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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pointer v. Texasgreen2 sentences1981Thus, in Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 923 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 ], the United States Supreme Court specifically mentioned that it had recognized the admissibility against a criminal defendant of dying declarations of a declarant, deceased at trial, as being beyond the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation *877 of witnesses. 1981Thus, in Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 923 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 ], the United States Supreme Court specifically mentioned that it had recognized the admissibility against a criminal defendant of dying declarations of a declarant, deceased at trial, as being beyond the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation *877 of witnesses. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gallardogreen1 sentence2023(See Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 138 [“Our precedent instructs that determinations about the nature of prior convictions are to be made by the court, rather than a jury, based on the record of conviction.”].) As relevant here, these related issues include the two 10 The Falcon court also suggested in a footnote (as Wiley argues here, see part II.B.1, ante) that the scope of the constitutional exception for prior convictions “may be debatable.” (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 954, fn. 13, rev. granted.) As discussed above, we will follow the California Supreme Court’s holdings in Blac | 1 | 1 |
Dutton v. Evansgreen2 sentences1976There are other analogous situations which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses.’ ” (Dutton v. Evans, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 80 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 222 ].) As Justice Harlan points out in a concurring opinion, the confrontation clause carried to its ultimate extreme would require exclusion of ordinary business and hospital records which are routinely accepted in evidence to establish “collateral” facts without violating the confrontation clause. 1976There are other analogous situations which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses.’ ” (Dutton v. Evans, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 80 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 222 ].) As Justice Harlan points out in a concurring opinion, the confrontation clause carried to its ultimate extreme would require exclusion of ordinary business and hospital records which are routinely accepted in evidence to establish “collateral” facts without violating the confrontation clause. | 1 | 1 |
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corporationgreen1 sentence1971See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 2 Cir., 1929, 35 F.2d 279 .” In Sears, at page 232 [11 L.Ed.2d at page 667], the court did appear to reserve to the states a limited area as follows: “Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so- as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purc | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coylegreen2 sentences1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. 1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Purcellgreen2 sentences1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. 1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation District
green
2 sentences2006For example, in Hayashi[, supra,] 167 Cal.App.2d 584 [ 334 P.2d 1048 ], the appellate court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation because, although the defendant’s failure to repair a levee within 10 to 21 days was negligence, it was not ‘a deliberate plan with regard to the *858 construction of public works.’ (Id. at pp. 590-592.) That is not to say that the later characterization of a public agency’s deliberate action as negligence automatically removes the action from the scope of the constitutional requirement for just compensation. 2006For example, in Hayashi[, supra,] 167 Cal.App.2d 584 [ 334 P.2d 1048 ], the appellate court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation because, although the defendant’s failure to repair a levee within 10 to 21 days was negligence, it was not ‘a deliberate plan with regard to the *858 construction of public works.’ (Id. at pp. 590-592.) That is not to say that the later characterization of a public agency’s deliberate action as negligence automatically removes the action from the scope of the constitutional requirement for just compensation. | 2 | 2002–2006 |
People v. Black
red
1 sentence2023This paragraph does not apply to enhancements imposed on prior convictions.” The statute does not specify the court is limited to finding that a prior conviction occurred; instead, it states the court may “consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) And, as our Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the prior conviction exception to the constitutional jury trial right, consideration of prior convictions may establish recidivism-based aggravating factors such as increasing seriousness of the convictions ( Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Towne
green
1 sentence2023This paragraph does not apply to enhancements imposed on prior convictions.” The statute does not specify the court is limited to finding that a prior conviction occurred; instead, it states the court may “consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) And, as our Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the prior conviction exception to the constitutional jury trial right, consideration of prior convictions may establish recidivism-based aggravating factors such as increasing seriousness of the convictions ( Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dowdell v. United States
green
2 sentences1976(Dowdell v. United States (1911) 221 U.S. 325 [ 55 L.Ed. 753 , 31 S.Ct. 590 ].) Or we might add, carried to its ultimate extreme the confrontation clause would preclude the court from taking mandatoiy judicial notice of unquestioned facts and even would prohibit the introduction of official records. 1976(Dowdell v. United States (1911) 221 U.S. 325 [ 55 L.Ed. 753 , 31 S.Ct. 590 ].) Or we might add, carried to its ultimate extreme the confrontation clause would preclude the court from taking mandatoiy judicial notice of unquestioned facts and even would prohibit the introduction of official records. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Dorado
green
2 sentences1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. 1970(People v. Coyle, 88 Cal.App.2d 967, 978 [ 200 P.2d 546 ]; People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [ 70 P.2d 706 ].) Next, the defendant urges that the impeaching priors were based on statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ]. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.