erred hearing in California

2015In the published portion of the opinion, we reject the contention, based on Morales-Garcia v. Holder (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 1058 (Morales-Garcia), that intimate partner battery, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude.

2015In the published portion of the opinion, we reject the contention, based on Morales-Garcia v. Holder (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 1058 (Morales-Garcia), that intimate partner battery, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude.

2009It is the tribe's prerogative to determine membership criteria and to decide who meets those criteria. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" ( Junious M., supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 793 , last italics added.) In light of these considerations, the Court of Appeal in Junious M. held that the trial court erred in hearing evidence on and deciding the issue of whether the minor's possible connection to the Nooksack Tribe would or would not make him an "Indian child" for purposes of the ICWA. ( Junious M., supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 792 .) The Court of Appeal stated: "The [juvenile] court erred in approachin

2009It is the tribe’s prerogative to determine membership criteria and to decide who meets those criteria. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Junious M., supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 793 , last italics added.) In light of these considerations, the Court of Appeal in Junious M. held that the trial court erred in hearing evidence on and deciding the issue of whether the minor’s possible connection to the Nooksack Tribe would or would not make him an “Indian child” for purposes of the ICWA.

2025Section 654, subdivision (a), provides that “ ‘ “in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” ’ ” To start, we must determine if the “ ‘different crimes were completed by a “single physical act.” ’ ” (People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776 , 795, quoting People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 .) “ ‘Whether a defendant will be found to have committed a single physical act for purposes of section 654 depends on whether some action the defendant is charged with having taken separately completes the actus reus for each of the relevant criminal off

2021As the Attorney General points out, Oliver failed to tender the objection she raises here before the trial court.7 By failing to timely raise this claim that the trial court failed “to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 ), Oliver has forfeited it on appeal.

2021(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 746 .) 10 When conducting our inquiry, “‘[a] single instruction is not viewed in isolation, and the ultimate decision on whether a specific jury instruction is correct and adequate is determined by consideration of the entire instructions given to the jury.’” (Covarrubias, at p. 906.) While we find the court erred and the error was harmless, we first address specific arguments raised by the parties.

2016(D.C. v. Harvard- Westlake School (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 836, 850 .) 9 II Request for Dismissal Golden contends the court erred in hearing the vexatious litigant motion after she submitted a request for dismissal without prejudice.

2015Ellis recognized when plaintiffs move to dismiss the case before an anti-SLAPP motion is heard, trial courts retain limited jurisdiction to consider the merits in order to award attorney’s fees.” (Ellis, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 .) In finding error, the court wrote, “[the] trial had not ‘commenced,’ the dismissal filed by plaintiff was effective upon filing, and the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to rule on defendants’ anti- SLAPP motion. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 881.) In the instant case, the trial court’s ruling on July 10, 2014, as well as the judgment Molnar prepared which the

2014Conduct alleged to be an invasion of privacy is to be evaluated based on the extent to which it furthers legitimate and important competing interests. [Citations.]” ( 7 Cal.4th at p. 38 .) The trial court here made a thorough analysis of the competing interests in this case, and other than challenging the adequacy of Dr. Chavez’s declaration, Dr. Montegut makes no argument the court erred in its analysis of competing interests as defined in Hill .

2013(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) 2.

2013Most recently, Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th 222 , held that the defendant did not create a kill zone by firing a single shot into a group of people.

2013Most recently, Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th 222 , held that the defendant did not create a kill zone by firing a single shot into a group of people.

2009Co., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 1068 .

2009Sylmar then filed a timely notice of appeal from the order granting the first SLAPP motion.” (Id. at pp. 1053-1054.) On appeal, “Sylmar contended] that the trial court erred in hearing the SLAPP motion because it filed a first amended complaint pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 472 prior to the hearing on the motion.” (Sylmar, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 .) The appellate court concluded that “Sylmar received the benefit of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 472 [that permitted amendments] when it was permitted to file the first amended complaint.” (Sylmar, supra, at p. 1054 .)

2007All victims of drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims,’ but it is precisely because they are all vulnerable that Carrie Lee cannot be considered to be vulnerable ‘in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.’ [Citation.] While we can visualize extraordinary situations in which a drunk driving victim might be considered to be ‘particularly vulnerable,’ such a situation is not present here, and therefore the court erred in applying rule 421(a)(3) to this case.” (People v. Bloom, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 322 .) Unlike our case, in Bloom the defendant was driving his

1988(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ].) He also contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as evidenced by trial counsel’s handling of the nystagmus evidence.

1988(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ].) He also contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as evidenced by trial counsel’s handling of the nystagmus evidence.

1987All victims of drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims,’ but it is precisely because they are all vulnerable that Carrie Lee cannot be considered to be vulnerable ‘in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.’ (People v. Smith, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p.436.) While we can visualize extraordinary situations in which a drunk driving victim might be considered to be ‘particularly vulnerable,’ such a situation is not present here, and therefore the court erred in applying rule 421(a)(3) to this case.” (.People v. Bloom, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 321-322, fn. omitted,

1987All victims of drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims,’ but it is precisely because they are all vulnerable that Carrie Lee cannot be considered to be vulnerable ‘in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.’ (People v. Smith, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p.436.) While we can visualize extraordinary situations in which a drunk driving victim might be considered to be ‘particularly vulnerable,’ such a situation is not present here, and therefore the court erred in applying rule 421(a)(3) to this case.” (.People v. Bloom, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 321-322, fn. omitted,

1986If counsel informs the court that he believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing...." (Italics added.) [7] In light of this holding, appellant's contention that the trial court erred in hearing the section 1026.5 petition before the section 1026.2 petition, need not be decided. [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code. [2] Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ].

1986If counsel informs the court that he believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing...." (Italics added.) [7] In light of this holding, appellant's contention that the trial court erred in hearing the section 1026.5 petition before the section 1026.2 petition, need not be decided. [1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code. [2] Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ].

1983All victims of drunk drivers are “vulnerable victims,” but it is precisely because they are all vulnerable that Carrie Lee cannot be considered to be vulnerable “in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.” (People v. Smith, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 436 .) While we can visualize extraordinary situations in which a drunk driving victim might be considered to be “particularly vulnerable,” such a situation is not present here, and therefore the court erred in applying rule 421(a)(3) to this case.

1970(Gastelum v. City of Torrance, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 582 at pp. 583-585 ; Slayton v. Wright, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d 219 at pp. 232-234 ; Castro v. Fowler Equipment Co., supra, 233 Cal.App.2d 416 at pp. 421-422 ; Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 263 at p. 275 .) Had the court’s action been valid in principle, moreover, it could not be taken through the device employed here (ordering intervener to pay such benefits to defendant) because the court lacked jurisdiction to change the terms of the 1967 workmen’s compensation award.

1970(Gastelum v. City of Torrance, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 582 at pp. 583-585 ; Slayton v. Wright, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d 219 at pp. 232-234 ; Castro v. Fowler Equipment Co., supra, 233 Cal.App.2d 416 at pp. 421-422 ; Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 263 at p. 275 .) Had the court’s action been valid in principle, moreover, it could not be taken through the device employed here (ordering intervener to pay such benefits to defendant) because the court lacked jurisdiction to change the terms of the 1967 workmen’s compensation award.

1970Co. v. Henderson (1921) 54 Cal.App. 510, 514 [ 202 P. 797 ].) On the other hand, the clear weight of post-JTz'n decisions (which the Supreme Court can overrule, but which we are not free to ignore as precedent) indicates that the trial court erred in principle by applying Witt v. Jackson , to the original third party judgment here, so as to reach the yet-unpaid death benefits.