principle upon rule in California

1948Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159 [ 88 P. 708 , 119 Am.St.Rep. 164 , 11 Ann.Cas. 609, 9 L.R.A.

1948Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159 [ 88 P. 708 , 119 Am.St.Rep. 164 , 11 Ann.Cas. 609, 9 L.R.A.

1930We cannot think, however, that this difference in the wording of the statutes in any way affects the principle upon which the rule is rested. ^The state punishes the wrongful taking of personal property belonging to or in the possession of another because of the offense against the majesty of its laws, and because of the inherent wickedness and criminality of the act, as well as because of the wrong done to the individual whose property is taken] Stated in another way, the state punishes larceny because it is larceny, and, that the guilty may not escape, it will treat any form of personal prop

1930We cannot think, however, that this difference in the wording of the statutes in any way affects the principle upon which the rule is rested. ^The state punishes the wrongful taking of personal property belonging to or in the possession of another because of the offense against the majesty of its laws, and because of the inherent wickedness and criminality of the act, as well as because of the wrong done to the individual whose property is taken] Stated in another way, the state punishes larceny because it is larceny, and, that the guilty may not escape, it will treat any form of personal prop

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1905The principle upon which this rule rests is not impaired by the fact that in certain exceptional instances the appellate court, upon a showing of matters occurring subsequent to the entry of the judgment, will decline to entertain the appeal or-to consider its merits, as, for example, where the judgment has been satisfied of record by the voluntary act of the appellant (People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 , [ 21 Pac. 540 ]; Moore v. Morrison, 130 Cal. 80 , [ 62 Pac. 268 ]); or where the judgment was. rendered upon a cause of action which did not survive, and by reason of the death of the appellant th

1901(Neslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428 ; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 .) For this purpose the recorder is the agent of such grantee, and the errors or omissions of the recorder in making such transcription are his errors or omissions in the same manner as are the errors of a sheriff in executing a writ, or of a clerk in recording an order or a judgment.

1901(Neslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428 ; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 .) For this purpose the recorder is the agent of such grantee, and the errors or omissions of the recorder in making such transcription are his errors or omissions in the same manner as are the errors of a sheriff in executing a writ, or of a clerk in recording an order or a judgment.

1899It may be admitted that the conclusion declared by Justice Temple is supported by persuasive reasons; yet we find no court in this country sustaining the proposition, unless the decision in McKenna v. McKenna, 70 Ill.

1896The earliest application of this rule was in the case of a mortgage of a female slave (Hughes v. Graves, 1 Litt. 317 ), which was decided in Kentucky in 1822, and was afterward followed in Maryland in 1836, in the case of Evans v. Merrihen, 8 Gill & J. 39, which also involved the offspring of a female slave which had been mortgaged; and these cases are cited as the authority upon which cases involving the same ques tian have been decided in other states—in some instances referring also to the principle upon which the rule rests, and in others merely referring to the cases as an authority.

1896(Cahoon v. Miers, 67 Md. 573 ; Gundy v. Biteler, 6 Ill.

1896(Cahoon v. Miers, 67 Md. 573 ; Gundy v. Biteler, 6 Ill.

1893The principle upon which this rule rests is that the judgment is an estoppel binding upon the parties and to' be enforced by the court: Klauber v. Car Co., 98 Cal. 105 , 32 Pac. 876 .

1893The principle upon which this rule rests is that the judgment is an estoppel binding upon the parties and to' be enforced by the court: Klauber v. Car Co., 98 Cal. 105 , 32 Pac. 876 .