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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.green2 sentences2026(Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 891 (Taylor); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2001) 531 U.S. 497 , 507-508 (Semtek); see id. at p. 507 [the United States Supreme Court “has the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments”].) In federal-question cases, “federal courts participate in developing ‘uniform federal rule[s]’ of res judicata, which [the high court] has ultimate authority to determine and declare.” (Taylor, at p. 891, quoting Semtek, at p. 508.) In diversity cases, “federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which 2026(Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 891 (Taylor); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2001) 531 U.S. 497 , 507-508 (Semtek); see id. at p. 507 [the United States Supreme Court “has the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments”].) In federal-question cases, “federal courts participate in developing ‘uniform federal rule[s]’ of res judicata, which [the high court] has ultimate authority to determine and declare.” (Taylor, at p. 891, quoting Semtek, at p. 508.) In diversity cases, “federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which | 2 | 7 |
Taylor v. Sturgellgreen2 sentences2026(Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 891 (Taylor); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2001) 531 U.S. 497 , 507-508 (Semtek); see id. at p. 507 [the United States Supreme Court “has the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments”].) In federal-question cases, “federal courts participate in developing ‘uniform federal rule[s]’ of res judicata, which [the high court] has ultimate authority to determine and declare.” (Taylor, at p. 891, quoting Semtek, at p. 508.) In diversity cases, “federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which 2018It states that the United States Supreme Court "has the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments." ( Semtek, supra , 531 U.S. at p. 507 , 121 S.Ct. 1021 , italics omitted.) If there were any doubt about the breadth of this holding, the high court removed it in Taylor, supra, 553 U.S. at page 892 , 128 S.Ct. 2161 , which applies Semtek in a case where the judgment at issue was entered in a federal question case. | 2 | 4 |
Gamble v. General Foods Corp.green1 sentence2018(See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; Taylor, at p. 891, citing Semtek, at pp. 507–508; see also Rest.2d Judgments, § 87 3 “The federal courts utilize a transactional analysis; i.e., two suits constitute a single cause of action if they both arise from the same ‘transactional nucleus of facts’ [citation] or a single ‘core of operative facts.’ [Citation.] California follows the primary right theory of Pomeroy; i.e., a cause of action consists of 1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, 2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and 3) a delict or wrong done by the defendant which con | 1 | 1 |
Butcher v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2014Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1452 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] [“California follows the rule that the preclusive effect of a prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law, at least where the prior judgment was on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.”].) While federal common law also governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity, the federal Supreme Court concluded there was no need to establish a uniform federal rule since state, not federal, substantive law was at issue, explaining: “And indeed, nationwide uniformity in th 2014Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1452 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] [“California follows the rule that the preclusive effect of a prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law, at least where the prior judgment was on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.”].) While federal common law also governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity, the federal Supreme Court concluded there was no need to establish a uniform federal rule since state, not federal, substantive law was at issue, explaining: “And indeed, nationwide uniformity in th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cabana v. Bullock
red
1 sentence1994Distinguishing errors committed at that phase from those committed at the guilt phase, the court noted: “. . . a jury’s conviction cannot stand if the instructions provided the jury do not require it to find each element of the crime under the proper standard of proof.” (Id., at p. 384 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 715 ].) Had Cabana remained the last word on the rule of per se reversal it would appear doubtful appellant’s conviction could be affirmed under the CantrellThomton exception, despite the overwhelming evidence of guilt, which appellant effectively conceded. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Pope v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1994However, after two subsequent cases, Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , and Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ], the obstacle posed by Cabana to the validity of the Cantrell-Thomton exception “seems to have been removed.” (People v. Joiner, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 225 .) In Rose the court faced the question whether the rule requiring per se reversal necessarily applied to Sandstrom error, in which an erroneous instruction to the jury on an element of a charged offense impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on that element. 1994However, after two subsequent cases, Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , and Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ], the obstacle posed by Cabana to the validity of the Cantrell-Thomton exception “seems to have been removed.” (People v. Joiner, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 225 .) In Rose the court faced the question whether the rule requiring per se reversal necessarily applied to Sandstrom error, in which an erroneous instruction to the jury on an element of a charged offense impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on that element. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rose v. Clark
red
1 sentence1994However, after two subsequent cases, Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , and Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ], the obstacle posed by Cabana to the validity of the Cantrell-Thomton exception “seems to have been removed.” (People v. Joiner, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 225 .) In Rose the court faced the question whether the rule requiring per se reversal necessarily applied to Sandstrom error, in which an erroneous instruction to the jury on an element of a charged offense impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on that element. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Joiner
green
1 sentence1994However, after two subsequent cases, Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 , and Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 ], the obstacle posed by Cabana to the validity of the Cantrell-Thomton exception “seems to have been removed.” (People v. Joiner, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 225 .) In Rose the court faced the question whether the rule requiring per se reversal necessarily applied to Sandstrom error, in which an erroneous instruction to the jury on an element of a charged offense impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on that element. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.