reversed defense in California

2022There was no barrier of any kind between the picnic area and the parking lot. ( Robison, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1296-1297.) The court framed the foreseeability issue as “whether it was reasonably foreseeable, in view of the configuration and use of the parking lot and picnic area, that a car might fail to turn left at the word ‘stop’ painted on the pavement, and that picnickers might be injured as a consequence of Magic Mountain’s failure to provide an appropriate separation between the parking lot and the picnic area,” or, more succinctly, “an errant car hitting an unprotected picnic ta

2021There was no barrier of any kind between the picnic area and the parking lot. ( Robison, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1296-1297.) The court framed the foreseeability issue as “whether it was reasonably foreseeable, in view of the configuration and use of the parking lot and picnic area, that a car might fail to turn left at the word ‘stop’ painted on the pavement, and that picnickers might be injured as a consequence of Magic Mountain’s failure to provide an appropriate separation between the parking lot and the picnic area,” or, more succinctly, “an errant car hitting an unprotected picnic ta

2016In Jackson, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1305 , another division of this court reversed a defense summary judgment on the ground there were triable issues ‘“concerning the existence of a substantial conflict between a federal interest and a state law.” (Id. at p. 1317.) The court focused on evidence that the naval specifications for weather resistant, polyurethane paint products did not appear to preclude additional warnings.

2016In Jackson, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1305 , another division of this court reversed a defense summary judgment on the ground there were triable issues ‘“concerning the existence of a substantial conflict between a federal interest and a state law.” (Id. at p. 1317.) The court focused on evidence that the naval specifications for weather resistant, polyurethane paint products did not appear to preclude additional warnings.

2016(Id. at pp. 1316-1317.) The court expressly declined to rule, however, that because approximately 20 percent of the paint products were sold commercially, the products were not “military equipment.” (Id. at p. 1319.) “Plaintiff seems to argue that military equipment means a product made exclusively for military use with no commercial *637 purpose; however, plaintiff cites no case espousing that extreme position.[ 7 ] In our view, if a product is produced according to military specifications and used by the military because of particular qualities which serve a military purpose, and is incident

2002Exch., supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at p. 385 .) The court reversed the defense judgment and remanded the matter for findings on various factual matters such as whether the arsonist shareholder was in dominant control of the corporation, whether the cash used to set up the corporation came from separate property of the wives, whether the couples separated before or after the fire, etc. (Id. at pp. 387-388.) In its discussion of the relevant authority, the court summarized its understanding of the rules governing recoverability by an innocent co-insured in other types of situations and relationships a

2001Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. "(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmis

2001Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. "(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmis

2001Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. "(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmis

2001Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. "(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmis

1961This contention is supported by the recent case of Cummings v. County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 258 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 363 P.2d 900 ], in which this court reversed a defense verdict because of the giving of instructions *650 substantially similar to those here involved.

1961This contention is supported by the recent case of Cummings v. County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 258 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 363 P.2d 900 ], in which this court reversed a defense verdict because of the giving of instructions *650 substantially similar to those here involved.