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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Bear Valley Milling & Lumber Co.green2 sentences1992(Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co. [1945] 26 Cal.2d 590, 602 [ 160 P.2d 1 ].)” (Collison v. Thomas, supra at p. 496 .) The trial court in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 590, pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the five-year statute (Code Civ. 1992(Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co. [1945] 26 Cal.2d 590, 602 [ 160 P.2d 1 ].)” (Collison v. Thomas, supra at p. 496 .) The trial court in Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 590, pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the five-year statute (Code Civ. | 1 | 2 |
Hamilton v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987(Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 591 P.2d 1254 ]; Millsberg v. State Bar (1971) 6 Cal.3d 65, 74-75 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 490 P.2d 543 ].) Petitioner characterizes his own conduct as a negligent failure to comply with a purely technical requirement that he disclose his status as a principal of Satellite and that he obtain Coss’s consent to his acting in a dual capacity. 1987(Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 591 P.2d 1254 ]; Millsberg v. State Bar (1971) 6 Cal.3d 65, 74-75 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 490 P.2d 543 ].) Petitioner characterizes his own conduct as a negligent failure to comply with a purely technical requirement that he disclose his status as a principal of Satellite and that he obtain Coss’s consent to his acting in a dual capacity. | 1 | 1 |
Millsberg v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987(Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 591 P.2d 1254 ]; Millsberg v. State Bar (1971) 6 Cal.3d 65, 74-75 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 490 P.2d 543 ].) Petitioner characterizes his own conduct as a negligent failure to comply with a purely technical requirement that he disclose his status as a principal of Satellite and that he obtain Coss’s consent to his acting in a dual capacity. 1987(Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 591 P.2d 1254 ]; Millsberg v. State Bar (1971) 6 Cal.3d 65, 74-75 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 223 , 490 P.2d 543 ].) Petitioner characterizes his own conduct as a negligent failure to comply with a purely technical requirement that he disclose his status as a principal of Satellite and that he obtain Coss’s consent to his acting in a dual capacity. | 1 | 1 |
Scheas v. Robertsongreen2 sentences1958The plea of the statute of limitations has been held to constitute more than a purely technical defense. ‘ ‘ Statutes of limitation are . . . ‘vital to the welfare of society and are favored by the law ... to be viewed as statutes of repose, and as such constitute meritorious defenses.’ ” (Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 125-126 [ 238 P.2d 982 ].) The issue of the running of the statute was thoroughly gone into on the trial and appellants for that reason cannot claim the prejudice of the injection of a new issue which they were not given full opportunity to meet. 1958The plea of the statute of limitations has been held to constitute more than a purely technical defense. ‘ ‘ Statutes of limitation are . . . ‘vital to the welfare of society and are favored by the law ... to be viewed as statutes of repose, and as such constitute meritorious defenses.’ ” (Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 125-126 [ 238 P.2d 982 ].) The issue of the running of the statute was thoroughly gone into on the trial and appellants for that reason cannot claim the prejudice of the injection of a new issue which they were not given full opportunity to meet. | 1 | 1 |
E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1934Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 180, 188 [ 193 Pac. 105, 108 , 16 A. L. 1934Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 180, 188 [ 193 Pac. 105, 108 , 16 A. L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. Woods
green
1 sentence2023“It has been said that the erroneous granting of a summary judgment motion ‘lies outside the curative provisions’ of the harmless error provision of the California Constitution because such an error denies a party of its right to a jury trial.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 947 .) Thus, only “purely technical errors in granting summary judgment can be found harmless.” (Ibid.) Given the “importance of providing the minimum statutory notice of a summary judgment hearing,” (Robinson v. Woods, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 ), we find that ruling on a motion that failed to prov | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hawkins v. Wilton
green
1 sentence2023“It has been said that the erroneous granting of a summary judgment motion ‘lies outside the curative provisions’ of the harmless error provision of the California Constitution because such an error denies a party of its right to a jury trial.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 947 .) Thus, only “purely technical errors in granting summary judgment can be found harmless.” (Ibid.) Given the “importance of providing the minimum statutory notice of a summary judgment hearing,” (Robinson v. Woods, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 ), we find that ruling on a motion that failed to prov | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Turner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
green
2 sentences1928The old rule of strietissimi juris applies only to the extent that no implication shall be indulged in to impose a burden not clearly inferable from the language of the contract, but does not apply so as to hold that a contract shall not be reasonably interpreted as other contracts are.’ (See, also, to the same effect, Pratt v. Matthews, 24 Hun [N. Y.], 387.) ” Also, as stated in the case of Turner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 187 Cal. 76 , at page 85 [ 200 Pac. 959, 962 ] : “In this case the Surety Company stands upon a purely technical defense, and while it is true that the rule is in its favo 1928The old rule of strietissimi juris applies only to the extent that no implication shall be indulged in to impose a burden not clearly inferable from the language of the contract, but does not apply so as to hold that a contract shall not be reasonably interpreted as other contracts are.’ (See, also, to the same effect, Pratt v. Matthews, 24 Hun [N. Y.], 387.) ” Also, as stated in the case of Turner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 187 Cal. 76 , at page 85 [ 200 Pac. 959, 962 ] : “In this case the Surety Company stands upon a purely technical defense, and while it is true that the rule is in its favo | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.