reasonably diligent inquiry (California) · Go Syfert
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reasonably diligent inquiry in California

7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1918–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Bedolla v. Logan & Frazergreen
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive 28 Here it is not suggested that law enforcement authorities, or

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive not to report a crime—particularly in cases like this one, where

22
Claremont Terrace Homeowners' Ass'n v. United Statesgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–2022
2 sentences

2022Garrett Co. v. States (1935) 3 Cal.2d 379, 381 ; accord, Pell v. McElroy (1868) 36 Cal. 268, 273 [“The simple, independent fact of possession is sufficient to raise a presumption of interest in the premises on behalf of the occupant.”].) 11 “ ‘The possession required to impart notice to a subsequent purchaser must be open, notorious, exclusive and visible, and not consistent with the record title.’ [Citation.] If either a tenant or a stranger is in possession of leased premises, the purchaser is charged with all those facts which might have been ascertained had a reasonably diligent inquiry be

1989(Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 408 ; Basch v. Tidewater etc. Co., supra, 49 Cal.App.2d Supp. 743 , 748.) “ ‘Possession is notice not only of whatever title the occupant has but also of whatever right he may have in the property, and the knowledge chargeable to a person after he is put on inquiry by possession of land is not limited to such knowledge as would be gained by examination of the public records.’ ” (Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 409 .) Possession of land imparts to the intending purc

12
Dreyfus v. Hirtgreen
cal · 1890 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1951–1989
2 sentences

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

12
Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulmangreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Garrett Co. v. States (1935) 3 Cal.2d 379, 381 ; accord, Pell v. McElroy (1868) 36 Cal. 268, 273 [“The simple, independent fact of possession is sufficient to raise a presumption of interest in the premises on behalf of the occupant.”].) 11 “ ‘The possession required to impart notice to a subsequent purchaser must be open, notorious, exclusive and visible, and not consistent with the record title.’ [Citation.] If either a tenant or a stranger is in possession of leased premises, the purchaser is charged with all those facts which might have been ascertained had a reasonably diligent inquiry be

11
Pell v. McElroygreen
· 1868 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Garrett Co. v. States (1935) 3 Cal.2d 379, 381 ; accord, Pell v. McElroy (1868) 36 Cal. 268, 273 [“The simple, independent fact of possession is sufficient to raise a presumption of interest in the premises on behalf of the occupant.”].) 11 “ ‘The possession required to impart notice to a subsequent purchaser must be open, notorious, exclusive and visible, and not consistent with the record title.’ [Citation.] If either a tenant or a stranger is in possession of leased premises, the purchaser is charged with all those facts which might have been ascertained had a reasonably diligent inquiry be

11
Marlenee v. Browngreen
cal · 1943 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989(Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 408 ; Basch v. Tidewater etc. Co., supra, 49 Cal.App.2d Supp. 743 , 748.) “ ‘Possession is notice not only of whatever title the occupant has but also of whatever right he may have in the property, and the knowledge chargeable to a person after he is put on inquiry by possession of land is not limited to such knowledge as would be gained by examination of the public records.’ ” (Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 409 .) Possession of land imparts to the intending purc

1989(Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 408 ; Basch v. Tidewater etc. Co., supra, 49 Cal.App.2d Supp. 743 , 748.) “ ‘Possession is notice not only of whatever title the occupant has but also of whatever right he may have in the property, and the knowledge chargeable to a person after he is put on inquiry by possession of land is not limited to such knowledge as would be gained by examination of the public records.’ ” (Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Assn. v. United States, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 398, 409 .) Possession of land imparts to the intending purc

11
High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hullgreen
calctapp · 1962 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

11
Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfergreen
calctapp · 1929 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

1989(Dreyfus v. Hirt (1890) 82 Cal. 621, 625 [ 23 P. 193 ]; High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Pacific Fruit Exchange v. Schropfer (1929) 99 Cal.App. 692, 694 [ 279 P. 170 ]; 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:55, pp. 86-87.) This latter rule should apply where, as here, a possessor asserts that notice of additional rights contained in an unrecorded, unreferenced document is implied from possession consistent with a recorded lease. 7 If a tenant is in possession of leased premises, and the circumstances are such

11
Garber v. Gianellagreen
cal · 1893 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1942–1942
2 sentences

1942(Garber v. Gianella, 98 Cal. 527, 529 [ 33 P. 458 ].) It is also settled that if the circumstances as to possession are such as to put a purchaser on inquiry he is chargeable with knowledge of all that a reasonably diligent inquiry as to the rights and claims of the occupant might have disclosed. (25 Cal. Jur., pp. 834-836.) The same *749 must on principle be applicable when the prospective purchaser knows of an outstanding lease on the property although the lessee is not in possession of the property.

1942(Garber v. Gianella, 98 Cal. 527, 529 [ 33 P. 458 ].) It is also settled that if the circumstances as to possession are such as to put a purchaser on inquiry he is chargeable with knowledge of all that a reasonably diligent inquiry as to the rights and claims of the occupant might have disclosed. (25 Cal. Jur., pp. 834-836.) The same *749 must on principle be applicable when the prospective purchaser knows of an outstanding lease on the property although the lessee is not in possession of the property.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
cluster 763626 green
ca9 · 1999
2 sentences

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive 28 Here it is not suggested that law enforcement authorities, or

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive not to report a crime—particularly in cases like this one, where

22014–2014
Deveny v. ENTROPIN, INC. green
calctapp · 2006
2 sentences

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive 28 Here it is not suggested that law enforcement authorities, or

2014(Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. (9th Cir.1999) 175 F.3d 699, 704 , 706 & fn. 9.)” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 428 , italics added; see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 .) It is thus open to even the most negligent victim to argue that a reasonably diligent inquiry, if conducted, would not have uncovered the fraud. 13 The rule commencing the statutory period upon discovery by a private victim may not adequately take account of situations in which victims have a material incentive not to report a crime—particularly in cases like this one, where

22014–2014
J. R. Garrett Co. v. States neutral
cal · 1935
1 sentence

2022Garrett Co. v. States (1935) 3 Cal.2d 379, 381 ; accord, Pell v. McElroy (1868) 36 Cal. 268, 273 [“The simple, independent fact of possession is sufficient to raise a presumption of interest in the premises on behalf of the occupant.”].) 11 “ ‘The possession required to impart notice to a subsequent purchaser must be open, notorious, exclusive and visible, and not consistent with the record title.’ [Citation.] If either a tenant or a stranger is in possession of leased premises, the purchaser is charged with all those facts which might have been ascertained had a reasonably diligent inquiry be

12022–2022
Garstang v. Skinner green
cal · 1913
2 sentences

1918(Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721 , [ 134 Pac. 329 ]; Lady Washington C.

1918(Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721 , [ 134 Pac. 329 ]; Lady Washington C.

11918–1918

Where else courts name it

TX 35 (1940–2026) MS 18 (1997–2017) MA 16 (1975–2025) OR 13 (1959–2026) MI 9 (1995–2018) CA 7 (1918–2022) CO 7 (1991–2012) PA 7 (1920–2015) MD 4 (2005–2016) AR 4 (1940–2004) WA 4 (2010–2019) NY 3 (1991–2010) WI 3 (1989–2020) IA 3 (1926–2022) ND 2 (2011–2011) NJ 2 (1927–1960) NC 2 (2013–2026) NH 2 (1992–1995) TN 2 (2006–2011) DC 2 (1976–1996) SC 2 (1970–1996) AZ 2 (2013–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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