Lexington motion in California

2017The court reasoned in relevant part: "The additional insured endorsements ('AIE') provide[ ] coverage 'only with respect to liability arising out of [the subcontractors'] ongoing operations .' [Citation.] Because there were no homeowners in existence until after the subcontractors' work was completed, it follows that ... any potential liability to the homeowners arising out of the subcontractors' work must have arisen out of the subcontractor's completed operations ." (Italics added.) The trial court reasoned further that "[t]here is a distinction between ongoing operations and completed opera

2017The court reasoned in relevant part: "The additional insured endorsements ('AIE') provide[ ] coverage 'only with respect to liability arising out of [the subcontractors'] ongoing operations .' [Citation.] Because there were no homeowners in existence until after the subcontractors' work was completed, it follows that ... any potential liability to the homeowners arising out of the subcontractors' work must have arisen out of the subcontractor's completed operations ." (Italics added.) The trial court reasoned further that "[t]here is a distinction between ongoing operations and completed opera

2020(County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314 .) 2 January 12, 2018 hearing stated the court had granted Lexington’s motion and exonerated the bond.

2013Co. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1060 .) However, “section 3287 does not authorize prejudgment interest as a matter of law where the amount of damage, as opposed to only the determination of liability, depends upon a judicial determination based upon conflicting evidence and is not ascertainable from truthful data supplied by the claimant to his debtor.” (Id. at p. 1062.) Here, Lexington contends that damages were uncertain because the parties disputed the tender date and the end date of Lexington’s defense obligation and also what formula to use to allocate fees and costs among the three primar

2013Co., supra, 210 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 660, citing Montrose II, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 668 .) That conclusion does not resolve the coverage question, because it is necessary to decide whether the continuous loss endorsement affects activation of Lexington's defense duty.

2013(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 .) A triable issue of material fact exists " 'if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.' [Citation.] Thus, a party 'cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact.' " (Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Ins.

2007Robie, J., and Butz, J., concurred. 1 Undesignated section references are to this code. 2 The statutory appearance period is “[t]he 185 days after the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties.” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658 .) 3 Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 867 was decided after the trial court denied Lexington’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. 4 Because the trial court’s conclusion that Lexington was required to file its motion to vacate the f

2007Robie, J., and Butz, J., concurred. 1 Undesignated section references are to this code. 2 The statutory appearance period is “[t]he 185 days after the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties.” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658 .) 3 Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 867 was decided after the trial court denied Lexington’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. 4 Because the trial court’s conclusion that Lexington was required to file its motion to vacate the f