erred hearing in Georgia

2024Because Sobh has not shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s conversion of the hearing, we decline to find an abuse of discretion.11 Moreover, it was Sobh who proffered the testimony of Mr. Sobh as support for his position, so he cannot now claim that the trial court erred by hearing Mr. Sobh’s testimony on the matter.12 And, although it is typically the parties rather than the trial court judge who questions witnesses, it is nonetheless true that [a] trial judge may propound questions to a witness to develop the truth of the case, to clarify testimony, to comment on pertinent eviden

2024Because Sobh has not shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s conversion of the hearing, we decline to find an abuse of discretion.11 Moreover, it was Sobh who proffered the testimony of Mr. Sobh as support for his position, so he cannot now claim that the trial court erred by hearing Mr. Sobh’s testimony on the matter.12 And, although it is typically the parties rather than the trial court judge who questions witnesses, it is nonetheless true that [a] trial judge may propound questions to a witness to develop the truth of the case, to clarify testimony, to comment on pertinent eviden

1994This argument was raised and rejected in Williamson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 439 ( 390 SE2d 658 ).

1994This argument was raised and rejected in Williamson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 439 ( 390 SE2d 658 ).

1986Held: Ordinarily, where no transcript or agreed statement of facts is furnished, “the appellate court is bound to assume that the trial court’s findings are supported by sufficient competent evidence for there is a presumption in favor of the regularity of all proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Vaughan v. Buice, 253 Ga. 540 ( 322 SE2d 282 ) (1984).

1986Held: Ordinarily, where no transcript or agreed statement of facts is furnished, “the appellate court is bound to assume that the trial court’s findings are supported by sufficient competent evidence for there is a presumption in favor of the regularity of all proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Vaughan v. Buice, 253 Ga. 540 ( 322 SE2d 282 ) (1984).

1975In Williams v. Overstreet, 230 Ga. 112 ( 195 SE2d 906 ), the arguments made by the plaintiffs in this case as to the right to trial by jury in equity cases were extensively dealt with.

1975In Williams v. Overstreet, 230 Ga. 112 ( 195 SE2d 906 ), the arguments made by the plaintiffs in this case as to the right to trial by jury in equity cases were extensively dealt with.

1927And, as was said in the case of Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271 (1) : ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear as a defense does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/ ” In Short v. State, 140 Ga. 780 ( 80 S. E. 8 ), this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Evans, said: “ ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/” So I do not think that the court erred in this instruction to th

1927And, as was said in the case of Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271 (1) : ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear as a defense does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/ ” In Short v. State, 140 Ga. 780 ( 80 S. E. 8 ), this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Evans, said: “ ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/” So I do not think that the court erred in this instruction to th

1927And, as was said in the case of Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271 (1) : ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear as a defense does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/ ” In Short v. State, 140 Ga. 780 ( 80 S. E. 8 ), this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Evans, said: “ ‘The doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing/” So I do not think that the court erred in this instruction to th

1913As pointed out by Chief Justice Bleckley in Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. 129 ( 9 S. E. 542 ), the defense of alibi rests upon two prongs: The jury may either consider the alibi on the general case, for the purpose of determining whether any view of the alibi in connection with other evidence raises a reasonable doubt; or they may consider whether the proof of the alibi alone and of itself raises such a doubt as will require the jury to acquit.

1913As pointed out by Chief Justice Bleckley in Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. 129 ( 9 S. E. 542 ), the defense of alibi rests upon two prongs: The jury may either consider the alibi on the general case, for the purpose of determining whether any view of the alibi in connection with other evidence raises a reasonable doubt; or they may consider whether the proof of the alibi alone and of itself raises such a doubt as will require the jury to acquit.