 1 |
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.red2 sentences2016(E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 419 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 650 P.2d 1171 ] [plaintiff had less than “B” average in college and “unspectacular” test scores; impermissible to look to future earnings for doctors]; Martinides v. Mayer (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1205-1206 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 679 ] [plaintiff had “C” grades in high school, never attended college or any nursing classes; impermissible to look to future earnings for nurses].) To be sure, a handful of cases suggest that a plaintiffs earning capacity is within a jury’s common knowledge and thus may be left to the jury’s 2016(E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 419 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 650 P.2d 1171 ] [plaintiff had less than “B” average in college and “unspectacular” test scores; impermissible to look to future earnings for doctors]; Martinides v. Mayer (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1205-1206 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 679 ] [plaintiff had “C” grades in high school, never attended college or any nursing classes; impermissible to look to future earnings for nurses].) To be sure, a handful of cases suggest that a plaintiffs earning capacity is within a jury’s common knowledge and thus may be left to the jury’s | 1 | 1 |
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences1979The conclusion of law that defendant was entitled to recover attorneys' fees rested upon the provisions of the mortgage, and the court could determine what amount would be reasonable without hearing any testimony thereon. [Citations.]'" ( Ibid. ) (2) Attorney fees are not like the usual item of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable attorney fee in the judgment without hearing evidence or making a finding as to the amount of such fee. ( Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) "`The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his cour 1979The conclusion of law that defendant was entitled to recover attorneys' fees rested upon the provisions of the mortgage, and the court could determine what amount would be reasonable without hearing any testimony thereon. [Citations.]'" ( Ibid. ) (2) Attorney fees are not like the usual item of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable attorney fee in the judgment without hearing evidence or making a finding as to the amount of such fee. ( Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) "`The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his cour | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Shaponagreen2 sentences1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o 1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o | 1 | 1 |
Huber v. Shedoudygreen2 sentences1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o 1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o | 1 | 1 |
Pehau v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o 1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Simms
green
1 sentence2021We disagree. “ ‘Broadly stated, a criminal defendant has a right to be personally present at certain pretrial proceedings and at trial under various provisions of law, including the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, and sections 977 and 1043.’ (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230 .) That right extends to sentencing and resentencing 6 proceedings . . . . [Citation.] A criminal defendant’s right to atten | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cole
green
1 sentence2021We disagree. “ ‘Broadly stated, a criminal defendant has a right to be personally present at certain pretrial proceedings and at trial under various provisions of law, including the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, and sections 977 and 1043.’ (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230 .) That right extends to sentencing and resentencing 6 proceedings . . . . [Citation.] A criminal defendant’s right to atten | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation, Manhattan-Ward, Incorporated v. Grinnell Corporation, 1225 Vine Street Building, Inc. v. Grinnell Corporation
yellow
1 sentence1979The conclusion of law that defendant was entitled to recover attorneys' fees rested upon the provisions of the mortgage, and the court could determine what amount would be reasonable without hearing any testimony thereon. [Citations.]'" ( Ibid. ) (2) Attorney fees are not like the usual item of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable attorney fee in the judgment without hearing evidence or making a finding as to the amount of such fee. ( Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) "`The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his cour | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Genis v. Krasne
green
2 sentences1979The conclusion of law that defendant was entitled to recover attorneys' fees rested upon the provisions of the mortgage, and the court could determine what amount would be reasonable without hearing any testimony thereon. [Citations.]'" ( Ibid. ) (2) Attorney fees are not like the usual item of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable attorney fee in the judgment without hearing evidence or making a finding as to the amount of such fee. ( Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) "`The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his cour 1979(Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) “ ‘The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, . . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Carriere v. Minturn
green
1 sentence1979The conclusion of law that defendant was entitled to recover attorneys' fees rested upon the provisions of the mortgage, and the court could determine what amount would be reasonable without hearing any testimony thereon. [Citations.]'" ( Ibid. ) (2) Attorney fees are not like the usual item of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable attorney fee in the judgment without hearing evidence or making a finding as to the amount of such fee. ( Genis v. Krasne, supra, 47 Cal.2d 241, 246 .) "`The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his cour | 1 | 1979–1979 |
In Re Brain
green
2 sentences1959(In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [ 328 P.2d 465 ]; In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [ 233 P. 390 ].) If those cases were correctly decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case, for there is no more reason in the former than in the latter to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defendant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. 1959(In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [ 328 P.2d 465 ]; In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [ 233 P. 390 ].) If those cases were correctly decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case, for there is no more reason in the former than in the latter to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defendant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
In Re Breen
red
2 sentences1959(In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [ 328 P.2d 465 ]; In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [ 233 P. 390 ].) If those cases were correctly decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case, for there is no more reason in the former than in the latter to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defendant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. 1959(In re Breen, 162 Cal.App.2d 235 [ 328 P.2d 465 ]; In re Brain, 70 Cal.App. 334 [ 233 P. 390 ].) If those cases were correctly decided, the judgment should be vacated in the present case, for there is no more reason in the former than in the latter to vacate the judgment without inquiry as to whether the right secured by the statute had in fact been violated. [10] The purpose of the requirement that a plea be entered by defendant personally is to ensure that the plea is his own. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
City Investment Co. v. Pringle
green
1 sentence1956(See Huber v. Shedoudy (1919), 180 Cal. 311, 313-314 [ 181 P. 63 ]; Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 463-464 [ 267 P.2d 378 ]; Pehau v. Stewart (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 90, 97 [ 245 P.2d 692 ].) It is particularly to be observed that where attorneys’ fees are allowable solely by virtue of contract they cannot be recovered by merely including them in the memorandum of costs (City Investment Co. v. Pringle (1920), supra, 49 Cal.App. 353, 355 .) 2 Therefore, lessors, in the prior action, properly set up their claim for attorneys’ fees before it *247 could be known whether there would o | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.