premises line rule in California

2026For example, the California Supreme Court described it as a “ ‘ “slippery concept,’ ‘riddled with exceptions,” ’ and difficult to apply uniformly. [Citation.] Such criticism led, among other things, to the premises line rule.” (Wright v. State of California, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230 ; see also Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 508.) In an effort to create a “sharp line of demarcation” as to when the employee’s commute terminates and the course of employment commences for purposes of determining whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, “ ‘courts adopted the premises lin

2023Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 153, 157 .) Over time, this rule “became the subject of significant criticism, the California Supreme Court, for example, describing it as a ‘“slippery concept,”’ ‘“riddled with exceptions,”’ and difficult to apply uniformly. [Citation.]” (Wright v. State of California (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 5 1230 (Wright).) “Such criticism led, among other things, to the premises line rule.” (Ibid.) “In an effort to create a ‘sharp line of demarcation’ as to when the employee’s commute terminates and the course of employment commences, courts adopted the premises line

2026Extending [the employer’s] liability to the total premises is somewhat arbitrary but as a practical measure is well established.’ ” (Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) Our Supreme Court has explained that the “premises line rule” has the advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins and ends—objectively and fairly, and that any disadvantages of such “ ‘a sharp, objective, and perhaps somewhat arbitrary line has been drawn,’ ” are outweighed by “ attempting to formulate and apply a subjective rule justly.” (General Ins., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 599 ; se

2023Co., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 598 .) In attempting to avoid this conclusion, appellants argue a triable issue remained on whether the premises line rule applied to Jones’s injuries based on the following factors: (1) Jones was leaving work, rather than arriving; (2) her means of commute was not employer-designated, and her route was not reserved for employees but also used by students and the general public; and (3) UCI’s campus was large.

2026Citing Makins v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 198 Cal. 698 and McIvor v. Savage (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 128 , plaintiffs argue the premises line rule is inapplicable when (as here) an employee is off duty and engaged in a purely personal act that does not benefit his employer and amounts to unnecessary loitering on the employer’s premises.

2026Citing Makins v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 198 Cal. 698 and McIvor v. Savage (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 128 , plaintiffs argue the premises line rule is inapplicable when (as here) an employee is off duty and engaged in a purely personal act that does not benefit his employer and amounts to unnecessary loitering on the employer’s premises.

2015Appeals Bd. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 745 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 246 ] [illegible] the going and coming rule but indicting that the employer’s premises was the entire campus.)[ 5 ] The purpose of the premises line rule is to ‘ “enabl[e] courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins — objectively and fairly.” ’ (Santa Rosa Junior College, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 353, fn. 11 .) “In order to raise a triable issue, Plaintiff relies primarily on the fact that he had a landlord-tenant relationship with Defendant and a lease which imposed obligations on Defendant, including the duty to maintain the stair

2015Appeals Bd. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 745 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 246 ] [illegible] the going and coming rule but indicting that the employer’s premises was the entire campus.)[ 5 ] The purpose of the premises line rule is to ‘ “enabl[e] courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins — objectively and fairly.” ’ (Santa Rosa Junior College, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 353, fn. 11 .) “In order to raise a triable issue, Plaintiff relies primarily on the fact that he had a landlord-tenant relationship with Defendant and a lease which imposed obligations on Defendant, including the duty to maintain the stair

2015(See Ibid; Greydanus, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 492-493 [liability imposed where worker was required to turn left off of public highway to access employer’s premises].) That Schultz was driving his personal vehicle at the time of the accident is of no moment in the analysis of the application of the premises line rule, because regardless of his means of travel to Building No. 1440, Schultz would have been on the secure premises of Edwards owing only to his status as a JT3 employee.

2015Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 335- 336.) These cases recognize that where an employee is required to access the employer’s property by a specific means, an injury occurring during the course of entry into the property, even if on a public highway, is considered to have occurred in the course of employment under the premises line rule. ( Greydanus, supra, at pp. 492-493 .) 11 “The liability of an employer for injuries sustained by his employees on the employment premises is exceedingly broad.

2015Appeals Bd. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 ) that the California Supreme Court decision in Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers’ Comp.

2005Code, § 3600) is closely related *468 to the test for whether an employee is acting within the “scope of employment” under respondeat superior (Hinman, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 962, fn. 3), and (2) that “[i]n the ‘going and coming’ cases, the California courts often cite tort and workers’ compensation cases interchangeably.” (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722 .) Hartline contends public policy favors the adoption of the premises line rule for purposes of respondeat superior.