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7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mathis v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1937In Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 807 ( 11 S. E. 1018 ), Judge Bleckley, speaking for the court, said: “The constitution of 1877 (art. 1, sec. 4) declares: ‘Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.' The law embraced in the Code of 1882 for the exercise of local option as to fences, is a general law having uniform operation throughout the State [italics supplied], notwithstanding it embodies the option principle to be exercised locally and separately by 1937In Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 807 ( 11 S. E. 1018 ), Judge Bleckley, speaking for the court, said: “The constitution of 1877 (art. 1, sec. 4) declares: ‘Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.' The law embraced in the Code of 1882 for the exercise of local option as to fences, is a general law having uniform operation throughout the State [italics supplied], notwithstanding it embodies the option principle to be exercised locally and separately by | 1 | 3 |
Hasty v. Health Service Centers, Inc.green2 sentences2022That it instead identifies as the trigger only the “receipt” of the previously described notification is at least some evidence that the option clause is triggered as long as the company receives notice of the intent to sell—regardless of who sent, or how the company got, the notice the company “recei[ves].” Accord Hasty, 258 Ga. at 626 (where operative agreement similarly required owner to give written notice of intent to sell to right-of-first-refusal holder, right of first refusal was triggered despite owner’s failure to give such notice after owner granted option to third party to buy the 2022As a general matter, a right of first refusal is a right to buy property “when the owner decides to sell.” Hasty, 258 Ga. at 626 (emphasis omitted); IH Riverdale, LLC v. McChesney Capital Partners, 280 Ga. App. 9, 12 (1) (b) ( 633 SE2d 382 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
IH RIVERDALE, LLC v. McChesney Capital Partners, LLCgreen2 sentences2022As a general matter, a right of first refusal is a right to buy property “when the owner decides to sell.” Hasty, 258 Ga. at 626 (emphasis omitted); IH Riverdale, LLC v. McChesney Capital Partners, 280 Ga. App. 9, 12 (1) (b) ( 633 SE2d 382 ) (2006). 2022As a general matter, a right of first refusal is a right to buy property “when the owner decides to sell.” Hasty, 258 Ga. at 626 (emphasis omitted); IH Riverdale, LLC v. McChesney Capital Partners, 280 Ga. App. 9, 12 (1) (b) ( 633 SE2d 382 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Larned v. Wentworthgreen2 sentences1935See Larned v. Wentworth, 114 Ga. 208 ( 39 S. E. 855 ); Sneed v. Wood, 24 Ga. App. 210 ( 100 S. E. 714 ); 66 C. 1935See Larned v. Wentworth, 114 Ga. 208 ( 39 S. E. 855 ); Sneed v. Wood, 24 Ga. App. 210 ( 100 S. E. 714 ); 66 C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Caver
neutral
2 sentences1958Because of the difference in policy provisions, the arguments advanced in the Harwell case cannot apply to the policy here under construction. (6) As to the endorsement providing, “The Association cannot cancel this policy for any period for which the premium has been paid,” we agree with the decision in Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Caver, 169 Miss. 554 ( 152 So. 897 ), which, construing the endorsement in connection with the option clause, held: “It will be noted from the quoted clauses from the policy that the insurance company reserved the right to decline to accept any premium 1958Because of the difference in policy provisions, the arguments advanced in the Harwell case cannot apply to the policy here under construction. (6) As to the endorsement providing, “The Association cannot cancel this policy for any period for which the premium has been paid,” we agree with the decision in Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Caver, 169 Miss. 554 ( 152 So. 897 ), which, construing the endorsement in connection with the option clause, held: “It will be noted from the quoted clauses from the policy that the insurance company reserved the right to decline to accept any premium | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Snead v. Wood
green
1 sentence1935See Larned v. Wentworth, 114 Ga. 208 ( 39 S. E. 855 ); Sneed v. Wood, 24 Ga. App. 210 ( 100 S. E. 714 ); 66 C. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Ryan
green
1 sentence1935See Larned v. Wentworth, 114 Ga. 208 ( 39 S. E. 855 ); Sneed v. Wood, 24 Ga. App. 210 ( 100 S. E. 714 ); 66 C. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Griggs v. State
green
1 sentence1932In Ogletree v. Hutchinson, 126 Ga. 454 (2) ( 55 S. E. 179 ), the Supreme Court held that a stipulation of this kind does not have the effect of making the person actually receiving the money under the policy the beneficiary thereunder, but that it “is merely an appointment, by the parties to the contract, of a person who may collect the amount due under the policy for the benefit of the person ultimately entitled.” So, by the written provisions of the policy under consideration, it was enforceable against the company only by an executor or administrator of the insured, but with an option or pr | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Ogletree v. Hutchinson
green
1 sentence1932In Ogletree v. Hutchinson, 126 Ga. 454 (2) ( 55 S. E. 179 ), the Supreme Court held that a stipulation of this kind does not have the effect of making the person actually receiving the money under the policy the beneficiary thereunder, but that it “is merely an appointment, by the parties to the contract, of a person who may collect the amount due under the policy for the benefit of the person ultimately entitled.” So, by the written provisions of the policy under consideration, it was enforceable against the company only by an executor or administrator of the insured, but with an option or pr | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Cassidy v. Life Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1932Cassidy v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 43 Ga. App. 798 ( 160 S. E. 549 ); Williard v. Prudential Insurance Co., 276 Pa. 427 ( 120 Atl. 461 , 28 A. L. 1932Cassidy v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 43 Ga. App. 798 ( 160 S. E. 549 ); Williard v. Prudential Insurance Co., 276 Pa. 427 ( 120 Atl. 461 , 28 A. L. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Williard v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
neutral
2 sentences1932Cassidy v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 43 Ga. App. 798 ( 160 S. E. 549 ); Williard v. Prudential Insurance Co., 276 Pa. 427 ( 120 Atl. 461 , 28 A. L. 1932Cassidy v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 43 Ga. App. 798 ( 160 S. E. 549 ); Williard v. Prudential Insurance Co., 276 Pa. 427 ( 120 Atl. 461 , 28 A. L. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Crabb v. State
green
1 sentence1931In Crabb v. State, 88 Ga. 584 ( 15 S. E. 455 ), this court declared that the general local option liquor law was a general law providing for obtaining prohibition in the several counties of this State, notwithstanding the fact that it did not become operative in a county until it had been approved by a popular vote. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.