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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage Casesgreen2 sentences2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr 2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Harrisgreen2 sentences2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr 2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr | 1 | 1 |
County of Orange v. LESLIE B.green2 sentences2009County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 979-982 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ], held the trial court properly declined to apply the presumption where it would allow the biological father to escape his support obligations and the purposes served by the presumption were undermined by the lack of a parental relationship between the child and the mother’s former husband. 2009County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 979-982 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ], held the trial court properly declined to apply the presumption where it would allow the biological father to escape his support obligations and the purposes served by the presumption were undermined by the lack of a parental relationship between the child and the mother’s former husband. | 1 | 1 |
Comino v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Community Bankgreen2 sentences1998(See Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729, 735 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 518 P.2d 329 ].) As with any common law rule, the meaning of the one form of action rale must be ascertained from the holdings in the cases in which it has been applied with an eye toward potential distinctions in light of the purposes served by the rule. 2 The following synopsis of the rule, extracted from Walker , is given in Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 997 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 800 P.2d 557 ] (Wozab). “ ‘[S]ection 726 is susceptible of a dual application—it may be interposed by th 1998(See Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729, 735 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 518 P.2d 329 ].) As with any common law rule, the meaning of the one form of action rale must be ascertained from the holdings in the cases in which it has been applied with an eye toward potential distinctions in light of the purposes served by the rule. 2 The following synopsis of the rule, extracted from Walker , is given in Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 997 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 800 P.2d 557 ] (Wozab). “ ‘[S]ection 726 is susceptible of a dual application—it may be interposed by th | 1 | 1 |
Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozabgreen2 sentences1998(See Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729, 735 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 518 P.2d 329 ].) As with any common law rule, the meaning of the one form of action rale must be ascertained from the holdings in the cases in which it has been applied with an eye toward potential distinctions in light of the purposes served by the rule. 2 The following synopsis of the rule, extracted from Walker , is given in Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 997 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 800 P.2d 557 ] (Wozab). “ ‘[S]ection 726 is susceptible of a dual application—it may be interposed by th 1998(See Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729, 735 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 518 P.2d 329 ].) As with any common law rule, the meaning of the one form of action rale must be ascertained from the holdings in the cases in which it has been applied with an eye toward potential distinctions in light of the purposes served by the rule. 2 The following synopsis of the rule, extracted from Walker , is given in Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 997 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 800 P.2d 557 ] (Wozab). “ ‘[S]ection 726 is susceptible of a dual application—it may be interposed by th | 1 | 1 |
Silberg v. Andersongreen2 sentences1998Such candor in turn is essential to maintaining the integrity of the judicial truth-seeking process. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 642 ; Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-214 [ 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Finally, the court noted that the finality of a judicial proceeding is protected from collateral attack by immunizing witnesses from liability. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, at p. 643 .) Finding that all of *131 these goals are as desirable in the context of private contractual arbitration as in a judicial proceeding, the court concluded that the purposes ser 1998Such candor in turn is essential to maintaining the integrity of the judicial truth-seeking process. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 642 ; Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-214 [ 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Finally, the court noted that the finality of a judicial proceeding is protected from collateral attack by immunizing witnesses from liability. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, at p. 643 .) Finding that all of *131 these goals are as desirable in the context of private contractual arbitration as in a judicial proceeding, the court concluded that the purposes ser | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Hearstgreen2 sentences1988(See, e.g., Davis v. Hearst (1911) 160 Cal. 143, 154-180 [ 116 P. 530 ].) Its meaning is measured against the purposes served by the privilege. 1988(See, e.g., Davis v. Hearst (1911) 160 Cal. 143, 154-180 [ 116 P. 530 ].) Its meaning is measured against the purposes served by the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooley v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022For example, in Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 , 253-254, we concluded individuals facing an SVP probable cause hearing were not similarly situated with those seeking habeas review of a short-term detention under the LPS Act because the purposes served by the standard of proof at the LPS hearing had no rational application in the SVP context. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Lisa R.
green
2 sentences2009In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636 , 648-651 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 ], held that a man had a due process right to challenge the presumption, in part because the purposes served by the presumption *384 were undermined by the death of the husband and wife. 2009In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636 , 648-651 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 ], held that a man had a due process right to challenge the presumption, in part because the purposes served by the presumption *384 were undermined by the death of the husband and wife. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
1 sentence2009(See also Comino v. Kelley, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 [presumption rebutted where there “is neither a marital union nor a family unit to preserve”].) 25 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) 26 Troxel did not hold that the Washington statute was unconstitutional per se or that the due process clause requires “all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition pr | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Commission
green
1 sentence2003(Sierra Club, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 .) To my mind, the analogy between the purposes served by the doctrine of avoidable consequences and the rule requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies is striking, and the disparity between the holdings reached by a majority of this court in State Department of Health Services and this case—decisions filed just one week apart—equally as baffling. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Moore v. Conliffe
green
1 sentence1998Such candor in turn is essential to maintaining the integrity of the judicial truth-seeking process. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 642 ; Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-214 [ 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Finally, the court noted that the finality of a judicial proceeding is protected from collateral attack by immunizing witnesses from liability. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, at p. 643 .) Finding that all of *131 these goals are as desirable in the context of private contractual arbitration as in a judicial proceeding, the court concluded that the purposes ser | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hackethal v. Weissbein
green
2 sentences1994By its immediate, unanimous response to Hackethal v. Weissbein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 55 , the Legislature demonstrated a strong conviction that the absolute privilege afforded by section 47 should not be confined narrowly only to witnesses who testify in peer review proceedings conducted by governmental agencies, but rather should apply also to witnesses who testify in analogous peer review proceedings conducted by private entities, because the purposes served by the privilege apply equally to such proceedings. 1994By its immediate, unanimous response to Hackethal v. Weissbein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 55 , the Legislature demonstrated a strong conviction that the absolute privilege afforded by section 47 should not be confined narrowly only to witnesses who testify in peer review proceedings conducted by governmental agencies, but rather should apply also to witnesses who testify in analogous peer review proceedings conducted by private entities, because the purposes served by the privilege apply equally to such proceedings. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.