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7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rodriguesgreen2 sentences2021Tsujimura, 140 Hawai#i at 315, 400 P.3d at 516 (clarifying the test applied in State v. Rodrigues, 113 Hawai#i 41, 49-50, 147 P.3d 825, 833-34 (2006) (the Rodrigues test)). 2021Tsujimura, 140 Hawai#i at 315, 400 P.3d at 516 (clarifying the test applied in State v. Rodrigues, 113 Hawai#i 41, 49-50, 147 P.3d 825, 833-34 (2006) (the Rodrigues test)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Tsujimura.green2 sentences2021Tsujimura, 140 Hawai#i at 315, 400 P.3d at 516 (clarifying the test applied in State v. Rodrigues, 113 Hawai#i 41, 49-50, 147 P.3d 825, 833-34 (2006) (the Rodrigues test)). 2021Tsujimura, 140 Hawai#i at 315, 400 P.3d at 516 (clarifying the test applied in State v. Rodrigues, 113 Hawai#i 41, 49-50, 147 P.3d 825, 833-34 (2006) (the Rodrigues test)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eastergreen2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 1 |
Patricia Ouska v. Lynn Cahill-Masching, 1green2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Collettgreen2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 1 |
State v. Terrygreen2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 1 |
Tortolito v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rodrigues v. State
green
2 sentences2008Applying the Rodrigues standard to the case at bar, I conclude that "a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope[,]" Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 173 , 472 P.2d at 520 , with the severe mental distress engendered upon learning that one's child has suffered potentially fatal injuries, and the court was therefore correct in finding liability for this claim. 2008Applying the Rodrigues standard to the case at bar, I conclude that "a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope[,]" Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 173 , 472 P.2d at 520 , with the severe mental distress engendered upon learning that one's child has suffered potentially fatal injuries, and the court was therefore correct in finding liability for this claim. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Guth v. Freeland
green
2 sentences2008See id. ("Applying the Rodrigues standard returns reason and symmetry to the law. . . ." (Quoting Guth, 96 Hawai'i at 159 , 28 P.3d at 994 . 2008See id. ("Applying the Rodrigues standard returns reason and symmetry to the law. . . ." (Quoting Guth, 96 Hawai'i at 159 , 28 P.3d at 994 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Hurd v. Terhune
green
2 sentences2020Therefore, under the Rodrigues analysis, Beaudet-Close invoked his right to remain silent. 13 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) analyzed the prosecution’s use at trial of defendant Hurd’s refusal to participate in a reenactment of how he shot his wife. 619 F.3d at 1082 . 2020Therefore, under the Rodrigues analysis, Beaudet-Close invoked his right to remain silent. 13 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) analyzed the prosecution’s use at trial of defendant Hurd’s refusal to participate in a reenactment of how he shot his wife. 619 F.3d at 1082 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Leach
green
2 sentences2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss 2017See also Ouska v, Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence were improper because they were used to infer the defendant’s guilt); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1995) (determining that the prosecutor’s questions to the officer regarding the defendant’s prearrest silence was impermissible and that “[a] comment upon an accused’s silence occurs when used to the state’s advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admiss | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1978In Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204 , 532 P.2d 673 (1975), we affirmed a summary judgment for defendant upon our conclusion that, as a matter of law, the risk of harm to plaintiff of serious mental distress was not sufficiently foreseeable to include the plaintiff among those to whom defendant’s duty of care extended in the operation of a motor vehicle. 1978In Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204 , 532 P.2d 673 (1975), we affirmed a summary judgment for defendant upon our conclusion that, as a matter of law, the risk of harm to plaintiff of serious mental distress was not sufficiently foreseeable to include the plaintiff among those to whom defendant’s duty of care extended in the operation of a motor vehicle. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Valley Cattle Company v. United States
green
1 sentence1970Valley Cattle Co. v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 12 (D.Haw. 1966). [3] *515 The State's contention that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations was also based on the mistaken premise that the Rodrigues' claim rested on the design and construction of the culvert which had been completed some sixteen years before suit. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.