defendants took exception in Connecticut

2010The defendants submitted proposed jury instructions that included a charge based on the holding of Kraus v. Newton, supra, 211 Conn. 191 , that, absent the existence of unusual circumstances, the defendants were entitled to wait a reasonable period of time after the end of the storm before removing ice from the sidewalk. 3 The court did not charge the jury in accordance *78 with the principles of Kraus , and the defendants took an exception to the court’s failure to so charge.

2002Confronted with a claim of improper instruction arising out of a crime that involved the use of a dangerous instrument in State v. Huff, 10 Conn. App. 330, 335 , 523 A.2d 906 , cert. denied, 203 Conn. 809 , 525 A.2d 523 (1987), we stated: “The court read the jury the statutory definition of the essential element of the crime charged, namely use of a ‘dangerous instrument.’ ‘Serious physical injury,’ is not itself, however, an essential element of the crime charged.

2002Confronted with a claim of improper instruction arising out of a crime that involved the use of a dangerous instrument in State v. Huff, 10 Conn. App. 330, 335 , 523 A.2d 906 , cert. denied, 203 Conn. 809 , 525 A.2d 523 (1987), we stated: “The court read the jury the statutory definition of the essential element of the crime charged, namely use of a ‘dangerous instrument.’ ‘Serious physical injury,’ is not itself, however, an essential element of the crime charged.

2002Confronted with a claim of improper instruction arising out of a crime that involved the use of a dangerous instrument in State v. Huff, 10 Conn. App. 330, 335 , 523 A.2d 906 , cert. denied, 203 Conn. 809 , 525 A.2d 523 (1987), we stated: “The court read the jury the statutory definition of the essential element of the crime charged, namely use of a ‘dangerous instrument.’ ‘Serious physical injury,’ is not itself, however, an essential element of the crime charged.

2002Confronted with a claim of improper instruction arising out of a crime that involved the use of a dangerous instrument in State v. Huff, 10 Conn. App. 330, 335 , 523 A.2d 906 , cert. denied, 203 Conn. 809 , 525 A.2d 523 (1987), we stated: “The court read the jury the statutory definition of the essential element of the crime charged, namely use of a ‘dangerous instrument.’ ‘Serious physical injury,’ is not itself, however, an essential element of the crime charged.

1992It has long been recognized that “[a] master is liable for the wilful torts of his servant committed within the scope of the servant’s employment and in furtherance of his master’s business.” Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 154 Conn. 544, 547 , 227 A.2d 251 (1967).

1992It has long been recognized that “[a] master is liable for the wilful torts of his servant committed within the scope of the servant’s employment and in furtherance of his master’s business.” Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 154 Conn. 544, 547 , 227 A.2d 251 (1967).

1987We have stated that the test of a court’s charge “is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 240 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); Borsoi v. Sparico, 141 Conn. 366, 371 , 106 A.2d 170 (1954).

1987We have stated that the test of a court’s charge “is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 240 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); Borsoi v. Sparico, 141 Conn. 366, 371 , 106 A.2d 170 (1954).

1987Practice Book § 4185; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., supra, 241; Kosko v. Kohler, 176 Conn. 383, 389 , 407 A.2d 1009 (1978).

1987Practice Book § 4185; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., supra, 241; Kosko v. Kohler, 176 Conn. 383, 389 , 407 A.2d 1009 (1978).

1987We have stated that the test of a court’s charge “is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 240 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); Borsoi v. Sparico, 141 Conn. 366, 371 , 106 A.2d 170 (1954).

1987We have stated that the test of a court’s charge “is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 240 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); Borsoi v. Sparico, 141 Conn. 366, 371 , 106 A.2d 170 (1954).

1987Because the defendants took no exception on the point, this claim was “not distinctly raised at trial”; State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 461 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986); and we are relieved of any obligation to consider it further.

1987Because the defendants took no exception on the point, this claim was “not distinctly raised at trial”; State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 461 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986); and we are relieved of any obligation to consider it further.

1986As we recently have held in State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87 , 502 A.2d 388 (1985), and in State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 134 , 502 A.2d 381 (1985), the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, supra, because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is “beyond criticism in every particular.” State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the

1986As we recently have held in State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87 , 502 A.2d 388 (1985), and in State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 134 , 502 A.2d 381 (1985), the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, supra, because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is “beyond criticism in every particular.” State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the

1986As we recently have held in State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87 , 502 A.2d 388 (1985), and in State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 134 , 502 A.2d 381 (1985), the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, supra, because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is “beyond criticism in every particular.” State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the

1986As we recently have held in State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87 , 502 A.2d 388 (1985), and in State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 134 , 502 A.2d 381 (1985), the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, supra, because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is “beyond criticism in every particular.” State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the

1986In Carter , we stated that “the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans [ 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973)], because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is ‘beyond criticism in every particular.’ State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the trial court’s charge on insanity their respective claims of error were not reviewed by this c

1986In Carter , we stated that “the failure properly to object to a court’s charge on insanity renders the claim of error unreviewable by this court even under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans [ 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973)], because the trial court is under no constitutional obligation to charge the jury with a definition of insanity that is ‘beyond criticism in every particular.’ State v. Harman, supra. In each of those cases, because the defendants took no exception to the trial court’s charge on insanity their respective claims of error were not reviewed by this c

1980State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332 , 426 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.

1980State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332 , 426 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.

1980State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332 , 426 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.

1980State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332 , 426 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.

1980State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332 , 426 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.