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17 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1890–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re RRgreen1 sentence2025See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006) (an appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion). 14 court erred in hearing and granting Courtney’s Petition for Enforcement because Courtney failed to serve Abundant Life, LLC, a necessary party. | 1 | 1 |
Murk v. Scheelegreen1 sentence2015Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W. 3d 513, 542 (Tex. 2002), instead of Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W. 3d 865, 866-67 (Tex. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Goggins v. Leogreen2 sentences2015The trial court erred in granting judgment for possession of the subject real property on April 17, 2015, because Appellee failed to tender evidence that GMAC was entitled to rely on “tenancy at sufferance” language in the Deed of Trust, and GMAC was not in privity of contract with Cox in regard to the claimed lien instrument 12 Conclusion/Prayer 13 Certificate of Service 15 Appendix 1 Judgment 16ff Appendix 2 Statutes and Rules 18ff BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 3 List of Authorities Cases Page Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989) 10 Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning, 271 S.W.2d 18 2015The trial court erred in granting judgment for possession of the subject real property on April 17, 2015, because Appellee failed to tender evidence that GMAC was entitled to rely on “tenancy at sufferance” language in the Deed of Trust, and GMAC was not in privity of contract with Cox in regard to the claimed lien instrument 12 Conclusion/Prayer 13 Certificate of Service 15 Appendix 1 Judgment 16ff Appendix 2 Statutes and Rules 18ff BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 3 List of Authorities Cases Page Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989) 10 Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning, 271 S.W.2d 18 | 1 | 1 |
Durham v. FORT WORTH TENT & AWNING COMPANYgreen1 sentence2015The trial court erred in granting judgment for possession of the subject real property on April 17, 2015, because Appellee failed to tender evidence that GMAC was entitled to rely on “tenancy at sufferance” language in the Deed of Trust, and GMAC was not in privity of contract with Cox in regard to the claimed lien instrument 12 Conclusion/Prayer 13 Certificate of Service 15 Appendix 1 Judgment 16ff Appendix 2 Statutes and Rules 18ff BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 3 List of Authorities Cases Page Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989) 10 Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning, 271 S.W.2d 18 | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2015The trial court erred in granting judgment for possession of the subject real property on April 17, 2015, because Appellee failed to tender evidence that GMAC was entitled to rely on “tenancy at sufferance” language in the Deed of Trust, and GMAC was not in privity of contract with Cox in regard to the claimed lien instrument 12 Conclusion/Prayer 13 Certificate of Service 15 Appendix 1 Judgment 16ff Appendix 2 Statutes and Rules 18ff BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 3 List of Authorities Cases Page Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989) 10 Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning, 271 S.W.2d 18 2015The trial court erred in hearing the case and rendering judgment on April 17, 2015, because at such time the Appellee’s pleading 11 Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989): “. . . in the absence of some evidence to the contrary, the filing of a reminder notice with the clerk creates a presumption that such notice was called to the attention of the trial judge on the date of filing.” 12 The Fifth Court of Appeals followed that course in Berry v. Berry, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals also took that approach in Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1 | 1 | 1 |
St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolffgreen1 sentence2015Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W. 3d 513, 542 (Tex. 2002), instead of Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W. 3d 865, 866-67 (Tex. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Berrygreen2 sentences2015The trial court erred in granting judgment for possession of the subject real property on April 17, 2015, because Appellee failed to tender evidence that GMAC was entitled to rely on “tenancy at sufferance” language in the Deed of Trust, and GMAC was not in privity of contract with Cox in regard to the claimed lien instrument 12 Conclusion/Prayer 13 Certificate of Service 15 Appendix 1 Judgment 16ff Appendix 2 Statutes and Rules 18ff BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 3 List of Authorities Cases Page Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989) 10 Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning, 271 S.W.2d 18 2015The trial court erred in hearing the case and rendering judgment on April 17, 2015, because at such time the Appellee’s pleading 11 Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989): “. . . in the absence of some evidence to the contrary, the filing of a reminder notice with the clerk creates a presumption that such notice was called to the attention of the trial judge on the date of filing.” 12 The Fifth Court of Appeals followed that course in Berry v. Berry, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals also took that approach in Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1 | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Davisgreen1 sentence1995See Davis v. Davis, 734 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
Trevino v. Stategreen1 sentence1994See Trevino , 565 S.W.2d at 941 . | 1 | 1 |
Koonce v. City of Mesquitegreen1 sentence1973See Koonce v. City of Mesquite, 382 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler 1964, writ dism’d); Brady v. Brady, 255 S.W.2d 585 *301 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1953, no writ); Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1936, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Bradygreen1 sentence1973See Koonce v. City of Mesquite, 382 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler 1964, writ dism’d); Brady v. Brady, 255 S.W.2d 585 *301 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1953, no writ); Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1936, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Baseygreen2 sentences1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: “As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustaine 1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: “As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustaine | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gaskill v. Vhs San Antonio Partners, LLC
green
1 sentence2024Rother likens the Rule 91a notice requirement to the notice requirement in summary judgment motions, arguing that a trial court “errs if it grants a motion for summary judgment without giving prior notice of the hearing date to the non-movant.” Relying on Gaskill v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC, 456 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied), Rother argues that because the hearing date for a Rule 91a motion “triggers the respondent’s deadlines to file a nonsuit or amended pleading,” strict compliance with the rule’s notice requirement is required. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Wyatt v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Davis , 734 S.W.2d at 712 ; Wyatt , 908 S.W.2d at 270 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sneed v. State
green
1 sentence1995“It is well established that issues of fact as to jury misconduct raised at a hearing on motions for new trial are for the determination of the trial judge, and where there is conflicting evidence there is no abuse of discretion where the motion for new trial is overruled.” Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 266 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Simmons v. State
green
1 sentence1985He contends that this refusal constitutes reversible error, citing Simmons v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), but in the alternative urges this Court to order the instant record supplemented by said statement of facts. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dugie v. Dugie
green
2 sentences1981Dugie v. Dugie, supra . 1981Dugie v. Dugie, supra. We reverse and remand the order of the court overruling the appellant’s plea of privilege. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hall v. Kynerd
neutral
1 sentence1973See Koonce v. City of Mesquite, 382 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler 1964, writ dism’d); Brady v. Brady, 255 S.W.2d 585 *301 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1953, no writ); Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1936, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Burgett v. Texas
green
2 sentences1969Appellant next contends that the court erred at the hearing on punishment in permitting the State to prove certain prior convictions which he alleges is in violation of the rule announced in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 116-117 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 . 1969Appellant next contends that the court erred at the hearing on punishment in permitting the State to prove certain prior convictions which he alleges is in violation of the rule announced in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 116-117 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation
green
2 sentences1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: "As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow `the injured party to have the value to him of the contract's performance.' Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928); or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). `The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustained 1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: “As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustaine | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker
green
2 sentences1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: “As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustaine 1969It is stated in Blakeway v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 429 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.App., n. r. e.) as follows: “As a general rule, damages for breach of contract seek to allow ‘the injured party to have the value to him of the contract’s performance.’ Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418 , 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 , 60 A.L.R. 936 (1928) ; or as stated differently by the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666 , 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952). ‘The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually sustaine | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Harris v. Wood County Cotton Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1950Hence, and wholly aside from questions of damage which are not before the .court, it is my opinion that the interest of .Loeffler is not pooled with the interest of Scott in the wells drilled South of Loeffler’s interest. [Harris v. Wood County Cotton Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App.], 222 S.W.2d 331 . * * *» We find the court erred in not hearing appellant’s cause of action raised by his pleadings upon the merits and the law relative to recovering the value of his oil which had been unlawfully drained from his land, if any, by Paul Scott, Nate Ginsberg, H. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Hunt v. Hunt
green
1 sentence1919The statement given under this assignment is: “Plaintiff’s first amended original petition was filed on February 4, 1919, and the cause was heard and tried on the same day.” Appellant cites Hunt v. Hunt, 196 S. W. 967 ; R. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Coward v. Sutfin
green
1 sentence1919Goodhue v. Meyers, 58 Tex. 405 ; Chandler v. Mackling, 22 Tex. 42 ; Coward v. Sutfin, 185 S. W. 378 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Goodhue v. J. Meyers & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1919Goodhue v. Meyers, 58 Tex. 405 ; Chandler v. Mackling, 22 Tex. 42 ; Coward v. Sutfin, 185 S. W. 378 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Perego v. White
neutral
1 sentence1890The question of the rights of a settler in a similar case was discussed in the case of Perego v. White, 77 Texas, 196 , and speaking of the appellant in that case it was said: ‘'He should have pleaded that he was an actual settler upon the lauds at the time they were sold by the county and that he desired to purchase, and should in the suit at least have offered to purchase upon the terms upon which the county sold.” This indicates, we think, the correct rule. | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.