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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc.green2 sentences2013(Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 694 .) The defendants argued that the Rutherford standard for causation was inapplicable as it was specifically formulated for asbestos cases. 2013(Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 694 .) The defendants argued that the Rutherford standard for causation was inapplicable as it was specifically formulated for asbestos cases. | 1 | 2 |
Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co.green2 sentences2017(Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 77, 79 .) While one case suggested that Rutherford’s rule “would appear appropriate” for injuries due to cigarette smoke, the appellate court ultimately concluded that it need not resolve the issue on the facts before it. 2004Indeed, Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th 71 , which followed the Rutherford analysis in evaluating the sufficiency of complaint, was a toxic tort action based upon the plaintiff’s contracting multiple myeloma, a form of cancer, following his alleged exposure to numerous different chemical substances over a 21-year period. | 1 | 2 |
Verdier v. Verdiergreen2 sentences2014(Verdier v. Verdier (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 325, 334 [ 284 P.2d 94 ] [“[i]f the [two] covenants are independent, breach of one does not excuse performance of the other”].) Defendants, by contrast, appear to equate the phrases “material breach” and “failure or refusal to close” in section 1.2. 2014(Verdier v. Verdier (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 325, 334 [ 284 P.2d 94 ] [“[i]f the [two] covenants are independent, breach of one does not excuse performance of the other”].) Defendants, by contrast, appear to equate the phrases “material breach” and “failure or refusal to close” in section 1.2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Izell v. Union Carbide Corp.
green
1 sentence2015In view of this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Marteney had encounters with Gold Bond sufficient for an exposure of .05 fiber years.11 (See Izell v. Union Carbide Corp. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 962 , 973- 974 [under Rutherford standard, plaintiff adequately showed exposure to defendant’s asbestos on basis of evidence that from mid- to late-1970’s, while supervising workers, he frequently encountered dust from joint compound 10 According to Dyson, for purposes of the “fiber year” unit of measurement, a year is 2000 hours, based on a 40-hour work week for 50 weeks. 11 Pointing to c | 1 | 2015–2015 |
O'NEIL v. Crane Co.
green
2 sentences2015UCC contends (1) that the testimony from the Marteneys’ experts regarding the causation of Marty Marteney’s mesothelioma did not satisfy the Rutherford standard, (2) that there is insufficient evidence that Marty Marteney was exposed to its asbestos, (3) that the jury’s special verdicts regarding the adequacy of UCC’s product warnings shielded it from liability under a theory of strict liability based on a design defect, and (4) that the “design defect” theory fails under O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 (O’Neil). 2015UCC contends (1) that the testimony from the Marteneys’ experts regarding the causation of Marty Marteney’s mesothelioma did not satisfy the Rutherford standard, (2) that there is insufficient evidence that Marty Marteney was exposed to its asbestos, (3) that the jury’s special verdicts regarding the adequacy of UCC’s product warnings shielded it from liability under a theory of strict liability based on a design defect, and (4) that the “design defect” theory fails under O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 (O’Neil). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014The State of the Evidence As in Rutherford, the erroneous instruction here did not impair AutoZone’s ability to put on its full case. ( Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 983-984.) The instruction “would not, by its nature, result in exclusion of relevant defense evidence.” (Ibid.) The “state of the evidence” consideration also examines the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues related to the instruction. 2014The State of the Evidence As in Rutherford, the erroneous instruction here did not impair AutoZone’s ability to put on its full case. ( Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 983-984.) The instruction “would not, by its nature, result in exclusion of relevant defense evidence.” (Ibid.) The “state of the evidence” consideration also examines the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues related to the instruction. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Sanders
green
2 sentences1997We are confident of their ability to distinguish a true case of group discrimination by peremptory challenges from a spurious claim....' [Citations.] Applying this standard of giving considerable deference to the determination of the trial court, `we see no good reason to second-guess [the trial court's] factual determination' [citation] that the prosecutor was not motivated by bias...." ( Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 501 .) [19] There is no record of the ethnic or racial background of the other impaneled jurors. [20] It is worth emphasizing that the Rutherford challenge happened quite earl 1997We are confident of their ability to distinguish a true case of group discrimination by peremptory challenges from a spurious claim....' [Citations.] Applying this standard of giving considerable deference to the determination of the trial court, `we see no good reason to second-guess [the trial court's] factual determination' [citation] that the prosecutor was not motivated by bias...." ( Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 501 .) [19] There is no record of the ethnic or racial background of the other impaneled jurors. [20] It is worth emphasizing that the Rutherford challenge happened quite earl | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.