statutoiy requirement in Connecticut

2011Only weeks ago, in reversing a judgment of this court, our Supreme Court in Sequenzia v. Guerrieri Masonry, Inc., 298 Conn. 816,821-22 , 9 A.3d 322 (2010), concluded that this court “should have decided the appeal based only on the issues properly brought before it” and rejected the contention that “the Appellate Court has the discretion to decide a case on any basis, regardless of whether that claim was raised by the parties.” Because the burden rests exclusively with the plaintiff to demonstrate a statutoiy waiver on the part of the legislature, logic dictates that the “strong presumption in

2011Only weeks ago, in reversing a judgment of this court, our Supreme Court in Sequenzia v. Guerrieri Masonry, Inc., 298 Conn. 816,821-22 , 9 A.3d 322 (2010), concluded that this court “should have decided the appeal based only on the issues properly brought before it” and rejected the contention that “the Appellate Court has the discretion to decide a case on any basis, regardless of whether that claim was raised by the parties.” Because the burden rests exclusively with the plaintiff to demonstrate a statutoiy waiver on the part of the legislature, logic dictates that the “strong presumption in

2009In the absence of a statutoiy waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so. “[A] plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the claims commissioner.” Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 *352 Conn. 317.

2008As this court recognized in State v. Palmer, 206 Conn. 40 , 536 A.2d 936 (1988), however, this overlap does not diminish the fact that the two crimes have different elements.

2008As this court recognized in State v. Palmer, 206 Conn. 40 , 536 A.2d 936 (1988), however, this overlap does not diminish the fact that the two crimes have different elements.

2004General Statutes § 52-556 creates a cause of action against the state and represents a statutoiy exception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619, 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808 , 576 A.2d 538 (1990). “[B]ecause the state has permitted itself to be sued in certain circumstances, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . .

2004General Statutes § 52-556 creates a cause of action against the state and represents a statutoiy exception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619, 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808 , 576 A.2d 538 (1990). “[B]ecause the state has permitted itself to be sued in certain circumstances, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . .

2004General Statutes § 52-556 creates a cause of action against the state and represents a statutoiy exception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619, 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808 , 576 A.2d 538 (1990). “[B]ecause the state has permitted itself to be sued in certain circumstances, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . .

2004General Statutes § 52-556 creates a cause of action against the state and represents a statutoiy exception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619, 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808 , 576 A.2d 538 (1990). “[B]ecause the state has permitted itself to be sued in certain circumstances, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . .

2004Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted.) White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

2004Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted.) White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Information that is relevant to the treatment of the patient... is admissible.” (Citations omitted.) Aspiazu v. Orgera, 205 Conn. 623, 626-28 , 535 A.2d 338 (1987).

1997Information that is relevant to the treatment of the patient... is admissible.” (Citations omitted.) Aspiazu v. Orgera, 205 Conn. 623, 626-28 , 535 A.2d 338 (1987).

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1997Acknowledging that his claim is unpreserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). “[B]ecause jury instructions that misstate the statutoiy defense of self-defense violate a defendant’s fourteenth amendment right to establish a defense”; State v. Jones, 39 Conn. App. 563, 567 , 665 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 931 , 667 A.2d 800 (1995); the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the precepts of State v. Golding, supra, 239-40 . 5 At the outset, we note that under the third prong of Golding , “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved const

1986It may have been intended to indicate the acceptance by the Superior Court as a separate magistracy of the authority to refer cases to committees created by the legislature not only in cases where the parties had consented but also in those cases where “the questions involved are such as clearly ought to be sent to a committee.” General Statutes § 52-425; see State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 507 , 353 A.2d 723 (1974); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 161 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968).

1986It may have been intended to indicate the acceptance by the Superior Court as a separate magistracy of the authority to refer cases to committees created by the legislature not only in cases where the parties had consented but also in those cases where “the questions involved are such as clearly ought to be sent to a committee.” General Statutes § 52-425; see State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 507 , 353 A.2d 723 (1974); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 161 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968).