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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rhoadsgreen2 sentences1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. 1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences1983We are satisfied that based on the facts of this case it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred if Garcia’s testimony which under the Shirley rule was tainted by pretrial hypnosis had not been admitted. 9People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, 69-70 ; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) 2. 1983We are satisfied that based on the facts of this case it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred if Garcia’s testimony which under the Shirley rule was tainted by pretrial hypnosis had not been admitted. 9People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, 69-70 ; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) 2. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kellyyellow2 sentences1990The reason for the Shirley rule is that the use of hypnosis to improve the memory of a potential witness is not accepted as reliable by a consensus of the relevant scientific community, and hence the witness’s posthypnotic testimony is inadmissible under the test of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ], and Frye v. United States (D.C. 1990The reason for the Shirley rule is that the use of hypnosis to improve the memory of a potential witness is not accepted as reliable by a consensus of the relevant scientific community, and hence the witness’s posthypnotic testimony is inadmissible under the test of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ], and Frye v. United States (D.C. | 1 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences1985NOTES [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. [2] Shirley expressly held that the Watson standard of prejudice would apply to erroneous admission of testimony by a previously hypnotized witness. ( 31 Cal.3d at p. 68 , citing People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 40 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] [ Watson standard applies to admission of scientifically unreliable evidence].) Defendant argues that Shirley error should be evaluated under the more stringent reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 1985NOTES [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. [2] Shirley expressly held that the Watson standard of prejudice would apply to erroneous admission of testimony by a previously hypnotized witness. ( 31 Cal.3d at p. 68 , citing People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 40 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] [ Watson standard applies to admission of scientifically unreliable evidence].) Defendant argues that Shirley error should be evaluated under the more stringent reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 | 1 | 1 |
Donaldson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1984Thus, our retroactivity decision should not be made until we have carefully assessed, among other things, “the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; accord Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 38 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 672 P.2d 110 ].) If, as Justice Gardner, the Attorney General and amicus district attorneys association each suggest, making Shirley retroactive to pending cases will have a “devastating” effect on the administration of justice, t 1984Thus, our retroactivity decision should not be made until we have carefully assessed, among other things, “the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; accord Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 38 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 672 P.2d 110 ].) If, as Justice Gardner, the Attorney General and amicus district attorneys association each suggest, making Shirley retroactive to pending cases will have a “devastating” effect on the administration of justice, t | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1984“Neither good-faith reliance” on prior law or accepted practice “nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.” (Williams v. United States (1971) supra, 401 U.S. 646, 653 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 395 ].) In a fruitless effort to distinguish the retroactivity precedents, respondent contends that hypnosis is different because its effects on the witness can assertedly be identified at trial and be counteracted by cross-examination. 1984“Neither good-faith reliance” on prior law or accepted practice “nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.” (Williams v. United States (1971) supra, 401 U.S. 646, 653 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 395 ].) In a fruitless effort to distinguish the retroactivity precedents, respondent contends that hypnosis is different because its effects on the witness can assertedly be identified at trial and be counteracted by cross-examination. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Palmergreen2 sentences1984(See, e.g., People v. Palmer (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 239, 250-255 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 1 A.L.R.4th 1056 ] (analysis of gunshot residue particles by studying their chemical characteristics with a scanning electron microscope equipped for X-ray spectrometry).) Rather, it is often—as in Shirley and the case at bar—emotionally charged and highly personal testimony by the actual victim of or eyewitness to the crime being prosecuted, directly identifying the defendant as the perpetrator or furnishing some crucial piece of evidence against him. 1984(See, e.g., People v. Palmer (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 239, 250-255 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 1 A.L.R.4th 1056 ] (analysis of gunshot residue particles by studying their chemical characteristics with a scanning electron microscope equipped for X-ray spectrometry).) Rather, it is often—as in Shirley and the case at bar—emotionally charged and highly personal testimony by the actual victim of or eyewitness to the crime being prosecuted, directly identifying the defendant as the perpetrator or furnishing some crucial piece of evidence against him. | 1 | 1 |
Stovall v. Dennogreen2 sentences1984Thus, our retroactivity decision should not be made until we have carefully assessed, among other things, “the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; accord Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 38 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 672 P.2d 110 ].) If, as Justice Gardner, the Attorney General and amicus district attorneys association each suggest, making Shirley retroactive to pending cases will have a “devastating” effect on the administration of justice, t 1984Thus, our retroactivity decision should not be made until we have carefully assessed, among other things, “the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; accord Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 38 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 672 P.2d 110 ].) If, as Justice Gardner, the Attorney General and amicus district attorneys association each suggest, making Shirley retroactive to pending cases will have a “devastating” effect on the administration of justice, t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Shirley
red
2 sentences1990Respecting the Shirley error, we therefore find it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred had Aguirre’s presumptively tainted testimony been excluded. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 70 .) 2. 1990Respecting the Shirley error, we therefore find it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred had Aguirre’s presumptively tainted testimony been excluded. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 70 .) 2. | 3 | 1983–1990 |
People v. Milosavljevic
green
2 sentences1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. 1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Shirley
green
2 sentences1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. 1999The effect of the admission is the same as the plea of guilty for the purposes of collateral use to enhance subsequent, new crimes. [¶] Convicted by his plea of guilty and his admission, defendant may not now be exonerated by sentencing considerations in subsequent proceedings. ’ ” (People v. Milosavljevic, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 , quoting People v. Shirley, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60-61 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) We concluded: “We agree with the Shirley analysis. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Guerra
red
2 sentences1990Bill No. 2669 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 1984.) The bill’s aim was to bring California in line with those jurisdictions from whose cases Justice Kaus fashioned his pre-Shirley exception in Guerra [.People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 ( 208 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 690 P.2d 635 )].” 3 (People v. Burroughs, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1162, 1168-1169 .) In the present case, as related above, appellant did testify in his own behalf. 1990Bill No. 2669 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 1984.) The bill’s aim was to bring California in line with those jurisdictions from whose cases Justice Kaus fashioned his pre-Shirley exception in Guerra [.People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 ( 208 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 690 P.2d 635 )].” 3 (People v. Burroughs, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1162, 1168-1169 .) In the present case, as related above, appellant did testify in his own behalf. | 2 | 1985–1990 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences1990Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]. 1990Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013 [ 54 App.D.C. 46 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ]. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Burroughs
green
1 sentence1990Bill No. 2669 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 1984.) The bill’s aim was to bring California in line with those jurisdictions from whose cases Justice Kaus fashioned his pre-Shirley exception in Guerra [.People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 ( 208 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 690 P.2d 635 )].” 3 (People v. Burroughs, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1162, 1168-1169 .) In the present case, as related above, appellant did testify in his own behalf. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. MacK
green
1 sentence1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Williams
red
2 sentences1985Contrary authorities cited by the People, in particular People v. Williams (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 920 [ 183 Cal. Rptr. 498 ], were expressly disapproved. (37 Cal.3d at p. 413, and fn. 24.) (6b) However, any error in admitting Johnston's testimony here was clearly harmless. 1985Contrary authorities cited by the People, in particular People v. Williams (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 920 [ 183 Cal. Rptr. 498 ], were expressly disapproved. (37 Cal.3d at p. 413, and fn. 24.) (6b) However, any error in admitting Johnston's testimony here was clearly harmless. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Nixon
green
2 sentences1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi 1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Mena
green
2 sentences1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi 1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State Ex Rel. Collins v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC.
green
2 sentences1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi 1985Collins v. Superior Court, etc. (1982) 132 Ariz. 180 [ 644 P.2d 1266, 1273-1275 ]; State v. Mena (1981) 128 Ariz. 226 [ 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 ]; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980) 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 .) At least one court has explicitly applied the reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice, apparently on the ground of constitutional error. ( People v. Nixon (1983) 125 Mich. App. 807 [ 337 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 ].) Extended discussion of the issue is unnecessary, since we are persuaded, for reasons explained in the text, that any Shirley error here was harmless even under the Chapman test. [3] Prior to the crimi | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences1984We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that the admissibility of prehypnotic evidence is a question that should be "reserved until raised on an adequate record in an appropriate case." ( People v. Gonzales (Mich. 1983) supra, 336 N.W.2d 751 (mod. of 329 N.W.2d 743 ).) V. (13) We therefore apply the Shirley rule to the facts of this case. 1984We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that the admissibility of prehypnotic evidence is a question that should be "reserved until raised on an adequate record in an appropriate case." ( People v. Gonzales (Mich. 1983) supra, 336 N.W.2d 751 (mod. of 329 N.W.2d 743 ).) V. (13) We therefore apply the Shirley rule to the facts of this case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Gainer
red
2 sentences1984As with the rule we adopted in Gainer ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 853 ), we do not reach the question whether the Shirley rule applies on collateral attack to cases now final. [25] The Collins opinion impliedly acknowledged that the rule it adopted was in effect partially retroactive when it observed in closing ( ibid. ) that "This Court is cognizant that its holding is not purely prospective...." The implication was made express later in the same year by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which opined that the guidelines declared in Collins "might more properly be characterized as contemplating the applicat 1984As with the rule we adopted in Gainer ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 853 ), we do not reach the question whether the Shirley rule applies on collateral attack to cases now final. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.