erred instruction (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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erred instruction in Connecticut

5 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
O'Keefe v. Fitzgeraldgreen
conn · 1927 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
2 sentences

1990The plaintiff claims that the court erred in its instruction on the family car doctrine when it instructed the panel that "if you find that the defendant Ward had specifically asked permission to use the car on the night in question or was in the habit of specifically asking permission to use the vehicle when she decided to, then she would not be using the vehicle under a general authority to drive and the plaintiff would have failed to sustain his burden of proof on this necessary element and your verdict under those circumstances must be for the defendant Richard DeForest." 3 The court belie

1990In O'Keefe v. Fitzgerald 106 Conn. at 299 the Supreme Court remarked under very similar facts ". . . [I]t appears that she did not venture to take the car without permission, in fact she approached the owner twice upon the matter.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction green
connappct · 2013
2 sentences

2025Reviewing courts have provided multiple considera- tions, none individually dispositive, for evaluating the credibility of a petitioner’s claim of prejudice or that but for counsel’s alleged deficient representation, there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. ‘‘In evaluating the credi- bility of such an assertion, the strength of the state’s case is often the best evidence of whether a [petitioner] in fact would have changed [her] plea and insisted on going to trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Cor

2025Reviewing courts have provided multiple considera- tions, none individually dispositive, for evaluating the credibility of a petitioner’s claim of prejudice or that but for counsel’s alleged deficient representation, there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. ‘‘In evaluating the credi- bility of such an assertion, the strength of the state’s case is often the best evidence of whether a [petitioner] in fact would have changed [her] plea and insisted on going to trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Cor

12025–2025
Glendenning v. Conservation Commission green
connappct · 1987
2 sentences

2017The court should have considered the plaintiffs' claims and evidence of aggrievement in relation to the commission's anticipated environmental impact for the purpose of making findings thereon and drawing its conclusions therefrom as to the plaintiffs' aggrievement." Id., at 56 , 529 A.2d 727 .

2017The court should have considered the plaintiffs' claims and evidence of aggrievement in relation to the commission's anticipated environmental impact for the purpose of making findings thereon and drawing its conclusions therefrom as to the plaintiffs' aggrievement." Id., at 56 , 529 A.2d 727 .

12017–2017
State v. Famiglietti green
conn · 1991
2 sentences

2014We disagree. *348 “In State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605, 619-20 , 595 A.2d 306 (1991), our Supreme Court set forth the applicable principles governing specific unanimity charges: [W]e have not required a specific unanimity charge to be given in every case in which criminal liability may be premised on the violation of one of several alternative subsections of a statute.

2014We disagree. *348 “In State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605, 619-20 , 595 A.2d 306 (1991), our Supreme Court set forth the applicable principles governing specific unanimity charges: [W]e have not required a specific unanimity charge to be given in every case in which criminal liability may be premised on the violation of one of several alternative subsections of a statute.

12014–2014
Cox v. McClure green
· 1901
2 sentences

1917Cox v. McClure, 73 Conn. 486, 491 , 47 Atl. 757 .

1917Cox v. McClure, 73 Conn. 486, 491 , 47 Atl. 757 .

11917–1917

Where else courts name it

CA 32 (1903–2025) OH 25 (1984–2019) TX 17 (1890–2025) IL 16 (1906–2023) PA 14 (1842–2024) NH 12 (2007–2025) OK 12 (1899–2010) NC 10 (1925–2025) NY 8 (1899–2016) GA 7 (1881–2024) WA 6 (1983–2024) NM 5 (1948–2021) CT 5 (1917–2025) MO 5 (1872–2001) KY 4 (1930–2012) FL 4 (1907–2008) TN 4 (2005–2025) AZ 4 (1962–2010) MI 4 (1887–2025) AL 3 (1976–2014) WV 3 (1882–2025) NE 3 (1957–2019) NJ 3 (2020–2025) AR 3 (1913–1919) IA 3 (1858–1969) MN 2 (1986–2006) IN 2 (1917–1936) LA 2 (1989–2011) WI 2 (1908–2022) ME 2 (1991–1996) CO 2 (2025–2025) UT 2 (2021–2024) OR 2 (1971–1983) WY 2 (1995–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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