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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Lifschutzgreen2 sentences1978To borrow the expression of the Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 438 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 467 P.2d 557 , 44 A.L.R.3d 1 ]: “[I] do not believe the patient-psychotherapist privilege should be frozen into the rigidity of absolutism.” Nor has the Legislature done so. 1978To borrow the expression of the Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 438 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 467 P.2d 557 , 44 A.L.R.3d 1 ]: “[I] do not believe the patient-psychotherapist privilege should be frozen into the rigidity of absolutism.” Nor has the Legislature done so. | 3 | 4 |
Herrera v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1990“In camera proceedings provide an effective means of balancing two competing considerations.” (Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1162 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ]; italics original.) Thus, while section 915, subdivision (b)’s provision for in camera hearings does not by its terms apply to anything other than official information, identity of informers, and trade secrets, the Supreme Court has approved its use in conjunction with the patient-psychotherapist privilege. 1990“In camera proceedings provide an effective means of balancing two competing considerations.” (Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1162 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ]; italics original.) Thus, while section 915, subdivision (b)’s provision for in camera hearings does not by its terms apply to anything other than official information, identity of informers, and trade secrets, the Supreme Court has approved its use in conjunction with the patient-psychotherapist privilege. | 1 | 1 |
George R. Caesar, M.D. v. Louis P. Mountanos, as Sheriff of the County of Marin, State of Californiagreen1 sentence1988The possibility that the psychotherapist could be compelled to reveal those communications to anyone . . . can deter persons from seeking needed treatment and destroy treatment in progress.” (Caesar v. Mountanos (9th Cir. 1976) 542 F.2d 1064, 1072 (dis. opn. of Hufstedler, J.) citing Katz et al., Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis and the Law (1967) pp. 726-727.) judicial deference to the patient-psychotherapist privilege also promotes societal weal. “[EJffective treatment reduces the costs of antisocial behavior attributable to mental illness.” (Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychother *789 apy | 1 | 1 |
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myersgreen2 sentences1988(Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 262 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 625 P.2d 779 , 20 A.L.R.4th 1118 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ].) However, the patient-psychotherapist privilege is not absolute. 1988(Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 262 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 625 P.2d 779 , 20 A.L.R.4th 1118 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ].) However, the patient-psychotherapist privilege is not absolute. | 1 | 1 |
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1988(Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 262 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 625 P.2d 779 , 20 A.L.R.4th 1118 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ].) However, the patient-psychotherapist privilege is not absolute. 1988(Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 262 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 625 P.2d 779 , 20 A.L.R.4th 1118 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ].) However, the patient-psychotherapist privilege is not absolute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Kristine W.
green
1 sentence2017This case is not akin to In re Kristine W. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 521 , in which a minor’s patient-psychotherapist privilege was permitted to be invaded for the limited purpose of gathering information to ensure minor was receiving appropriate services. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ben Lee Brown v. Walter E. Craven
green
1 sentence1982The record indicates that he consulted with counsel at appropriate times and behaved properly while the jury was present. [3] In Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166 , relied on by the majority, the trial court "summarily denied the motions [for substitution], making no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction with his counsel or taking any other steps which might possibly lead to the appointment of substitute counsel in whom Brown could repose his confidence." ( Id., at p. 1169.) Here the requirements for such an inquiry (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 8 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1982The record indicates that he consulted with counsel at appropriate times and behaved properly while the jury was present. [3] In Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166 , relied on by the majority, the trial court "summarily denied the motions [for substitution], making no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction with his counsel or taking any other steps which might possibly lead to the appointment of substitute counsel in whom Brown could repose his confidence." ( Id., at p. 1169.) Here the requirements for such an inquiry (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 8 1982The record indicates that he consulted with counsel at appropriate times and behaved properly while the jury was present. [3] In Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166 , relied on by the majority, the trial court "summarily denied the motions [for substitution], making no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction with his counsel or taking any other steps which might possibly lead to the appointment of substitute counsel in whom Brown could repose his confidence." ( Id., at p. 1169.) Here the requirements for such an inquiry (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 8 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Marsden
green
2 sentences1982The record indicates that he consulted with counsel at appropriate times and behaved properly while the jury was present. [3] In Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166 , relied on by the majority, the trial court "summarily denied the motions [for substitution], making no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction with his counsel or taking any other steps which might possibly lead to the appointment of substitute counsel in whom Brown could repose his confidence." ( Id., at p. 1169.) Here the requirements for such an inquiry (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 8 1982The record indicates that he consulted with counsel at appropriate times and behaved properly while the jury was present. [3] In Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166 , relied on by the majority, the trial court "summarily denied the motions [for substitution], making no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction with his counsel or taking any other steps which might possibly lead to the appointment of substitute counsel in whom Brown could repose his confidence." ( Id., at p. 1169.) Here the requirements for such an inquiry (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 8 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California
red
2 sentences1978As our high court observed in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], in attempting to balance the countervailing interests, the Legislature has tempered the broad rule of privilege granted by Evidence Code section 1014 by enacting the exception provided for in Evidence Code section 1024. 1978As our high court observed in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], in attempting to balance the countervailing interests, the Legislature has tempered the broad rule of privilege granted by Evidence Code section 1014 by enacting the exception provided for in Evidence Code section 1024. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.