picture factors in California

2009Code, § 1054.1, subd. (f); cf. Funk v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423 , 424 [ 340 P.2d 593 ].) People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ] stated on page 821: "[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness's credibility. ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. 763 ].) Indeed, we have held that `when an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that t

2009Code, § 1054.1, subd. (f); cf. Funk v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423 , 424 [ 340 P.2d 593 ].) People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ] stated on page 821: "[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness's credibility. ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. 763 ].) Indeed, we have held that `when an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that t

2009Code, § 1054.1, subd. (f); cf. Funk v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423 , 424 [ 340 P.2d 593 ].) People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ] stated on page 821: "[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness's credibility. ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. 763 ].) Indeed, we have held that `when an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that t

2009Code, § 1054.1, subd. (f); cf. Funk v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423 , 424 [ 340 P.2d 593 ].) People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ] stated on page 821: "[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness's credibility. ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. 763 ].) Indeed, we have held that `when an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that t

2015In fact, the nature of the plea deals was the proper subject of disclosure to the jury. “[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness’s credibility. [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]hen an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 821 ; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 337 .) The prosecutor’s commen

2015In fact, the nature of the plea deals was the proper subject of disclosure to the jury. “[T]he existence of a plea agreement is relevant impeachment evidence that must be disclosed to the defense because it bears on the witness’s credibility. [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]hen an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 821 ; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 337 .) The prosecutor’s commen

2021California law requires that the terms of a plea agreement, or any agreement affecting the witness, be disclosed to the jury “ ‘ “to ensure the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 337 ; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 459 .) Thus, “[i]t is settled that making a record of the terms of a plea agreement requiring a witness to tell the truth does not constitute impermissible 10 vouching.” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 , overruled on another ground by People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 52

2021California law requires that the terms of a plea agreement, or any agreement affecting the witness, be disclosed to the jury “ ‘ “to ensure the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 337 ; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 459 .) Thus, “[i]t is settled that making a record of the terms of a plea agreement requiring a witness to tell the truth does not constitute impermissible 10 vouching.” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 , overruled on another ground by People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 52

2021California law requires that the terms of a plea agreement, or any agreement affecting the witness, be disclosed to the jury “ ‘ “to ensure the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 337 ; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 459 .) Thus, “[i]t is settled that making a record of the terms of a plea agreement requiring a witness to tell the truth does not constitute impermissible 10 vouching.” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 , overruled on another ground by People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 52

2007The prosecutor read the contents of Keyes’s plea agreement during each opening argument, but it was permissible to advise the jury of this information: “ ‘[W]hen an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 821 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 831 P.2d 249 ], 9 quoting People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 47 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ]; accord, People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 971.

1992Defendant first argues that reference to the district attorney's preliminary determination of Buckley's credibility as a condition of the plea agreement was improper because it implied the existence of information, known to the prosecutor but undisclosed to the jury, that proved Buckley was telling the truth. ( United States v. Roberts (9th Cir.1980) 618 F.2d 530, 536 .) (9) Defendant correctly notes that a prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or belief in a witness's credibility when there is "`substantial danger that jurors will interpret this as being based on information at the pr

1992Defendant first argues that reference to the district attorney's preliminary determination of Buckley's credibility as a condition of the plea agreement was improper because it implied the existence of information, known to the prosecutor but undisclosed to the jury, that proved Buckley was telling the truth. ( United States v. Roberts (9th Cir.1980) 618 F.2d 530, 536 .) (9) Defendant correctly notes that a prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or belief in a witness's credibility when there is "`substantial danger that jurors will interpret this as being based on information at the pr