proposed pleading requirement in California

2025Under these circumstances, the court could reasonably conclude that Seiden was seeking “just more delays” and had not “demonstrated a willingness and ability to comply with the procedural requirements that led to the dismissal” (id. at p. 729).15 15 Seiden relies on Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918 , where the court held that the plaintiff, who sought to vacate a court order so that she could file an opposition, substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement by setting forth “the same factual contentions and legal arguments . . . in her va

2021(See County of Stanislaus v. Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401-402; Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 933 .) 3.

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002Plaintiffs application to vacate the summary judgment was conspicuously silent as to how plaintiff proposed to circumvent the effect of such admissions. [3] *907 The purpose behind the proposed pleading requirement is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits. ( Job v. Farrington, supra, 209 Cal. App.3d at p. 341 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 , citing County of Los Angeles v. Lewis, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 400 , 177 P. 154 .) The requirement thus helps ensure that courts do not become "`"a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility

2002Plaintiffs application to vacate the summary judgment was conspicuously silent as to how plaintiff proposed to circumvent the effect of such admissions. [3] *907 The purpose behind the proposed pleading requirement is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits. ( Job v. Farrington, supra, 209 Cal. App.3d at p. 341 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 , citing County of Los Angeles v. Lewis, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 400 , 177 P. 154 .) The requirement thus helps ensure that courts do not become "`"a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility

2025Case law explains that with respect to the statute’s mandatory relief provision, “[t]he phrase ‘in proper form’ encompasses the mandate, expressly included in the discretionary relief provision . . . that the motion be ‘ “accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed . . . .” ’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 63, italics added.) “[S]ubstantial compliance with that requirement is sufficient.” (Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315 , 1324 (Dollase) [citing Carmel, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403 in which the defendants “prepared a propo

2013(County of Los Angeles v. Lewis (1918) 179 Cal. 398, 400 ; La Bonte & Ransom Co. v. Scellars (1928) 90 Cal.App. 183, 185 ; Weil & Brown, op. cit., ¶ 5:385, p. 5-100 (rev .# 1, 2011).) C.

2002"Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 .) There is a presumption that the word "shall" imposes a mandatory statutory directive, while "may" is permissive. ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 777 P.2d 610 .) The key question is

2002"Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 .) There is a presumption that the word "shall" imposes a mandatory statutory directive, while "may" is permissive. ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 777 P.2d 610 .) The key question is

2002Plaintiffs application to vacate the summary judgment was conspicuously silent as to how plaintiff proposed to circumvent the effect of such admissions. [3] *907 The purpose behind the proposed pleading requirement is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits. ( Job v. Farrington, supra, 209 Cal. App.3d at p. 341 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 , citing County of Los Angeles v. Lewis, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 400 , 177 P. 154 .) The requirement thus helps ensure that courts do not become "`"a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility

2002Plaintiffs application to vacate the summary judgment was conspicuously silent as to how plaintiff proposed to circumvent the effect of such admissions. [3] *907 The purpose behind the proposed pleading requirement is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits. ( Job v. Farrington, supra, 209 Cal. App.3d at p. 341 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 , citing County of Los Angeles v. Lewis, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 400 , 177 P. 154 .) The requirement thus helps ensure that courts do not become "`"a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility

2002"Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 .) There is a presumption that the word "shall" imposes a mandatory statutory directive, while "may" is permissive. ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 777 P.2d 610 .) The key question is

2002"Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 .) There is a presumption that the word "shall" imposes a mandatory statutory directive, while "may" is permissive. ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 777 P.2d 610 .) The key question is

2002(See also Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d *904 228 ["Relief can only be granted under the mandatory provision in section 473, subdivision (b), if relief could have been granted under the discretionary provision."].) MCI contends that the court was without authority to grant relief under section 473(b), since plaintiff failed to accompany the motion with a copy of the proposed opposition papers.

2002"As a general rule, . . . a `"directory" or "mandatory" designation does not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is "permissive" or "obligatory," but instead simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.' [Citation.] If the action is invalidated, the requirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not, it is `directory' only." ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 , 43 Cal.R

2002"As a general rule, . . . a `"directory" or "mandatory" designation does not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is "permissive" or "obligatory," but instead simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.' [Citation.] If the action is invalidated, the requirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not, it is `directory' only." ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 , 43 Cal.R

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the above authorities by invoking what he characterizes as a "well-recognized exception" to the proposed pleading requirement, i.e., where the default or dismissal "consists of a failure to take a step that does not require a pleading." (Underscoring and italics in original.) The sole case plaintiff cites as authority for this "well-recognized exception" is Freeman v. Goldberg (1961) 55 Cal.2d 622 , 12 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 361 P.2d 244 ( Freeman) .

2002Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the above authorities by invoking what he characterizes as a "well-recognized exception" to the proposed pleading requirement, i.e., where the default or dismissal "consists of a failure to take a step that does not require a pleading." (Underscoring and italics in original.) The sole case plaintiff cites as authority for this "well-recognized exception" is Freeman v. Goldberg (1961) 55 Cal.2d 622 , 12 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 361 P.2d 244 ( Freeman) .

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002Freeman therefore falls within an established line of cases permitting relief where the moving party has substantially complied with the proposed pleading requirement. ( Estate of Parks (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 623, 632 , 24 Cal.Rptr. 250 [no need to attach copy of proposed objection to report of inheritance tax appraiser where substance of the objection was contained in the verified application and declaration]; Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 [motion to set aside default filed at the end of the six-month time limit, but proposed answer filed before the court hear

2002"As a general rule, . . . a `"directory" or "mandatory" designation does not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is "permissive" or "obligatory," but instead simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.' [Citation.] If the action is invalidated, the requirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not, it is `directory' only." ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 , 43 Cal.R

2002"As a general rule, . . . a `"directory" or "mandatory" designation does not refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is "permissive" or "obligatory," but instead simply denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.' [Citation.] If the action is invalidated, the requirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not, it is `directory' only." ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 , 43 Cal.R