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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Home Insurance v. Landmark Insurancegreen2 sentences1995Nor did the court set forth in its opinion, or make any attempt to analyze, the standard definition of “occurrence” found in the standard form CGL policy. 21 Finally, apparently satisfied with its earlier observation in Home that, “[b]y its terms, section 22 [the codified loss-in-progress rule] applies to both first-party [property insurance] and third-party [liability insurance] cases” (Home, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395, fn. 4 ), the Fireman’s Fund court made no further effort to analyze how application of the loss-in-progress rule might differ in the third party liability insurance cont 1995Nor did the court set forth in its opinion, or make any attempt to analyze, the standard definition of "occurrence" found in the standard form CGL policy. [21] Finally, apparently satisfied with its earlier observation in Home that, "[b]y its terms, section 22 [the codified loss-in-progress rule] applies to both first-party [property insurance] and third-party [liability insurance] cases" ( Home, supra, 205 Cal. App.3d at p. 1395, fn. 4 ), the Fireman's Fund court made no further effort to analyze how application of the loss-in-progress rule might differ in the third party liability insurance | 2 | 2 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurancegreen2 sentences2006(Montrose II, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 654-656.) As the court said, it set out to determine “when potential coverage is triggered under a CGL policy where the underlying third party claims involve continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury, and how the loss-in-progress rule applies to such policies.” (Id. at p. 661, fn. omitted.) It concluded “that the standard CGL policy language, such as was incorporated into Admiral’s policies in issue in this case, provides coverage for bodily injury and property damage that occurs during the policy period. 2005Co. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 645, 691, 693 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 913 P.2d 878 ] [where existence and extent of injuries were unknown from insured’s “standpoint,” coverage, coverage of continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage under a commercial general liability policy did not offend loss-in-progress rule].) And in cases like the present one where the insured is presented with at least a possibility of a claim during the policy period, there is even less reason to use the loss-in-progress rule to construe the word “claim” against the insured. 3 See Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of In | 1 | 4 |
Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 695 .) According to Mid-Century, the trial court erroneously framed the issue in terms of forfeiture and waiver, when in fact the loss-in-progress rule governed and compelled a conclusion 5 Insurance Code section 22 states: “Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event.” Section 250 states: “Except as provided in this article, any contingent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest, or create a 1995We disagree. (11) Section 22 defines "insurance" as a "contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a *690 contingent or unknown event." (Italics added.) Section 250 provides that "any contingent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest, or create a liability against him, may be insured against, subject to the provisions of this code." (Italics added.) Accordingly, when a loss is "known or apparent" before a policy of insurance is issued, there is no coverage. ( Prudential-LMI, supr | 1 | 2 |
Pacific Employers Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1995Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 1358; see also Keeton & Widiss (1988) Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices, § 5.10(d), p. 598.) The "claims made" concept was subsequently extended into the field of general liability coverage, and in 1986 ISO issued both a revised standard form occurrence-based CGL policy (now referred to as a commercial general liability policy) and a new standard form CGL "claims made" policy. [25] The Hawaii Supreme Court has likewise concluded that even where an injured third party has filed a lawsui | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monteleone v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2021Allstate was not willing and lost no time in informing appellants that it would not insure or defend for that loss.” ( Monteleone, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519.) Elsewhere the court recognized that Allstate had the discretion to reinstate the policy without a lapse, despite the accident that occurred when the policy was out of force. 2021(Monteleone, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 514 .) The Monteleones appealed, arguing summary judgment was error because “Allstate had renewed the policy without lapse, had collected the entire premium without deduction or offset for a lapse, had waived its right to claim lapse and is estopped from so asserting, and that the loss in progress rule is inapplicable to this case.” (Id. at p. 513.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting, among other things, the Monteleones’ “strained interpretation” of the amended declaration page that indicated the policy period was December 21 to June 21. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Firemans's Fund Insurance v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences1995(Fireman’s Fund, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1626-1627.) The court indicated that “[t]o the extent Home’s rationale rests on the loss-in-progress rule, it, too, is fully applicable to a third party claim.” (Id. at p. 1627, fn. omitted.) And the Fireman’s Fund court reasoned further that, “[l]ike the situation in Home , here the issues arise in a context where the claimant [i.e., the insured] has been fully satisfied and the case involves allocating loss between insurers. 1995In short, the Fireman's Fund court applied the manifestation trigger of coverage which it had earlier adopted in Home . ( Fireman's Fund, supra, 223 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1626-1627.) The court indicated that "[t]o the extent Home's rationale rests on the loss-in-progress rule, it, too, is fully applicable to a third party claim." ( Id. at p. 1627, fn. omitted.) And the Fireman's Fund court reasoned further that, "[l]ike the situation in Home , here the issues arise in a context where the claimant [i.e., the insured] has been fully satisfied and the case involves allocating loss between insurers. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indemnity
green
2 sentences1995(Post, at pp. 689-692.) Accordingly, to the extent the decisions in Fireman’s Fund, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1621 , and Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Assn. v. Industrial Indemnity, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 714 , are inconsistent with the principles discussed herein, those decisions are hereby disapproved. 5. 1995However, third party liability policies do not contain in their occurrence sections any discovery requirement or a policy limitations period for the filing of an action after manifestation of a defect." The Zurich court also retreated from the "rather narrow definition of contingency" espoused in Fireman's Fund in connection with that opinion's discussion of the loss-in-progress rule, and reached new conclusions regarding the applicability of that rule in third party liability insurance cases, consistent with the conclusions we reach today respecting the applicability of that rule to this case | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.