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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2018(See People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322 , 330, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 617 [admission of 11-year-old misdemeanor burglary and theft convictions "not unreasonable and within [trial court's] discretion"].) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the Mireles's prior convictions were admissible. 2018(See People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322 , 330, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 617 [admission of 11-year-old misdemeanor burglary and theft convictions "not unreasonable and within [trial court's] discretion"].) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the Mireles's prior convictions were admissible. | 1 | 2 |
Stiles v. Bodkingreen2 sentences2015Even if Respondents’ Contractual Obligations to Make Disclosures Merged with the Deed, the Collateral Obligations Exception to that Doctrine Applies “While the merger doctrine is universally accepted, it is only the starting point, inasmuch as the exceptions to the rule are at least as important as the rule itself.” (9 Thompson, supra, § 82.13(d), p. 721.) A prominent exception to the merger rule exists for contractual provisions that are “ ‘collateral to the deed.’ ” (Stiles v. Bodkin (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 839, 843 [ 111 P.2d 675 ] (Stiles); see Mills v. The Richmond Co., Inc. (1922) 56 Cal.Ap 2015Even if Respondents’ Contractual Obligations to Make Disclosures Merged with the Deed, the Collateral Obligations Exception to that Doctrine Applies “While the merger doctrine is universally accepted, it is only the starting point, inasmuch as the exceptions to the rule are at least as important as the rule itself.” (9 Thompson, supra, § 82.13(d), p. 721.) A prominent exception to the merger rule exists for contractual provisions that are “ ‘collateral to the deed.’ ” (Stiles v. Bodkin (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 839, 843 [ 111 P.2d 675 ] (Stiles); see Mills v. The Richmond Co., Inc. (1922) 56 Cal.Ap | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. the Richmond Co., Inc.green1 sentence2015Even if Respondents’ Contractual Obligations to Make Disclosures Merged with the Deed, the Collateral Obligations Exception to that Doctrine Applies “While the merger doctrine is universally accepted, it is only the starting point, inasmuch as the exceptions to the rule are at least as important as the rule itself.” (9 Thompson, supra, § 82.13(d), p. 721.) A prominent exception to the merger rule exists for contractual provisions that are “ ‘collateral to the deed.’ ” (Stiles v. Bodkin (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 839, 843 [ 111 P.2d 675 ] (Stiles); see Mills v. The Richmond Co., Inc. (1922) 56 Cal.Ap | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morangreen2 sentences2002(See People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 760 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 463 P.2d 763 ].) “[T]he defense of entrapment ... is not based on the defendant’s innocence. 2002(See People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 760 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 463 P.2d 763 ].) “[T]he defense of entrapment ... is not based on the defendant’s innocence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wheeler
red
2 sentences2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re 2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Burns
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re 2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re 2018On appeal, Mireles contends that his prior crimes were "barely probative and it gave the jury almost no additional information regarding [his] moral turpitude." Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction include 'whether the conviction (1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.' " ( *912 People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 52, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 .) Theft "re | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Woodard
green
2 sentences2017Assuming without deciding that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be admitted under section 1202, we reject defendant's assertion that the court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code section 352 when it prohibited the defense from presenting the welfare fraud conviction to impeach Kerr's statements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. **520 In considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction 2017Assuming without deciding that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be admitted under section 1202, we reject defendant's assertion that the court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code section 352 when it prohibited the defense from presenting the welfare fraud conviction to impeach Kerr's statements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. **520 In considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Clair
green
2 sentences2017Assuming without deciding that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be admitted under section 1202, we reject defendant's assertion that the court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code section 352 when it prohibited the defense from presenting the welfare fraud conviction to impeach Kerr's statements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. **520 In considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction 2017Assuming without deciding that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be admitted under section 1202, we reject defendant's assertion that the court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code section 352 when it prohibited the defense from presenting the welfare fraud conviction to impeach Kerr's statements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. **520 In considering whether to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction of a witness subject to impeachment concerning his or her credibility, the prominent factors in determining the probative value of the prior conviction | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Barnett
green
2 sentences2017(See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 , 1128, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 .) Moreover, because the prior conviction occurred in March 1998, during Kerr's relationship with defendant, it clearly was not remote in time. 2017(See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 , 1128, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 .) Moreover, because the prior conviction occurred in March 1998, during Kerr's relationship with defendant, it clearly was not remote in time. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Derbert
green
1 sentence1910Were this character of evidence disconnected with that tending to show guilt of the offense charged, the error would be apparent (People v. Derbert, 138 Cal. 470 , [ 71 Pac. 564 ]); but it is obvious that the object and purpose of the district attorney in proffering and making *150 this proof was to show that defendant on the morning of the robbery, and within a few hours before the same was committed, was penniless. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.