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22 California opinions name it 3 courts 1906–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spaulding v. Yovino-Younggreen2 sentences1978Spaulding v. Yovino-Young (1947) 30 Cal.2d 138, 144 [ 180 P.2d 691 ], does not assist Wilcox. 1959In support of their contention that paragraph 20 (the “time is of the essence” clause) is not applicable to the option agreement, plaintiffs cite the familiar rule that “in the absence of a provision [in a lease] making the exercise of the option to purchase personal to lessee, [citation] such option may be separated from the lease and transferred by the lessee independently of the leasehold interest.” (See 35 C.J., § 181, p. 1038; Spaulding v. Yovino-Young, 30 Cal.2d 138 [ 180 P.2d 691 ].) The authorities relied upon by plaintiffs, however, do not support their contention that paragraph 20 of | 1 | 2 |
Cates v. McNeilgreen2 sentences1954Reese Co. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [ 124 P. 442 ].)’ ” In Cates v. McNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706 [ 147 P. 944 ] the court said: “The option clause gave the respondents a right to purchase the leased premises for the price of six hundred dollars an acre. 1954Reese Co. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [ 124 P. 442 ].)’ ” In Cates v. McNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706 [ 147 P. 944 ] the court said: “The option clause gave the respondents a right to purchase the leased premises for the price of six hundred dollars an acre. | 1 | 2 |
Kajima Engineering & Costruction, Inc. v. Pacific Bellgreen1 sentence2020Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 709, 716 , italics added; accord, Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Pacific Bell (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1401 .) Logically, the language in section 645 about exception and review, namely that a general referee’s decision “may be excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by the court” (italics added), means that aggrieved parties have the option to challenge the general referee’s decision by bringing a postjudgment motion (see e.g., §§ 663a, 657), or by filing an appeal.5 Real parties’ construction is not tenable for three reasons. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods, Inc.green2 sentences1991Code, § 1643.) The purpose of the option clause is to benefit the lessee (see Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods, Inc. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1042 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 535 ]), by ensuring an opportunity to continue its business and recoup its investment. 1991Code, § 1643.) The purpose of the option clause is to benefit the lessee (see Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods, Inc. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1042 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 535 ]), by ensuring an opportunity to continue its business and recoup its investment. | 1 | 1 |
Riverside Fence Co. v. Novakgreen2 sentences1970In Riverside Fence Co. v. Novak (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 656, 660 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 536 ], it is stated: “The acceptance must be in accordance with the terms of the option agreement and must be free of conditions which the optionor is not bound to perform.” Here plaintiffs have alleged that the option agreement was accepted without reservation although the mode of acceptance was not that stated in the option contract. 1970In Riverside Fence Co. v. Novak (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 656, 660 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 536 ], it is stated: “The acceptance must be in accordance with the terms of the option agreement and must be free of conditions which the optionor is not bound to perform.” Here plaintiffs have alleged that the option agreement was accepted without reservation although the mode of acceptance was not that stated in the option contract. | 1 | 1 |
Moreno v. Blinngreen2 sentences1958Bank, 159 Cal.App.2d 184, 186, 189 [ 323 P.2d 834 ], where “an option and privilege” to purchase leased premises was involved; and Moreno v. Blinn, 81 Cal.App.2d 852, 853, 856 [ 185 P.2d 332 ], where the lease contained a clause giving the lessee a “first right to purchase.”) The record (Exhibit D) shows that on February 20, 1953, plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with Virgil and Ruth Smith whereby the land covered by the development and shareerop leases was leased to said Smiths. 1958Bank, 159 Cal.App.2d 184, 186, 189 [ 323 P.2d 834 ], where “an option and privilege” to purchase leased premises was involved; and Moreno v. Blinn, 81 Cal.App.2d 852, 853, 856 [ 185 P.2d 332 ], where the lease contained a clause giving the lessee a “first right to purchase.”) The record (Exhibit D) shows that on February 20, 1953, plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with Virgil and Ruth Smith whereby the land covered by the development and shareerop leases was leased to said Smiths. | 1 | 1 |
Richfield Oil Corp. v. Security-First National Bankgreen2 sentences1958Bank, 159 Cal.App.2d 184, 186, 189 [ 323 P.2d 834 ], where “an option and privilege” to purchase leased premises was involved; and Moreno v. Blinn, 81 Cal.App.2d 852, 853, 856 [ 185 P.2d 332 ], where the lease contained a clause giving the lessee a “first right to purchase.”) The record (Exhibit D) shows that on February 20, 1953, plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with Virgil and Ruth Smith whereby the land covered by the development and shareerop leases was leased to said Smiths. 1958Bank, 159 Cal.App.2d 184, 186, 189 [ 323 P.2d 834 ], where “an option and privilege” to purchase leased premises was involved; and Moreno v. Blinn, 81 Cal.App.2d 852, 853, 856 [ 185 P.2d 332 ], where the lease contained a clause giving the lessee a “first right to purchase.”) The record (Exhibit D) shows that on February 20, 1953, plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with Virgil and Ruth Smith whereby the land covered by the development and shareerop leases was leased to said Smiths. | 1 | 1 |
Gosliner v. Brionesgreen2 sentences1957In Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557, 560 [ 204 P. 19 ], this court said “. . . the character of the annexation to the land or other realty and the use made of the property are important considerations, but in most cases are subsidiarily employed for the purpose of testing the intention of the parties.” The lease contains the following covenant relating to the intention of the parties: “At the expiration of said lease, and if there has not been and/or will not be another contract entered into, the Lessors have the option to purchase all improvements, provided the Lessees intend to sell.” The o 1957In Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557, 560 [ 204 P. 19 ], this court said “. . . the character of the annexation to the land or other realty and the use made of the property are important considerations, but in most cases are subsidiarily employed for the purpose of testing the intention of the parties.” The lease contains the following covenant relating to the intention of the parties: “At the expiration of said lease, and if there has not been and/or will not be another contract entered into, the Lessors have the option to purchase all improvements, provided the Lessees intend to sell.” The o | 1 | 1 |
Knowles v. Murphygreen2 sentences1954And in Knowles v. Murphy, 107 Cal. 107, 115 [ 40 P. 111 ], it was held that if the tender was made by virtue of the option clause in the lease it did not release the defendants from their obligation to pay the rent, unless they should in some manner have sought the enforcement of the agreement to sell on the part of the lessor. 1954And in Knowles v. Murphy, 107 Cal. 107, 115 [ 40 P. 111 ], it was held that if the tender was made by virtue of the option clause in the lease it did not release the defendants from their obligation to pay the rent, unless they should in some manner have sought the enforcement of the agreement to sell on the part of the lessor. | 1 | 1 |
Falkenstein v. Poppergreen2 sentences1953(Falkenstein v. Popper, 81 Cal.App.2d 131, 133 [ 183 P.2d 707 ].) Since both option clauses are the same except as to the sum named therein, we shall refer only to the provisions of the “Wilshire” lease. 1953(Falkenstein v. Popper, 81 Cal.App.2d 131, 133 [ 183 P.2d 707 ].) Since both option clauses are the same except as to the sum named therein, we shall refer only to the provisions of the “Wilshire” lease. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc.green2 sentences1948(See Edwards v. Billow, 31 Cal.2d 350 [ 188 P.2d 748 ].) Plaintiff’s position is based upon his assumption that the three documents—(1) Needles’ letter of December 12, offering to purchase for $20,000 upon certain conditions; (2) the deposit receipt signed by defendants; and (3) the telegram from Needles—constitute a binding agreement on the part of the defendants to sell and of Needles (for his principal) to buy; and hence, as said in Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 54 Cal.App.2d 92, 97 [ 128 P.2d 608 ] : “The readiness, willingness and ability of the seller was demonstrated by the buye 1948(See Edwards v. Billow, 31 Cal.2d 350 [ 188 P.2d 748 ].) Plaintiff’s position is based upon his assumption that the three documents—(1) Needles’ letter of December 12, offering to purchase for $20,000 upon certain conditions; (2) the deposit receipt signed by defendants; and (3) the telegram from Needles—constitute a binding agreement on the part of the defendants to sell and of Needles (for his principal) to buy; and hence, as said in Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 54 Cal.App.2d 92, 97 [ 128 P.2d 608 ] : “The readiness, willingness and ability of the seller was demonstrated by the buye | 1 | 1 |
Streicher v. Heimburgegreen2 sentences1947(Streicher v. Heimburge, 205 Cal. 675, 683 [ 272 P. 290 ].) Respondent argues that the language of the option clause of the lease was properly construed to mean that at the expiration of the original term thereof an entirely new lease was to be executed by the parties covering a new term of four years, and that the lessee’s notice of exercise of the , option did not effect an extension of his term; that the terms “renew,” “re-lease” and “extension” are distinguishable; that because the option reads that the lessee “shall have the option to re-lease said property upon the terms hereinafter set 1947(Streicher v. Heimburge, 205 Cal. 675, 683 [ 272 P. 290 ].) Respondent argues that the language of the option clause of the lease was properly construed to mean that at the expiration of the original term thereof an entirely new lease was to be executed by the parties covering a new term of four years, and that the lessee’s notice of exercise of the , option did not effect an extension of his term; that the terms “renew,” “re-lease” and “extension” are distinguishable; that because the option reads that the lessee “shall have the option to re-lease said property upon the terms hereinafter set | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bock v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1978Spaulding v. Yovino-Young (1947) 30 Cal.2d 138, 144 [ 180 P.2d 691 ], does not assist Wilcox. 1959In support of their contention that paragraph 20 (the “time is of the essence” clause) is not applicable to the option agreement, plaintiffs cite the familiar rule that “in the absence of a provision [in a lease] making the exercise of the option to purchase personal to lessee, [citation] such option may be separated from the lease and transferred by the lessee independently of the leasehold interest.” (See 35 C.J., § 181, p. 1038; Spaulding v. Yovino-Young, 30 Cal.2d 138 [ 180 P.2d 691 ].) The authorities relied upon by plaintiffs, however, do not support their contention that paragraph 20 of | 2 | 1959–1978 |
Wind Dancer Production Group v. Walt Disney Pictures
green
1 sentence2026Although [the] defendants had the power to require a written exercise of the option, this requirement was for the benefit of [the] defendants and may be waived by them.” (Ibid.) The modification clause could also be waived. “[N]otwithstanding a provision in a written agreement that precludes oral modification, the 13 parties may, by their words or conduct, waive contractual rights. [Citations.] ‘“[T]he pivotal issue in a claim of waiver is the intention of the party who allegedly relinquished the known legal right.”’ [Citation.] [Citation.] ‘“The waiver may be either express, based on the word | 1 | 2026–2026 |
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Nationwide Insurance
green
1 sentence2020Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 709, 716 , italics added; accord, Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Pacific Bell (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1401 .) Logically, the language in section 645 about exception and review, namely that a general referee’s decision “may be excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by the court” (italics added), means that aggrieved parties have the option to challenge the general referee’s decision by bringing a postjudgment motion (see e.g., §§ 663a, 657), or by filing an appeal.5 Real parties’ construction is not tenable for three reasons. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences2018In so doing, it shed light on "the relative complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs that are frequently required in the adoption of alternative designs." ( Barker , supra , 20 Cal.3d at p. 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 .) We agree with the Court of Appeal that even if the Kims had not first put Toyota's decisionmaking process at issue, "testimony about how new safety technologies evolve and are phased in to vehicles in general, first as an option and then as standard equipment, is relevant to the risk-benefit analysis ..." and thus admissible. 2018In so doing, it shed light on "the relative complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs that are frequently required in the adoption of alternative designs." ( Barker , supra , 20 Cal.3d at p. 418 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 .) We agree with the Court of Appeal that even if the Kims had not first put Toyota's decisionmaking process at issue, "testimony about how new safety technologies evolve and are phased in to vehicles in general, first as an option and then as standard equipment, is relevant to the risk-benefit analysis ..." and thus admissible. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
O'NEILL v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Presumably, the court was referring to O'Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 1388 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 , which involved an individual's authority to make a statement on behalf of a company under Evidence Code section 1222. 2016Presumably, the court was referring to O'Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 1388 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 , which involved an individual's authority to make a statement on behalf of a company under Evidence Code section 1222. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
San Diego Improvement Co. v. Brodie
green
1 sentence1988In San Diego Improvement Co., the defendant “filed an answer in the form of a general denial and did not set up an affirmative claim of title in themselves.” (San Diego Improvement Co. v. Brodie, supra, 215 Cal. 97, 99 .) In Ernie , the defendant also denied plaintiff’s ownership and asserted ownership in itself of the strip of land between the parties’ adjoining property. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Foxx v. Williams
green
2 sentences1984We agree with the court in Foxx, supra, that the $6,000 minimum compensation requirement was intended to balance the equities between employer and performer. ( 244 Cal.App.2d at p. 236 .) This is quite clear when section 3423 is read in connection with Civil Code section 3391, subdivision 2, which provides specific performance cannot be enforced against a party as to whom the contract is not “just and reasonable. ” Taken together those sections demand a minimum standard of fairness as a condition on equitable enforcement of an exclusivity clause in a personal services contract. 1984The Legislature has concluded that an artist who is not entitled to receive a minimum of $6,000 per year by performing his contract should not be subjected to this kind of economic coercion.” (Foxx, supra, 244 Cal.App.2d at p. 236 .) If we were to hold the option clause satisfies section 3423, we would nullify the $6,000 compensation requirement as a counterweight on the employer. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lemat Corp. v. Barry
green
2 sentences1975From January 1967, when the ABA began to function, until the permanent injunction was issued in the case of Lemat Corp. v. Barry, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 671 , nobody knew whether the option clause in Barry’s contract with the Warriors was valid or not. 1975From January 1967, when the ABA began to function, until the permanent injunction was issued in the case of Lemat Corp. v. Barry, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 671 , nobody knew whether the option clause in Barry’s contract with the Warriors was valid or not. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Walter G. Reese Co. v. House
green
2 sentences1954Reese Co. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [ 124 P. 442 ].)’ ” In Cates v. McNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706 [ 147 P. 944 ] the court said: “The option clause gave the respondents a right to purchase the leased premises for the price of six hundred dollars an acre. 1954Reese Co. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [ 124 P. 442 ].)’ ” In Cates v. McNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706 [ 147 P. 944 ] the court said: “The option clause gave the respondents a right to purchase the leased premises for the price of six hundred dollars an acre. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown
green
2 sentences1953Co. v. Brown, 253 U.S. 101 [ 40 S.Ct. 460 , 64 L.Ed. 803 ], the Supreme Court of the United States says: “An option is a privilege given by the owner of property to another, to buy the property at his election. 1953Co. v. Brown, 253 U.S. 101 [ 40 S.Ct. 460 , 64 L.Ed. 803 ], the Supreme Court of the United States says: “An option is a privilege given by the owner of property to another, to buy the property at his election. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Edwards v. Billow
green
2 sentences1948(See Edwards v. Billow, 31 Cal.2d 350 [ 188 P.2d 748 ].) Plaintiff’s position is based upon his assumption that the three documents—(1) Needles’ letter of December 12, offering to purchase for $20,000 upon certain conditions; (2) the deposit receipt signed by defendants; and (3) the telegram from Needles—constitute a binding agreement on the part of the defendants to sell and of Needles (for his principal) to buy; and hence, as said in Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 54 Cal.App.2d 92, 97 [ 128 P.2d 608 ] : “The readiness, willingness and ability of the seller was demonstrated by the buye 1948(See Edwards v. Billow, 31 Cal.2d 350 [ 188 P.2d 748 ].) Plaintiff’s position is based upon his assumption that the three documents—(1) Needles’ letter of December 12, offering to purchase for $20,000 upon certain conditions; (2) the deposit receipt signed by defendants; and (3) the telegram from Needles—constitute a binding agreement on the part of the defendants to sell and of Needles (for his principal) to buy; and hence, as said in Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 54 Cal.App.2d 92, 97 [ 128 P.2d 608 ] : “The readiness, willingness and ability of the seller was demonstrated by the buye | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Hollywood Motion Picture Equipment Co. v. Furer
green
2 sentences1948P. Equipment Co. v. Furer, 16 Cal.2d 184 [ 105 P.2d 299 ]; 12 Cal.Jur. § 5, p. 858; 49 Am.Jur. § 25, p. 387; 111 A.L.R., note p. 1105).” The original complaint which was before the Supreme Court contained the following allegations: “that further by the terms and provisions of said agreement plaintiff was given and granted the option or privilege of renewing or extending said contract for a term of one additional year at a price or compensation of $350.00 per week, a second additional year at a price or compensation of $500.00 per week, a third additional year at a price or compensation of $750 1948P. Equipment Co. v. Furer, 16 Cal.2d 184 [ 105 P.2d 299 ]; 12 Cal.Jur. § 5, p. 858; 49 Am.Jur. § 25, p. 387; 111 A.L.R., note p. 1105).” The original complaint which was before the Supreme Court contained the following allegations: “that further by the terms and provisions of said agreement plaintiff was given and granted the option or privilege of renewing or extending said contract for a term of one additional year at a price or compensation of $350.00 per week, a second additional year at a price or compensation of $500.00 per week, a third additional year at a price or compensation of $750 | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Burke v. Norton
green
2 sentences1929The lease contained the following stipulation: “If the tenant shall abandon or vacate said premises before the expiration of this lease, or if, on account of default in the payment of any monthly instalment of rent after the tenth of the month, suit shall be brought, and possession of said premises shall be obtained from the tenant by the lessor, the lessor, if it so elect, shall have the option to lease or rent said premises for such rent and upon such terms as it may see fit, and if a sufficient sum shall not be realized to satisfy the rent herein reserved, the tenant agrees to satisfy and p 1929The lease contained the following stipulation: “If the tenant shall abandon or vacate said premises before the expiration of this lease, or if, on account of default in the payment of any monthly instalment of rent after the tenth of the month, suit shall be brought, and possession of said premises shall be obtained from the tenant by the lessor, the lessor, if it so elect, shall have the option to lease or rent said premises for such rent and upon such terms as it may see fit, and if a sufficient sum shall not be realized to satisfy the rent herein reserved, the tenant agrees to satisfy and p | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Butler v. Gosling
green
2 sentences1906(Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 586 , [ 72 Pac. 171 ]; Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422 , [ 62 Pac. 596 ].) There is therefore no foundation for the defendant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to prove a mistake in the preparation and execution of the deed. 1906(Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 586 , [ 72 Pac. 171 ]; Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422 , [ 62 Pac. 596 ].) There is therefore no foundation for the defendant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to prove a mistake in the preparation and execution of the deed. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Sears v. Ackerman
green
1 sentence1906(Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 586 , [ 72 Pac. 171 ]; Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422 , [ 62 Pac. 596 ].) There is therefore no foundation for the defendant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to prove a mistake in the preparation and execution of the deed. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.