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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1974–1979 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
D'AMICO v. Board of Medical Examinersred2 sentences1979A successful party may obtain an award of attorney’s fees from an opponent who has maintained an unfounded action or defense “‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppresssive reasons.’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 26 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ], quoting 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) p. 1709. 1979A successful party may obtain an award of attorney’s fees from an opponent who has maintained an unfounded action or defense “‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppresssive reasons.’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 26 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ], quoting 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) p. 1709. | 2 | 4 |
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences1979See also Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d 25, 42 .) There is no special requirement that a party establish that its opponent was guilty of obdurate behavior in order to receive attorney’s fees under the private attorney general theory. 1979See also Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d 25, 42 .) There is no special requirement that a party establish that its opponent was guilty of obdurate behavior in order to receive attorney’s fees under the private attorney general theory. | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1978(See Parker v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 556, 566 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 687 ].) In Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 833-839 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 86 ], another local division of this court reversed an award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions for the maintenance of an unfounded action or defense. 11 The $2,780 in remaining attorneys’ fees are unchallenged in Harbor’s brief and should be clearly recoverable under the reasoning of Lowell, Mustachio, McDowell and other cases. 1978(See Parker v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 556, 566 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 687 ].) In Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 833-839 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 86 ], another local division of this court reversed an award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions for the maintenance of an unfounded action or defense. 11 The $2,780 in remaining attorneys’ fees are unchallenged in Harbor’s brief and should be clearly recoverable under the reasoning of Lowell, Mustachio, McDowell and other cases. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Redmangreen2 sentences1978(See Parker v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 556, 566 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 687 ].) In Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 833-839 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 86 ], another local division of this court reversed an award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions for the maintenance of an unfounded action or defense. 11 The $2,780 in remaining attorneys’ fees are unchallenged in Harbor’s brief and should be clearly recoverable under the reasoning of Lowell, Mustachio, McDowell and other cases. 1978(See Parker v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 556, 566 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 687 ].) In Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 833-839 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 86 ], another local division of this court reversed an award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions for the maintenance of an unfounded action or defense. 11 The $2,780 in remaining attorneys’ fees are unchallenged in Harbor’s brief and should be clearly recoverable under the reasoning of Lowell, Mustachio, McDowell and other cases. | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County, Virginiagreen2 sentences1974The first group involves awards of attorney’s fees to the prevailing litigant when his opponent has maintained an unfounded action or defense and has done so “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” (6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) ¶ 54.77[2], p. 1709, fn. omitted.) This rationale has most recently been applied in school desegregation cases, notably Bell v. School Board (4th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 494 , 500, and Cato v. Parham (E.D.Ark. 1968) 293 F.Supp. 1375, 1378-1379 , affd. (8th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 12 . 21 Thus, in the former case an award was upheld in light o 1974The first group involves awards of attorney’s fees to the prevailing litigant when his opponent has maintained an unfounded action or defense and has done so “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” (6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) ¶ 54.77[2], p. 1709, fn. omitted.) This rationale has most recently been applied in school desegregation cases, notably Bell v. School Board (4th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 494 , 500, and Cato v. Parham (E.D.Ark. 1968) 293 F.Supp. 1375, 1378-1379 , affd. (8th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 12 . 21 Thus, in the former case an award was upheld in light o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. MacDougallgreen1 sentence1978“The first of these, involv[ed] awards against an *87 opponent who has maintained an unfounded action or defense ‘ “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons” ’ (11 Cal.3d at p. 26 [D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 ( 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 )]). . .” (Serrano III at p. 42; but see Williams v. MacDougall (1870) 39 Cal. 80, 85-86 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sierra Club v. Lynn
green
1 sentence1979This theory involves “ ‘ ... awards against an opponent who has maintained an unfounded action or defense “ ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Id., at pp. 86-87.) Another theory to justify an award of attorney fees is based on the so-called “substantial benefit” rule: when litigation “ ‘ . . . results in the conferral of substantial benefits, whether of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature, upon . . . [the opposing party, that party] may, in the exercise of the court’s equitable discretion, be required to yield some of those benefits in the form of an award o | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Robert J. COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ivan ALLEN, Jr., Mayor of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
green
1 sentence1976(See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen (5th Cir. *837 1972) 467 F.2d 836 ; Bradley v. Richmond School Board (1974) 416 U.S. 696 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 476 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 ].) An additional justification for imposition of attorney fees is where an unfounded action or defense is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner
green
2 sentences1976A sanction of $750 had already been assessed in connection with discovery, and the court felt that no further sanctions were justified. {Id., at pp. 26-27.) The California Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming the power of the trial court to award sanctions, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding an amount smaller than the plaintiffs desired. {Id., at p. 27.) Similarly, in Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal.App.3d 449 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], the reviewing court declined to decide the issue because there were no findings of fact 1976A sanction of $750 had already been assessed in connection with discovery, and the court felt that no further sanctions were justified. {Id., at pp. 26-27.) The California Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming the power of the trial court to award sanctions, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding an amount smaller than the plaintiffs desired. {Id., at p. 27.) Similarly, in Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal.App.3d 449 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], the reviewing court declined to decide the issue because there were no findings of fact | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond
green
2 sentences1976(See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen (5th Cir. *837 1972) 467 F.2d 836 ; Bradley v. Richmond School Board (1974) 416 U.S. 696 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 476 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 ].) An additional justification for imposition of attorney fees is where an unfounded action or defense is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. 1976(See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen (5th Cir. *837 1972) 467 F.2d 836 ; Bradley v. Richmond School Board (1974) 416 U.S. 696 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 476 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 ].) An additional justification for imposition of attorney fees is where an unfounded action or defense is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Cato v. Parham
green
1 sentence1974The first group involves awards of attorney’s fees to the prevailing litigant when his opponent has maintained an unfounded action or defense and has done so “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” (6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) ¶ 54.77[2], p. 1709, fn. omitted.) This rationale has most recently been applied in school desegregation cases, notably Bell v. School Board (4th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 494 , 500, and Cato v. Parham (E.D.Ark. 1968) 293 F.Supp. 1375, 1378-1379 , affd. (8th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 12 . 21 Thus, in the former case an award was upheld in light o | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Cato v. Parham
green
1 sentence1974The first group involves awards of attorney’s fees to the prevailing litigant when his opponent has maintained an unfounded action or defense and has done so “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” (6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971) ¶ 54.77[2], p. 1709, fn. omitted.) This rationale has most recently been applied in school desegregation cases, notably Bell v. School Board (4th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 494 , 500, and Cato v. Parham (E.D.Ark. 1968) 293 F.Supp. 1375, 1378-1379 , affd. (8th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 12 . 21 Thus, in the former case an award was upheld in light o | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.