policy reasons underlying doctrine in California

2009(See Musser v. Provencher (2002) 28 Cal.4th 274, 285-287 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 48 P.3d 408 ].) (9) In light of the fact the causes of action asserted in this matter involve injury to property rather than personal injury, the assignment of the punitive damages claim is incident to the transfer of real property from the Trust to Cook Endeavors, and Cook Endeavors is merely a continuation of the Trust in another form, we conclude Cook Endeavors is entitled to pursue whatever punitive damages claim may exist by virtue of the matters alleged in the complaint.

2009(See Musser v. Provencher (2002) 28 Cal.4th 274, 285-287 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 48 P.3d 408 ].) (9) In light of the fact the causes of action asserted in this matter involve injury to property rather than personal injury, the assignment of the punitive damages claim is incident to the transfer of real property from the Trust to Cook Endeavors, and Cook Endeavors is merely a continuation of the Trust in another form, we conclude Cook Endeavors is entitled to pursue whatever punitive damages claim may exist by virtue of the matters alleged in the complaint.

2002(Id. at p. 1187, citing Atchison v. City of Englewood (1973) 180 Colo. 407, 414 [ 560 P.2d 140 , 143].) Articulating the policy reasons underlying the rule, the Criste court stated: “First, to allow the exception to extend beyond purely declaratory relief would run counter to the purpose of declaratory actions, which is ‘to provide a remedy that is simpler and less harsh than coercive relief.’ [Citation.] Perhaps more importantly, to permit some but not other coercive actions to accompany a request for declaratory relief would open the door to uncertainty and potential claim splitting.

1999It then addressed the issue of whether the privilege protected prelitigation activities, and confirmed that it well could: “In light of this extensive history, it is late in the day to contend that communications with ‘some relation’ to an anticipated lawsuit are not within the privilege.” (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1194.) 8 More specifically, both before and after Rubin, several cases have held that prelitigation demand letters of the sort involved here may be privileged under the section.

1999(Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1193.) It then went on to note, as it had three years earlier in Silberg , the policy reasons underlying the rule, principally protecting access to the courts.

1989Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 605-606 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ], the Supreme Court explained the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and outlined certain limitations on the preclusive effect of a felony plea of guilty by a party in a criminal case in a subsequent civil action relating to the same conduct.

1989Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 605-606 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ], the Supreme Court explained the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and outlined certain limitations on the preclusive effect of a felony plea of guilty by a party in a criminal case in a subsequent civil action relating to the same conduct.

1989The court set forth these fundamental policies underlying collateral estoppel: “ ‘The rule is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ (Bernhard v. Bank of America, [1942] 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) ‘This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case. ’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, [1948] 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].) When a plea of guilty has been entered in

1989The court set forth these fundamental policies underlying collateral estoppel: “ ‘The rule is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ (Bernhard v. Bank of America, [1942] 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) ‘This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case. ’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, [1948] 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].) When a plea of guilty has been entered in

1989The court set forth these fundamental policies underlying collateral estoppel: “ ‘The rule is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ (Bernhard v. Bank of America, [1942] 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) ‘This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case. ’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, [1948] 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].) When a plea of guilty has been entered in

1989The court set forth these fundamental policies underlying collateral estoppel: “ ‘The rule is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.’ (Bernhard v. Bank of America, [1942] 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) ‘This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case. ’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, [1948] 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].) When a plea of guilty has been entered in